Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company v. 51- Spr- L.L.C : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company v. 51-
Spr- L.L.C : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Stephen Marshall; Erik A. Olson; Durham Jones and Pinegar; Attorneys for Defendant.
Mark L. Pouslen; Bret W. Reich; Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle and Poulsen; Attorneys for plaintiff.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Paulsen Construction Company v. 51- Spr- L.L.C, No. 20040507 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5053
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
—000O000— 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 
vs. 
51-SPR-L.L.C, 
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-
APPELLANT 
Appellate Case No. 20040507-CA 
Trial Court Civil No. 010405059 
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT ELLSWORTH PAULSEN'S 
ANSWER AND CROSS-APPEAL 
Appeal from the Order of the Fourth District Court, 
Utah County, Honorable Judge Gary D. Stott and Anthony W. Schofield 
Mark L. Pouslen (5424) 
Bret W. Reich (9542) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & 
POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-
Appellant Ellsworth Paulsen Construction 
Company 
R. Stephen Marshall (2097) 
Erik A. Olson (8479) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
I l l East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR 2 3 2005 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
—000O000-
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
51-SPR-L.L.C, 
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-
APPELLANT 
Appellate Case No. 20040507-CA 
Trial Court Civil No. 010405059 
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT ELLSWORTH PAULSEN'S 
ANSWER AND CROSS-APPEAL 
Appeal from the Order of the Fourth District Court, 
Utah County, Honorable Judge Gary D. Stott and Anthony W. Schofield 
Mark L. Pouslen (5424) 
Bret W. Reich (9542) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & 
POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-
Appellant Ellsworth Paulsen Construction 
Company 
R. Stephen Marshall (2097) 
Erik A. Olson (8479) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION vi 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR CROSS-APPEAI vi 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS ix 
M A I L M E N I ( >l I I IE CASE AND NAIURE< >!• T i l l ' PROCEEDINGS . . . 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
SUMMARY Oi ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 7 
I. BROADS i ()i\E AND .>. -.v. R CONTRACTED i O SHARE LOSSES, 
THERER v MEETING ML ELEMENTS OF A JOINT VENTURE 7 
A. \v here One Part} to a Joint Venture Contributes Funding and the 
Other Contributes Services, an Agreement to Share Losses Wi!' Be 
Inferred from the Parties' Respective Contributions 9 
10
 The Joint Venture Determination Is a Matter of Law 
II. >ASED UPON EXPENSIVE WORK OF SEVERAL SUB-TRADES, THE 
''RIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING AS A MATTER OF 
^ vV THAT THE LIENS WERE TIMELY 
A. The Timeliness of the Liens Was Made Conclusive b\ Five or 
Six Parties Who Testified To Providing Substantial 1 ah» ind 
Materials Wiibin 00 !);••, :, 'the Liens Being Filed 
iiuer me Holding of Interiors Contracting, the Trial Court 
Correctly Found the Liens Were Timely Because Part of the 
Work Done in the Fall Was at the Behest of the Owner Under 
Threat of Non-Payment > 
III. THE COURT MADE 11 IE CORRECT FACI UAi. DEI LkMEsA . 
THAT NO T TEV P! <: m ^ WERE WAIVED BY INTER IM i is v 
I 
RELEASES ON THE BACKS OF CHECKS 21 
A. Because the lien waivers were effective as of the date the 
work was invoiced for and not the date of the lien waivers or 
the date Broadstone submitted its invoices to the bank, no 
portion of EPCO's lien was waived 21 
B. The trial court properly found the indemnity provisions of the 
lien waiver had no application to the case 25 
BY INCLUDING THE $78,000 AS PART OF ITS LIEN, EPCO NOT 
ONLY DID NOT FILE AN ABUSIVE LIEN, BUT ON CROSS APPEAL 
IT SHOULD BE PERMITTED RECOVERY ON ITS LIEN AND 
CONTRACT CLAIM FOR THE $78,000 27 
A. Filing a Lien For Work Encompassed By a Written Change 
Order Authorized By The Owner Cannot Constitute an 
Abusive Lien 28 
B. As a Part of Its Cross-Appeal, EPCO Asks This Court to 
Permit Recovery of the $78,000 Advanced by EPCO as a 
Partnership Debt 34 
THE ATTORNEY FEES AT TRIAL WERE PROPERLY AWARDED BY 
THE TRIAL COURT, AND EPCO IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES 
RELATED TO THE PROSECUTION OF THIS APPEAL 39 
A. EPCO's attorney fees were factitiously allocated between 
compensable and non-compensable claims 39 
B. EPCO Is Entitled to its Attorney Fees Associated with this Appeal . . . . 42 
EPCO CROSS-APPEALS THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION 
THAT IT IS NOT ENTITLED TO PRE-JUDGMENT CONTRACTUAL 
INTEREST 43 
A. The Trial Court Erred When it Blurred the Distinction 
Between Prejudgment Interest, Which Must Be Liquidated, 
and Contractual Interest, Which is an Automatic Element of 
n 
B. It Would Be Improper for the Trial Court to Set-off EPCO' s 
Contractual Entitlement to Interest by Pre-judgment Interest 
Paid to Subcontractors on the Eve of Trial 49 
CONCLUSION 52 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction, 
977 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1999) 31, 40 
A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 94 P.3d 270 (Utah 2004) 28 
Albina Engine & Machine Works, Inc. v. Abel, 305 F.2d 77 (10,h Cir. 1962) 11 
Allen v. Smedley 2004 Ut. App. 408 (Case No. 20020653CA) 38 
Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 848 P.2d 171 (Utah App. 1993) 50 
Armed Services Ins. Exchange v. Harrison, 70 P.2d 35 (Utah 2003) 37 
Baily-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1994) 50 
Basset v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 1974) 8, 14 
Betenson v. Call Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684 (Utah 1992) 8 
Bjork v. April Industries, 560 P.2d 315 (Utah 1977) 45 
Brown v. Richards, 987 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1999) 41 
Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 310 P.2d 517 (Utah 1957) 11 
Burn v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415 (Utah App. 1994) 15 
Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1977) 47 
Canyon Country Store v., Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989) vii, 49 
iii 
Commercial Investment Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1997) 32 
Consolidation Coal v. Division of State Lands, 886 P.2d 514 (Utah 1994) 45 
Darrell J. Dickersen & Sons, Inc., v. Magna Water, 613 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980) 48 
Dixie State Bank v. Braken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) 40 
Dixon v. Prolmage, Inc. 987 P.2d 48 (Utah 1999) 14 
Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 94 P.3d 193 (Utah 2004) 23 
Farnsworth v. Jensen, 217 P.2d 571 (Utah 1950) vii, 46 
Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1995) 15 
First General Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480 (Utah App. 1996) 40, 41 
Hertz v. Nordic, LTD., Inc., 761 P.2d 959 (Utah App. 1988) 47 
Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 1990) ix, 11, 36, 42 
Howe Specialties, Inc. v. U.S. Construction, Inc., 
611 P.2d 705 (Utah 1980) 26 
Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs., 
827 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 20 
J. Pockynok Company, Inc. v. Smedsrud, 80 P.3d 563 (Utah App. 2003) 28 
J.V. Hatch Construction, Inc. v. Kapros, 971 P.2d 8 (Utah App. 1998) ix, 42 
Kahle v. Turner, 420 N.E. 2d 127; 66 Ohio App. 2d 49 (Ohio App. 1979) 10 
Johnco, Inc. v. Jameson Interests, 741 So. 2d 867 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1999) 12 
Lightsey v. Marshall, 992 P.2d 904 (N.M. App. 1999) 12 
Lindberg v. Creative Construction of Palm Beach, Inc., 
522 So.2d 467 (Fla. App. 4th Dist 1988) 11 
iv 
Luddington v. Bodenvest, LTD, 855 P.2d 204 (Utah 1993) viii, 36 
Martinez v. Wells, 88 P.3d 343 (Utah App. 2004) 36 
Mont Trucking v. Entrada Industries, 802 P.2d 779 (Utah App. 1990) vii, 45, 49 
Mud Control Laboratories v. Covey, 269 P.2d 854 (Utah 1954) 9, 10, 14 
Nupetco Assoc, v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877 (Utah 1983) 11 
Pacific Ins. Co. v. Martin & Luther General Contractors, Inc., 
455 P.2d 664 (Wyo. 1969) 33 
Pavoni v. Nielson, 999 P.2d 595(Utah App. 2000) 25 
Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift, 798 P.2d 738 (Utah 1990) 20, 34 
Richards v. Security Pacific National Bank, 
849 P.2d 606 (Utah App. 1993) cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993) viii, 42 
Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1987) 10 
Sate v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371 (Utah 1996) 23 
Stroud v. Stroud, 733 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1987) vii, 45 
Trench Shore Services v. Saratoga Springs Development, LLC, 
57 P.3d 241 (Utah App. 2002) 32 
Wagstajfv. Remco, Inc., 540 P.2d 931 (Utah 1975) 48 
Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218 (Utah App. 1999) 32 
W.S.A., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 7 F3.d 788 (8th Cir. 1993) 12 
Zeese v. Estate ofSiegel, 534 P.2d 85 (Utah 1995) 38 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1 50 
v 
Utah Code Ann. §15-1-4 ix, 45 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4(2) 44 
Utah Code Ann.§ 38-l-7(l)(b) 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25 28, 29, 32, 33, 34 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-28 6 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 32 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-6 ix, 16, 36 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-13 ix, 36 
Rules 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) 17 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction lies with this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§78-2-2(3)(j). Rule 3 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure also permits appeals as of right to be taken from 
final orders of the District Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR CROSS-APPEAL 
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court error when it ruled that, notwithstanding a 
contract provision which required the payment of interest on all unpaid balances, and a 
finding that 51-SPR breached by not paying contract balances, that over $100,000 in pre-
judgment contractual interest would be not permitted? 
vi 
b. Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-4(2); Stroud v. Stroud, 738 P.2d 
649, 650 (Utah App. 1987); Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 
1989); Mont Trucking v. Entrada Industries, 802 P.2d 799, (Utah App. 1990); Farnsworth 
v. Jensen, 111 P.2d 571, 503-03 (Utah 1950). 
c. Standard of Review: The issue presents mixed questions of law and fact. The 
trial court found that the owner breached the contract by not paying contract balances. The 
question of law arises in interpreting the contract permitting the recovery of interest and 
a statute that requires interest to be paid. This Court reviews the trial court's factual 
determination under a clearly erroneous standard, State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 
(Utah 1995). The Court reviews questions of law for correctness. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 
48 P.3rd 235 (Utah 2002). Statutory interpretations are also reviewed for correctness. 
Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997). This issue was 
preserved during the trial when Richard Ellsworth, EPCO's President, testified regarding 
the construction contracts for Northshore I and II, the contractual interest provision 
contained therein, and the subsequent acceptance of the contracts into evidence by the trial 
court. [Tr. 8468 at 34-45].l The issue was also preserved in EPCO's memoranda [R. 
8072-8083, R. 8148-8165, R. 8374-8385]. 
]Citations to the record follow the pattern established in Appellant's brief as follows: (1) 
references to record pages are preceded by "R"; (2) portions of the ten transcript volumes are 
referred to as "Tr." followed by the record number (e.g., 8459) and the page; and (3) trial exhibits 
are cited as "PL Ex." or "Def. Ex." All relevant orders are attached as Addenda, which are cited 
with an "Add." reference. 
vn 
Issue No. 2: Whether the trial court committed error when it ruled that a change 
order modifying a construction contract in the amount of $78,000, and signed by a person 
to whom the court had previously determined had full authority and acted as an agent of 
51-SPR, LLC, was not recoverable against 51-SPR, LLC. 
b. Determinative law: Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-6; Luddington v. Bodenvest, Ltd., 
855 Pd 204, 208-209 (Utah 1993); Zions First Nat. Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 
1090, 1095-96 (Utah 1988); Distort v. Enviropak Med. Products, Inc. 893 P.2d 1071, 
1076 (Utah App. 1995). 
c. Standard of Review: The issue presents mixed questions of law and fact. This 
Court reviews the trial court's factual determination under a clearly erroneous standard. 
State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). The Court reviews questions of law 
for correctness. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3rd 235 (Utah 2002). This issue was 
preserved in EPCO's memoranda [R. 7503-7509] and at trial [Tr. 8038 at 6, 9-10, 59-67]. 
Issue No. 3: Whether the court of appeals should award attorney's fees and costs 
on appeal to Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company. 
b. Determinative law: "An appeal from a suit brought to enforce a [mechanic's] lien 
claim qualifies as part of 'an action' for purposes of [Section 38-1-18]." Richards v. 
Security Pacific National Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 612 (Utah App. 1993) cert, denied, 859 P.2d 
585 (Utah 1993). If EPCO prevails on this appeal, it should be entitled to its attorney fees 
viii 
in prosecuting the appeal. Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 221 (Utah App. 1990) (Attorney 
fees allowed to a prevailing party on appeal in a mechanic's lien action). J.V. Hatch 
Construction, Inc. v. Kapros, 971 P.2d 8, 16 (Utah App. 1998) (Fees incurred on appeal in 
an mechanic's lien action are recoverable to the prevailing party). As part of its cross-
appeal, EPCO requests that it be awarded attorney fees on appeal if it prevails in this appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions, which are of central importance to the cross-
appeal, are set forth in their entirety in Addendum A. 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-6 
3. Utah Code Ann. §48-1-13 
IX 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
51-SPR- L.L.C. ("51-SPR") and Broadstone Investments, LLC ("Broadstone") 
formed a joint venture to develop two commercial office buildings in American Fork, Utah. 
Broadstone hired Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company ("EPCO") as the general 
contractor for the project. The partnership became troubled after 51-SPR complained that 
Broadstone had diverted partnership assets. Just as the building projects were completed, 
51-SPR kicked Broadstone out of the partnership and took control of the projects. 
Broadstone is without assets, and default judgments were entered against it in favor of both 
EPCO and 51-SPR. However, 51-SPR refused to pay approximately $800,000 of the 
construction costs for the project. EPCO and its subcontractors filed liens on the project, 
and 51-SPR filed suit to quiet title in the property. EPCO and the lien claimants were 
named in 51-SPR's suit, and EPCO and others filed separate suits. The actions were 
consolidated, and the litigation centered on the breach of contract and lien foreclosure 
claims. After extensive discovery, EPCO brought a motion for summary judgment on the 
joint venture liability/breach of contract claim. This joint venture summary judgment 
motion was granted to EPCO in December 2002. Despite having its liability determined on 
the contract claims, 51-SPR continued to litigate the lien claims both with EPCO and its 
subcontractors. Eventually, the subcontractors motions for summary judgment on their lien 
claims were granted, and the liens were foreclosed. Shortly, before trial the subcontractor 
judgments were paid by 51-SPR, leaving only damages issues on EPCO's lien and contract 
claims. The lien and contra ct damages claim was tried to the bench in a three day trial, with 
1 
EPCO putting on evidence of its damages.1 The trial court enforced the lien and contract 
actions to the amount of $721,215.93. It denied 51-SPR's abusive lien claim, denied that 
any portion of the liens had been waived, and granted EPCO attorney fees under the lien 
statute. However, the trial court refused to permit EPCO pre-judgment contractual interest 
on the grounds that the breach date was not clearly defined, and it refused to grant judgment 
to EPCO on a $78,000 change order which had been duly signed by Broadstone. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During a period of several months in the Summer of 1999, Robert Chimento,2 an 
owner of what was to become 51-SPR, worked through his realtor exchanging proposals 
with Guy Hatch and his company, Broadstone. In the various proposals being exchanged, 
the realtor proposed the creation of an anticipated "partnership" between Guy Hatch and 
Chimento for the two of them to develop property together into retail commercial office 
space in American Fork, Utah. [Tr. 337 through 345; 343-346.], [PL Exs. 20 to 24.] One 
of the proposals discussed most extensively was forming a partnership for the development 
1
 The entitlement to a lien claim had already decided in EPCO's favor by way of 
cross-motions for summary judgment. However, the amount of the lien claim, and 51-
SPR's abusive lien counterclaim, were reserved for trial. With the contract and lien 
claims already decided, most of the trial issues were academic, except as it related to 
quantum of recovery, and attorney fees recoverable under the lien statute. 
2
 Because 51-SPR was a closely held limited liability company controlled by 
Robert Chimento, and Broadstone was a closely held limited liability company 
controlled by Guy Hatch, the principals are sometimes used interchangeably herein with 
their respective companies. 
2 
of a 42 acre parcel known as the Williams' property,3 but title and price issues prohibited 
the selection of that parcel. [Tr. 337 through 345; 343-346.], [PL Ex. 22.] The various 
proposals culminated in a June 15, 2000, document referred to as Addendum No. 2.4 [JV 
Agreement, App. A.] The JV agreement, identified a 6.58 acre parcel in American Fork 
which the parties' agreed they would jointly develop into two commercial office buildings 
known Northshore I and II. [JV Agreement, App. A.] 51-SPR agreed to contribute cash, and 
Broadstone agreed to contribute construction expertise and services, for the development of 
the office complex in a profit sharing joint venture. [JV Agreement, App. A.] 
Mr. Chimento personally negotiated the acquisition of the property. [JV Order, p. 
4, App. B.] After acquiring the property, Broadstone entered into two identical construction 
AIA form fixed-price construction agreements with EPCO for building the structures of the 
buildings. Throughout the project, and up until the project was nearly completed, EPCO 
was unaware of 51-SPR's partnership with Broadstone, and had all of its dealings 
exclusively with Hatch. [Findings and Conclusions, p. 8, f 18, App. C] Central Bank 
provided the short-term construction funding and inspected EPCO's work throughout the 
3
 Reference to the Williams' property appears throughout the record in this case, 
based upon 51-SPR's belief that a $78,000 "advance" made by EPCO to Broadstone to 
pay for civil engineering was used by Broadstone to pay for engineering on the 
Williams' property in anticipation of that property being used for Northshore I and II. 
However, Richard Ellsworth testified that he did not know how the $78,000 was spent. 
[Tr. 60-63.] The $78,000 was claimed as part of EPCO's lien because Guy Hatch had 
signed a change order on North Shore II agreeing to reimburse EPCO for the advance. 
[Tr. 60-65] See, infra, part IV hereof. 
4
 Because the trial court concluded that this agreement was indeed a joint venture 
agreement, it is referred to herein throughout as the JV agreement. 
3 
construction of the projects. [Findings and Conclusions, p. 3, App. C] During the course 
of construction, the subcontractors submitted construction draws to EPCO, who in turn 
would submit draw requests to Hatch. Id. Hatch would then submit the construction 
invoicing to Central Bank. Particularly toward the end of the project, Hatch became very 
slow to submit the EPCO draws to the bank. [Tr. 302 to 303.] This was because the bank 
loan had nearly run out, yet all of the contract balances had not been paid to EPCO for work 
on the project. [Tr. 317-321.] After the draw requests were received by Central Bank, the 
bank issued joint checks to EPCO and its subcontractors, which contained lien waivers on 
the backs of the checks. [Lien Waiver Ruling, p. 5, App. D.] The trial court held that the 
lien waivers on the backs of the checks applied, but only as of the draw date the 
subcontractors submitted their respective draw requests,5 but did not released liens for work 
performed after the draw dates. [Lien Waiver Ruling, p. 5, App. D.] The significance of this 
is that at the time of trial, the evidence showed that none of the liens for contract balances 
were waived by the lien releases appearing on checks issued by Central Bank on 
construction payment requests made, in some instances, months earlier. [Tr. 309-311.] As 
noted in part III hereof, the trial court implicitly found that there was no portion of the lien 
5
 Throughout its appellant's brief, 51-SPR refers to the date that Hatch sent draws 
to Central Bank (sometimes months after the subcontractors had submitted draws to 
EPCO) as the "draw date" or "final draw date." This flawed characterization has led 51-
SPR to consistently conclude throughout the trial and now into this appeal, that EPCO 
and its subcontractors waived liens from the belated date of Hatch's submittals to the 
bank (as opposed to the subs draw date to EPCO), a proposition expressly and correctly 
rejected by the trial court. [Lien Waiver Ruling, p. 5, App. D.] 
4 
claim that was waived by the interim checks issued to the parties, because the waivers 
applied only to draw dates tied to when the subcontractor submitted their pay requests. 
As the construction loan dwindled, Broadstone failed to pay EPCO for several 
months. [Tr. 293-98.] Despite the non-payment, EPCO raced through and completed the 
project. Toward the end of the project, Guy Hatch disappeared, leaving change order 
requests un-processed, and nowhere for EPCO to send payment draw requests. [Tr. 294.] 
Because the invoices which had been sent to Broadstone were being ignored, and because 
there was no one to process draws or change orders, EPCO did not send the last three draws 
to Broadstone. [TR. 294.] The architect testified at trial that all of the work within the scope 
of EPCO's contracts, and numerous change orders, was satisfactorily completed. [Findings 
and Conclusions, p. 16, App. C] 51-SPR did not suggest, nor was there any evidence at 
trial, that there was any work uncompleted by EPCO, or that any had been done in a 
defective manner. [Findings and Conclusions, p. 7, App. C ] To the contrary, the testimony 
was that all work was satisfactorily completed. Id. 
After learning of the partnership with 51-SPR, EPCO called Mr. Chimento asking 
for payment. Mr. Chimento wrote to EPCO, apologizing for the late payments, and blaming 
it on the fact that the long-term financing had not gone through. [JV Order, p. 12, App. B.] 
Soon thereafter, 51 -SPR kicked Guy Hatch off of the project. Id at p. 8. Despite the fact that 
it had exclusive control and ownership of two buildings built by EPCO, such that it was 
receiving $70,000 per month in rents (while only debt servicing $20,00 per month to the 
bank), 51 -SPR repudiated any obligation to pay EPCO or its subcontractors for construction 
5 
costs. Id at p. 7. EPCO and most of its subcontractors filed liens.6 51-SPR sued EPCO and 
the lien claimants, and the actions were joined. After extensive discovery, the trial court 
granted summary judgment on the joint venture liability, holding that 51-SPR was jointly 
and severally liable with Broadstone for all construction debts on the projects. [JV Order, 
p. 12, App. B.] Despite the court having concluded that it was liable for all contract debts 
on the project, 51 -SPR continued to contest the lien claims7 for another year-and-a-half, until 
Judge Stott granted final judgement with damages on all lien and contract claims. [Findings 
and Conclusions, p. 7, App. C ] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. When Guy Hatch, as a general partner, requested and received a $78,000 advance 
from EPCO to allegedly pay for engineering costs on North Shore I and II, he incurred a 
partnership debt which, under the joint venture ruling, was reimbursable by the joint 
venture. Later, acting in his duly appointed capacity as a general partner of 51-
SPR/Broadstone, Guy Hatch ratified on behalf of the partnership his prior oral 
representations, by issuing a written change order to EPCO modifying the construction 
contract on Building II, and covenanting to reimburse the $78,000 advance made by EPCO. 
6
 EPCO's lien claim was in the amount of $850,651.07, and was inclusive of all 
the claims of the subcontractors. Including the judgment obtained by EPCO, the 
settlement and judgment amounts paid to all of the subcontractors, and attorney fees to 
date, 51-SPR has incurred amounts well in excess of twice that figure. 
7
 51-SPR substituted the liens pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-28 the liens 
were substituted by a corporate surety bond, which is also serving as a supercedes bond 
in the appeal. 
6 
2. The construction contracts which govern the parties' relationship required that 
interest at 10% per annum apply to all payments passed due. The trial court erred when it 
disallowed recovery for pre-trail contractual interest, on the grounds that EPCO's failure to 
invoice the last three draws (after the disappearance of the general partner on the project) 
left the debt unliquidated. The trial court improperly fused the concept of pre-judgement 
interest, which is discretionary and unliquidated, with pre-judgment contractual interest, 
which is inherently liquidated, mandatory and automatic upon a showing of breach. 
ARGUMENT 
L BROADSTONE AND 51-SPR CONTRACTED TO SHARE LOSSES, 
THEREBY MEETING ALL ELEMENTS OF A JOINT VENTURE. 
51-SPR takes the position that 51 -SPR did not share losses, thereby foreclosing joint 
venture liability. [Appellant's Brief, p. 11.] The trial court noted that the notion that 51-SPR 
did not share losses as part of the JV Agreement was nothing more than a bald and 
conclusory allegation which was "sharply contradicted by both the terms of the Agreement 
and the undisputed facts." [JV Order, p. 10, App. B.] The court noted that 51-SPR's capital 
contribution of $2.9 million was immediately at risk if the venture failed. [JV Order, p. 10, 
App. B.] The court further noted that as a joint tenant in the property, 51-SPR bore all the 
risk associated with property ownership, including tax and tort liability inherent in a 
property owner's duties. [JV Order, p. 10 App. B.] Finally, the court found that 51-SPR 
agreed in advance to immediately mortgage its ownership interest in the property to a 
construction lender, and then later guaranteed $4.3 million dollars in construction loans. [JV 
Order, p. 9-10, App. B.] 
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The Utah Supreme Court has identified Basset v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 1974) as 
"the leading case in Utah defining the essential elements of joint venture." Betenson v. Call 
Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684,686 (Utah 192). After identifying the elements 
as: 1) a community of interest in a common purpose; 2) a joint proprietary interest in the 
subject matter; 3) a mutual right of control; and 4) a right to share in profits, the court stated 
regarding the sharing of losses: 
While the agreement to share losses need not necessarily be stated in specific 
terms, the agreement must be such as to permit the court to infer the parties 
intended to share losses as well as profits. Basset, 530 P.2d at 2. [Emphasis 
added.] 
The precise issue posed by 51-SPR's appeal is whether an agreement to share losses 
may fairly be inferred from a pre-determined agreement8 by each party to place certain 
51-SPR casts the issue in overly simplistic terms: namely, whether or not the 
absence of an agreement to share losses precludes a joint venture. However, this element 
must be seen in the context of numerous compelling factors supporting the other four 
elements of a joint venture, with the sharing of losses element as but one relatively minor 
component of the larger picture. The trial court culled 17 determinative factors from the 
Chimento/51-SPR and Hatch/Broadstone agreement which it deemed defined a joint 
venture relationship. [JV Agreement, App. A; JV Order, pp 3-11 App. B.] These factors 
included: 1) the parties were to own the Northshore property as tenants in common; 2) 
51-SPR contributed $2.9 million, of which $1.7 million was used to acquire land, and 
another $1.2 million was earmarked for site work and construction costs; 3) Broadstone 
was the "project manager," would "operate the venture" and would obtain long-term 
financing, enter into construction contracts, and obtain leases on the buildings; 4) 51-
SPR would execute a mortgage to secure institutional construction financing; 5) 51-
SPR's funds for site development and construction costs ("hard"costs only) would be 
utilized "on a standard draw schedule.. .after inspection approval by a Chimento 
engineer"; 6) Broadstone would be a single member single purpose company whose 
"ownership interest and control shall be pledged to Chimento to secure [its] obligations"; 
7) Broadstone would "mortgage its tenancy in common interest to Chimento [51-SPR] to 
secure the pledge and restriction agreements [as] Hatch's obligations; 8) when the 
project was completed, the parties would create a new company which would be owned 
equally be each of them, and that all actions were to be in furtherance of this goal; 9) 
8 
assets at risk in the furtherance of their mutual enterprise. 
A. Where One Party to a Joint Venture Contributes Funding and the Other 
Contributes Services, an Agreement to Share Losses Will Be Inferred from the 
Parties' Respective Contributions. 
51-SPR argues that because the JV Agreement does not reference the sharing of 
losses, no joint venture can be found. The trial court held that the joint venture 
contemplated 51-SPR providing the financing and capital for the venture, with Broadstone 
contributing its time and construction management expertise to construct the Northshore 
buildings. [JV Order, p. 4 App. B.] In joint ventures where one party puts its money at risk, 
and the other puts its time and labor at risk, Utah courts have routinely inferred a sharing of 
losses from such a relationship. As noted in the mining partnership case of Mud Control 
Laboratories v. Covey, 269 P.2d 854, 2 Utah 2d 85, 92-93 (Utah 1954): 
People do not ordinarily enter into an partnership for the purpose of incurring 
during the first year, Chimento was to receive 10% return on capitol to be paid from 
operating income or the sale of the property, and if these were not sufficient, Hatch 
would guaranty this return from his own funds; 10) any remaining operating income at 
the end of the first year would inure to Hatch or Broadstone; 11) during the second year 
after completion of the project, Chimento had his choice between receiving 10% return 
on his investment, or 50/50 in the net operating income from the project; 12) after 
construction, permanent or "take out" financing would be obtained, which financing 
would be secured by the project—any financing would be used in order of priority to pay 
for the land acquisition costs, the construction costs, the site improvement costs and after 
Chimento has been repaid his investment, the balance was to be split 50/5 for each party; 
13) subsequent capitol transactions, such as refinance, sales, casualty, or condemnation 
after debt repayment was to be used to repay Chimento for his investment, and thereafter, 
to the parties 50/50; 14) all decisions related to the project would be made mutually, after 
consultations; 15) Hatch would submit to Chimento monthly construction reports; 16) 
Hatch's development company (other than Broadstone) would pay to Chimento $24,000 
per month as a consulting fee; 17) since the outset of the project through today, 51-SPR 
has owned the project except for one day. Id. 
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losses. It is not unusual for such relationships to come into being, either by 
operation of law, or by agreement, without the partners setting forth their 
obligations as to losses that may accrue. Responsibility for such losses is 
simply an incident of the partnership relation. It is elemental that when a 
partnership is created, an agreement between partners limiting liability is not 
binding on third parties. Were it otherwise, partners could, by private 
agreement between themselves, obtain the advantages of limited partnership 
without complying with the statutory requirements. [Emphasis added.] 
As noted above, just because two venturers do not expressly define in their agreement 
who will pay the debts of the venture, it does not follow that there is not a sharing of losses, 
particularly when assets such as construction capital and time and labor are placed at risk. 
In such a circumstance, the sharing of losses element is inferred from the parties' 
relationship. As stated by an Ohio court: 
We find no requirement that the members of a joint venture must pool 
expenses as well as income; that is the characteristic of a partnership. In joint 
ventures, pooling of expenses is not an absolute necessity. There is no reason 
why the parties cannot agree as to which part of the expenses each should 
bear before participating inprofits... .In addition, an agreement to share losses 
need not be express. In the absence of such a provision, an agreement will be 
implied to share losses to the same proportion as profits are shared. Citations 
omitted, emphasis added]. Kahle v. Turner, 420 N.E. 2d 127; 66 Ohio App. 
2d 49, 52 (Ohio App. 1979). 
In addition to the Mud Control case referred to above, at least four Utah cases have 
inferred agreements to share losses between joint venturer contractors or developers of 
property. In Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1987), one partner 
contributed land for a subdivision, while the other partner was to install infrastructure 
improvements. Lot owners sued Bitner when the improvements were not installed. The 
court found a joint venture based upon the parties' pre-determined agreement as to what 
each would contribute to the venture, after each had placed certain assets at risk. Similarly, 
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in Nupetco Assoc, v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1983) a landowner and a real estate 
agent worked together on a commercial development. The parties entered into an agreement 
in which they defined between themselves what their respective contributions would be and 
splitting profits 75%/25%. The Utah Supreme Court upheld a joint venture determination. 
Id. In Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 310 P.2d 517 (Utah 1957) two parties worked together 
in building a private club addition to a cafe. The court held both persons jointly liable as 
partners, where both partners participated in ordering and paying for materials, and 
otherwise jointly participated in the work on the venture. Finally, in Both v. White, 799 P.2d 
213 (Utah App. 1990), a real estate broker who became involved in the selling of homes for 
a builder, and actively participated promoting the home and received a commission thereon, 
was found to be a partner. None of these cases expressly discuss the sharing of losses, but 
all find a joint venture based upon conduct wherein each party made a contribution in terms 
of time or money to the venture. In short, the courts inferred in each instance a sharing of 
losses from the parties relationship, even though such was never expressly stated between 
the parties. 
Numerous courts outside of Utah which have formally examined the issue have 
concurred that the sharing of losses element can be inferred by the parties agreeing in 
advance which of their assets will be at stake in the relationship. Albina Engine & Machine 
Works, Inc. v. Abel, 305 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1962) (Applying Oklahoma law, joint venturers 
can agree in advance which risks the parties will bear as their portion of the venture). 
Lindberg v. Creative Construction of Palm Beach, Inc., 522 So.2d 467 (Flor. App. 4th Dist 
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1988) (In a condominium development project, the sharing of losses is inherent where one 
party to the venture provides funding and the other party provides labor). Lightsey v. 
Marshall 992P.2d904,128N.M. 353,356(N.M. App. 1999) (Sharing of losses is inferred 
where one party provided funds and the other provides labor). W.S.A., Inc. v. Liberty 
Mutual Ins. Co., 7 F 3d. 788 793 (8th Cir. 1993) (Where the parties apportioned risk by 
predetermined agreement, the sharing of losses is inferred). Johnco, Inc. v. Jameson 
Interests, 741 So. 2d 867, 871 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1999) (Especially where one venturer 
provides property and the other provides services, a sharing of losses will be inferred). 
In the instant case, the parties agreed in advance which party would contribute what 
asset in terms of money and services. This agreement made in advance meets all of the 
characteristics of the sharing of losses element of a joint venture. 51-SPR immediately 
placed its $2.9 capital contribution at risk by placing it into the venture. [JV Agreement, 
App. A.] [JV Order, pp. 9-10, App. B.] Broadstone agreed to put its labor costs at risk by 
managing the construction contracts, obtaining leases and managing the tenants. Id. 51-SPR 
agreed in advance to subordinate its fee interest in the property to a construction lender, and 
Broadstone agreed in advance to guaranty the construction debt. Id. Broadstone agreed that 
it would be paid $135,000 for construction management services, and 51-SPR's principals 
would receive $290,000 in consulting fees from a subsidiary of Broadstone, both of which 
involved the contribution of labor. Id. The parties agreed to be joint tenants in the property, 
mutually subjecting themselves to the risks attendant to property ownership. All of these 
acts constitute a pre-determined agreement to share losses. This is particularly so in light 
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of the avalanche of acts supporting the other four elements. So pervasive was the control 
and outright domination that 51 -SPR exercised over the venture, that the trial court indicated 
that it could conclude that 51-SPR was the true owner of the project, with Broadstone 
merely acting as its agent. [JV Order, p. 12, ft.nt. 19 App. B.] 
51 -SPR also guarantied a $4.3 million dollar construction loan. [JV Order, p. 11 ,App. 
B.] This latter point cannot be overstated. It is clear from the agreement that the parties 
were of the view that the construction loan of $4.3 million dollars would pay for all costs 
related to the development of the property. The JV Agreement did not detail who would pay 
vender debts, because the $4.3 million was thought to be sufficient to pay all such debts. [JV 
Agreement, pp. 1-2, App. A.] 51-SPR's agreement to guaranty the full $4.3 million9 
construction loan was tantamount to an agreement to share in all of the losses for the 
project, since there were no losses outside of the construction costs which were 
contemplated by the parties. 51-SPR is attempting to enjoy all of the benefits of direct 
ownership, such as the complete right of control, receipt of all rents and profits on the 
project,10 1031 exchange tax benefits of Northshore I and II, all while attempting to 
repudiate the very labor and material costs from which these ownership fruits were born. 
9
 51-SPR argues at page 15 of its brief that this fact should not be considered, 
since it was done at the end of the project. However, there is nothing in the law that 
requires the venture be static as of the date the JV Agreement was signed. The full scope 
of a joint venture may evolve over time, based upon the conduct of the parties. 
10
 The trial court noted that 51-SPR was receiving $70,00 per month in rents, 
while debt servicing $20,000 to $30,000 in construction loan debt [JV Order, p. 7, App. 
B.j All this while denying obligations to the very parties who made those profits 
possible by conferring their labors and materials to the partnership. 
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As stated in the Mud Control case, 269 P.2d at 7, 51-SPR is attempting thereby to convert 
a general partnership into a limited partnership. It is attempting by to limit its liability for 
construction costs, while maintaining all of the levers of ownership and control over every 
aspect of the project. It does so by the conclusory and utterly hollow contention that since 
the agreement which defined the parties relationship did not specify the sharing of losses, 
it has no obligation to pay the construction costs for the buildings. 
B. The Joint Venture Determination Is a Matter of Law 
51-SPR contends that the court could not reach the joint venture determination on 
summary judgment. [Appellant's Brief, p. 15.] However, where the "facts are not in 
dispute...the relationship of the parties is a matter of law." Basset, 530 P.2d at 2. Here, it 
is undisputed11 that the parties' relationship was defined by the JV Agreement. [JV 
Agreement, App. A.] That agreement was unambiguous, intricate and specific in defining 
the parties' relationship. Id. The trial court's only obligation under these circumstances was 
to apply the interpretive cannons, and give meaning to the intentions of the parties as set 
forth in the agreement. Dixon v. Prolmage, Inc. 987 P.2d 48, 52, (Utah 1999) (Where a 
contract is unambiguous, its interpretation is a matter of law). 51-SPR has never suggested 
that the JV Agreement is ambiguous, or that its meaning is subject to parol evidence. Under 
11
 There is no question that the JV Agreement is the agreement which defined 51-
SPR's and Broadstone's relationship. 51-SPR attached the JV Agreement to its 
appellant's brief and has treated it throughout the proceedings below as the governing 
agreement. During depositions, 51-SPR stipulated that the JV Agreement [App. A] and 
some related documents were the documents which entirely expressed the intentions of 
the parties. [Tr. 381-82; R. 2256, ft. nt. 10.] 
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such circumstances, one might reasonably ask 51-SPR what disputed facts could have been 
presented to the trial court that would trump the express terms of the fully integrated 
agreement. 
51 -SPR argues in its brief at page 16 that an affidavit filed by a principal of 51-SPR 
to the effect that he was not obligated to pay third-party debts, creates a fact issue. However, 
the trial court noted that these bald assertions do not create a genuine issue. [JV Order, p. 
10, App. B.] Whether or not 51-SPR is obligated to pay third-parties is the very issue to be 
decided by this appeal, so an affidavit to that effect is not helpful. Disputed facts do not 
preclude summary judgment where the facts are immaterial in light of the other decisive 
factors. Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649,655 (Utah App. 1995). Burn v. Cannondale Bicycle 
Co., 876P.2d415,419(UtahApp. 1994) ("According to the Utah Supreme Court, 'the mere 
existence of a genuine issue of fact...does not preclude the entry of summary judgment if 
those facts are immaterial to the resolution of the case.'"). For 51-SPR to declare as it does 
at page 16 of its appellant's brief that because the JV Agreement is silent on the "sharing of 
losses," it is absolved from doing so, is itself a circular argument, which says nothing about 
its duties in regard to ownership of the project. In the face of a comprehensive agreement 
defining the parties relationship and which undeniably shows the sharing of profits, mutual 
control over the project, a common purpose and enterprise, and the mutual committing of 
time and assets to the common enterprise, no fact is made material by reason of the 
agreement's silence on losses, as all such sharing of losses is implicit by operation of law 
in the parties' relationship. [JV Agreement, App. A.] 
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II. BASED UPON EXTENSIVE WORK OF SEVERAL SUB-TRADES, 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT THE LIENS WERE TIMELY. 
A. The Timeliness of the Liens Was Made Conclusive by Five or Six Parties Who 
Testified to Providing Substantial Labor and Materials Within 90 Days of the 
Liens Being Filed. 12 
51-SPR states in its brief in support of this appeal that the trial court "weighed 
evidence" when it found that EPCO's November 16, 2001, mechanic's lien was timely. 
[Appellant's Brief, p. 16.] 51-SPR's position on the timeliness of the lien suffers from the 
same circular argument that its joint venture argument suffered from: to wit, it asserts that 
fact issues remain, but does so in the face of compelling — if not overwhelming — evidence 
that contravenes its conclusory contentions. EPCO's lien was filed on November 16,2001. 
[PI. Exhibit 13.] Utah Code Ann. § 3 8-l-7(l)(b) at the time of the summary judgment below 
required that the lien be filed within 90 days of the project's "final completion date." The 
question thus becomes whether work was occurring on the project site after August 13, 
2001, i.e., 90 days before the lien was filed. 51-SPR's position is that the last day of work 
was "hotly contested." [Appellant's Brief, p. 17.] Like many other aspects of this case,13 
12
 If the court upholds the trial court's judgments finding a joint venture, all of the 
lien issues and lien waiver issues are moot, since as a joint venture partner, 51-SPR is 
contractually liable for the entire amount set forth in the judgment, except for attorney 
fees. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-6. Since the underlying agreement did not contain an 
attorney fee provision, the fees were predicated at the trial court on the lien foreclosure 
action. 
13
 51-SPR's strategy in this litigation has been to "hotly contest" the most minute 
factual and legal points, regardless of the avalanche of evidence and law marshaled 
against its position. For example, there were over 90 motions filed in the proceedings 
below, and 51-SPR took a default judgment against Broadstone which included an 
attorney fee component for its fees alone of over $430,000. 
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51-SPR may have hotly contested the motion, but it was contested in the face of extensive 
testimony by subcontractors and EPCO that they were all performing thousands — perhaps 
tens of thousands — of dollars of work on the project during the months of August, 
September and October, 2001. [Tr. 210-212.] 
Specifically, early in the case, EPCO and others14 filed summary judgments.15 [R. 
1287; 1382; 1528; and 1577.] 51-SPR filed a rule 56(f) motion requesting that additional 
discovery be conducted. [R. 1469; 1500.] The trial court granted the motion permitting 51-
SPR to take additional discovery. [R. 1547.] 51-SPR then embarked upon 10 depositions 
and extensive document production demands, including discovery from EPCO and the sub-
trades. That document production and those depositions revealed that EPCO's original 
contract contemplated that for Building I, the tenant improvements were all well known in 
advance, so EPCO built the building and the tenant build-outs in one continuous run of 
construction work. [R. 1552-56.] [Tr. 209-213.] However, because neither the tenants nor 
14
 Several of the sub-trades who worked on the project filed liens, and later sought 
to foreclose those liens as a part of the present action. The trial court upheld the 
timeliness of all the sub-trade liens, and foreclosed those liens by summary judgment in 
April 2003. [Lien Orders, App. E.] Reversal of EPCO's lien rights is tantamount to a 
reversal of the subcontractors lien judgments, since their liens were circumscribed into 
EPCO's lien. 
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 In its first ruling, the trial court held that the subcontractors' liens were all 
timely, but that it would reserve for trial the issue of the timeliness of EPCO's lien. 
[Lien Orders, p. 7, App. E.] However, after EPCO pointed out on reconsideration that 
since the subcontractor liens and their respective dates of completion were circumscribed 
within EPCO's lien, if the subcontractor liens were timely and within 90 days of final 
completion, it followed automatically that EPCO's lien was similarly timely, the court 
immediately issued an order granting EPCO's motion to reconsider, in which the court 
held that EPCO's lien was "timely and enforceable." [Lien Orders, App. E.] 
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their respective design plans had been concluded at the time Building II was nearing 
completion, EPCO was told by Broadstone to complete most of the shell of the building and 
to do the interior of the building as contract change order extras [R. 1552-56.] [TR. 209-213.] 
after a certificate of substantial completion16 was issued for the shell of the building. [R. 
1552-56.] [Tr. 209-213.] [R.1552-56.] Thus, EPCO and the other subcontractors supported 
their motions for summary judgment on the timeliness of their respective liens with the 
sworn deposition testimony, time cards, daily job logs, and invoices (none of which were 
rebutted by 51 -SPR in the slightest) of several sub-trades working at the site during the time 
period in question. [R. 2922-3037; 3131-3135; 2828-2900.] For example, the Architect, 
EPCO (the general contractor), Halverson (the mechanical subcontractor), A&T (the sheet 
metal subcontractor), Design West (the acoustical tile installer), Allstate (the electrical 
subcontractor), Clayco (the dry wall subcontractor), Decorative Landscape (the landscaper), 
and Kimco (the fire protection subcontractor), all testified that they performed, or saw work 
performed, within the 90 days of the lien being filed. [R. 2922-3037; 3131-3135; 2828-
2900.] The shear qualitative and quantitative nature of the work occurring in these months 
as testified to by these parties demonstrates that the work being done was not trivial or 
16
 51-SPR repeatedly asserts at pages 19 through 22 of its brief that the certificates of 
substantial completion issued in June of 2001 and a contract draw showing work on the shell of 
the building being 100% completed, create fact issues as to the last day of work. However, as 
noted above, the interior work on Building II could not be done until the tenants were in place 
and their office improvements designed. [R. 1552-56.][TR. 209-213.] Any documents, such as 
the substantial completion certificates or draw documents showing completion on paper, refer to 
the shell of the building, and are completely trumped by living, breathing witness testimony that 
those trades indeed performed extensive work after the dates of substantial completion, and after 
the date of EPCO's invoices. [R. 2922-3037.] Substantial completion is not final completion. 
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menial, but was substantive and extensive. [R. 2922-3037; 3131-3135; 2828-2900.] No 
amount of hotly contesting the facts is going to create a genuine issue as to whether such 
extensive work involving so many trades was trivial or transitory. The trial court's order 
granting summary judgment on the timeliness of the liens notes the last day these parties 
provided work on the buildings. [Lien Orders, App. E.] Where the testimony of record is 
conclusive, cumulative from multiple sources and un-rebutted, it will not be overcome by 
a single conclusory statement [See,e.g., Appellant's Brief, p. 17.] to the contrary, and 
summary judgment is appropriate. 
51-SPR contends at p. 20 of its appellant's brief that although it acknowledged that 
the sub-trades performed some of their work in the Fall of 2001, well within 90 days of the 
lien, "EPCO was unable to show that the work was within the scope of the original 
contract." 51-SPR makes this argument despite the fact that most of the work referred to 
was related to the interior structure of the buildings themselves, and the tenant 
improvements. In addition, all such interior work was billed to EPCO and paid for by 
EPCO either as part to the subcontractor's original contracts, or as extras to such contracts. 
EPCO also billed the work to 51-SPR as change order extras.17 [Tr. 209-213.] [R. 2901-
2980; 2922-3037; 3131-3135; 2828-2900.] It goes without saying that a change order 
modifies the original scope of work, and to the extent work was performed as a change order 
17
 At trial, the court awarded EPCO nearly $200,00 for extra change order work 
that included the tenant built-outs. [Findings and Conclusions, p. 6-7, App. C] 
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to the original agreement, it is by definition part of the scope of the original contract.18 None 
of the work used to support the late Fall 2001 final completion dates was performed, 
invoiced or paid for out of any contract other than the contracts that are the subject of the 
present appeal. Thus, the liens arising from such work is by definition, within the scope of 
the original contract. Any argument that change order work is not part of the original 
contract, and cannot be used to extend the time for filing a lien, defies both common sense 
and the express agreement of the parties. 
B. Under the Holding of Interiors Contracting, the Trial Court Correctly 
Found the Liens Were Timely Because Part of the Work Done in the Fall 
Was at the Behest of the Owner Under Threat of Non-Payment 
51-SPR argues at page 17 of its appellant's brief that the trial court misapplied the 
holding of Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs., 827 P.2d 963, 
965 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ^Interiors"). That case held that even small amounts of work can 
extend the time for recording a lien, if the "owner will not accept lienable work as completed 
and refuses to pay for the same until satisfactory corrective work is done..." The trial court 
noted that as it related to Building I, 19 where Halverson Mechanical and its sheet metal 
18
 51-SPR argues at p. 20 of its brief that perhaps the tenant work was performed 
as separate contracts for 51-SPR. However, it identifies no contract which would 
support such an argument, and the notion is belied by the fact that the parties, including 
Broadstone and 51-SPR, all treated the work for billing and processing purposes as 
contract extras to the original contracts. 
19
 There is no meaningful significance as to whether or not the work being 
completed in the Fall of 2001 was done upon Buildings I or II, since the lot upon which 
the buildings were constructed was not subdivided at the time of the filing of the liens, so 
both buildings constituted an improvement to a single unsegregated parcel of real 
property. [R.3024.] Under the holding of Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift, 798 
P.2d 738, 747 (Utah 1990), a single lien notice can include work performed on more 
20 
subcontractor performed 11 hours of work, the work performed was at the insistence of 51 -
SPR's representative, who threatened to not pay for the work if it was not performed. [Lien 
Orders, pp. 6 and 7, App. E.] In addition to the extensive quantitative work performed on 
the project in the Fall of 2001, the trial court correctly noted that 51-SPR's insistence that 
the work be performed or corrected before it would be paid for constituted a rejection of the 
work, and under the holding of Interiors, id at 965, 51-SPR would be estopped from 
asserting that the contract was completed before the work was repaired. [Lien Orders, p. 6 
and 7, App. E.] 
III. THE COURT MADE THE CORRECT FACTUAL DETERMINATION 
THAT NO LIEN RIGHTS WERE WAIVED BY INTERIM LIEN 
RELEASES ON THE BACKS OF CHECKS. 
A. Because the lien waivers were effective as of the date the construction draws 
and not the date of the lien waivers or the date Broadstone submitted its 
invoices to the bank, no portion of EPCO's lien was waived. 
The entire premise of 51-SPR's argument on lien waivers suffers from a single 
staggering leap of legal and factual logic, which was expressly rejected by the trier of fact. 
51-SPR argues that the court correctly upheld the enforceability of the lien waivers, but, 
"inexplicably, however, the trial court completely failed to apply the waivers at trial." 
[Appellant's Brief, p. 24.] 51-SPR entirely distorts the trial court's holding regarding the 
effective date of the lien waivers. [Appellant's Brief, p. 24.] The trial court's ruling was that: 
than one contract, the time for filing suit on a lien begins to run at completion of the 
project as a whole, regardless of whether separate contracts were involved, or when an 
individual contract is completed. 
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By endorsing the Central Bank checks, Ellsworth, Halverson, Westwood, and 
Allstate waived their claims and lien rights for work performed prior to the 
date that their draws were requested, but not for work performed 
subsequently. The date of the draw request is the date on which each such 
contractor or subcontractor requested the draw, not the date the check was 
received or cashed, which could be, and at times in this case was, many 
months after the request." [Lien Orders, p. 5, App. E.] [Emphasis added.] 
51-SPR's argument fails because it relies on the dates (April 11, 2001 for Building 
I, and June 25, 2001 for Building II) appearing on the checks, i.e., the date the checks were 
issued or the date Hatch submitted an invoice to the bank,20 not the dates the draws were 
submitted by the subcontractors or contractor. The court looked at the language on the lien 
waiver, and expressly held that Hatch's invoice date or the check dates had no application, 
because the lien waiver expressly waived liens: " payee may have up to the date of the [the 
builder's] draw request," not the date of the check. [Lien Orders, p. 5, App. E, quoting the 
language of the lien releases.] The court noted that the date the draws were submitted was 
often months before the checks were actually issued by Central Bank. Id. 51-SPR goes on 
for 11 pages in its brief arguing that liens were waived from the April 11 and June 25,2001, 
dates appearing on the checks,21 for all work after those dates, without even so much as 
20
 51-SPR argues on page 9 of its appellant's brief that April 11 and June 25 are 
the dates the liens were waived. 51-SPR states that these are the dates on the checks, and 
the dates of the "draw request." What 51-SPR fails to candidly tell this court is that the 
"draw request" date 51-SPR is referring to is the date Guy Hatch sent in his request to the 
bank for payment, not the day the subcontractors submitted their draws, as Judge Stott 
ruled was the date the waivers became effective. One might reasonably ask what Hatch's 
invoice date has to do with lien waivers appearing on the backs of checks issued to 
subcontractors or EPCO, especially when the lien waivers refer to the draw date of the 
person who provided the improvements. 
21
 51-SPR brushes aside the court's ruling and the express language of the lien 
waivers, and plows forward trying to show the value of work in place after the dates 
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mentioning to the court that the dates appearing on the checks were for draw dates many 
months before Hatch submitted them to the bank and the bank paid the checks. 
At trial, EPCO put on extensive evidence22 that the lien waivers did not cut off any 
construction draws on Buildings I and II because the construction draws in question had 
been submitted for the April and June checks (upon which 51-SPR relies as the lien cut-off 
dates) in February. EPCO's Chief Financial Officer Brent Oppenshaw testified how a 
subcontractor working on the project would get paid. [Tr. p. 300-02.] Mr. Oppenshaw 
testified that subcontractors working on the project would prepare draw requests and submit 
them to EPCO by the 20th of the month following the work contained in the draw request. 
Id. at 300. EPCO would then take the various draw requests from the subcontractors and 
combine them into a single draw request and submit it to Broadstone on AIA document 
G702. Id. at 300. Broadstone, in turn, would prepare a Builder's Request for Construction 
Advance and submit it to the funding entity, Central Bank. In fact, Mr. Oppenshaw testified 
that "Guy Hatch would prepare the form Central Bank would want the information on, and 
appearing on the checks. As noted above, however, the value of work after the date of 
the checks were issued has no relevance to a waiver tied to draw dates. Certainly, the 
date that Guy Hatch sent invoices to the bank has little or no relevance to a waiver date 
which expressly states that it waives liens from the date the subcontractor submits his 
draws. 
22
 The date liens were waived is a factual determination. Appellate courts are 
extremely deferential to findings of the trial court on issues of fact, and will not disturb 
those findings without a showing that findings were against the clear weight of evidence. 
Sate v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371. 372 (Utah 1996). It is the duty of the appellants to 
marshal the evidence and demonstrate that despite this evidence, the holding is so 
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of that evidence. Eggett v. Wasatch 
Energy Corp., 94 P.3d 193, 203 (Utah 2004). 
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typically, historically throughout the job he would wait 30 days, 40 days - at least 30 days 
if not more from the date we submitted our draw - our payment application to fill that out." 
[Tr. p. 302.] Towards the end of the project, Broadstone would hold the draw requests 
submitted by EPCO for two to three months before submitting the draws to Central Bank 
for payment. Id. Therefore, by the time the construction draw was submitted to Central 
Bank for payment, the checks disbursed by the bank were for work performed by EPCO's 
subcontractors two to three months and as much as four months before the draw was paid. 
Mr. Oppenshaw testified that the work covered by the April 11,2001 Hatch payment 
request and the Hatch June 25,2001 payment request did not waive payment for work after 
those dates for two reasons. First, the draws on those dates were for subcontractors, not for 
EPCO, so the waivers related back to the date the subcontractors submitted their draws. [Tr. 
p. 304 to 307.] Second, as noted in 51-SPR's addenda, the draws identified on the April 
11, 2001 draw are for the following subcontractors: Bardsley & Sons, Pulham Paint, 
Hatfield, and Moffat Brothers Plastering. None were paid to EPCO. [ Def. Ex. 15.] Mr. 
Oppenshaw testified that the work covered by the April 11, 2001, Broadstone invoice to 
Central Bank and corresponding checks on that date applied to work performed by the four 
subcontractors in February 2001 or earlier. [Tr. pp. 303-306.] Therefore, the applicable lien 
waiver date would be in February 2001 and not April 11, 2001. For Building II, 51-SPR 
incorrectly uses the June 21, 2001 check and draw request date (Def. Ex. 7) prepared by 
Broadstone as the applicable lien waiver date. Mr. Oppenshaw testified that Def. Ex. 7 was 
used to pay subcontractors working on Building I months before February, not for work on 
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Building II. [Tr. p. 308.] All of the payments identified on the June 21, 200, construction 
draw from Broadstone apply to work submitted by the subcontractors for the period ending 
February 28, 2001. Id. The record at the trial provides ample evidence that the lien waivers 
were inapplicable in cutting off or releasing any of the liened-for work. 
B. The trial court properly found the indemnity provisions of the lien waiver had 
no application to the case. 
51-SPR properly notes at page 29 of its appellant's brief that the court refused to 
enforce indemnity language included in the lien waivers. It goes without saying that if the 
lien waiver did not apply and was not effective to waive liens, that the indemnity portion of 
the lien waiver also did not apply. When the court found that no portion of the EPCO lien 
was released by the waivers, it automatically concluded that the indemnity sentence of the 
lien waiver had no application either. 
The trial court also properly found that 51-SPR was not entitled to indemnity as set 
forth in the lien waivers until it had paid all of the contract balances for which the indemnity 
was given. "Under a contract to indemnify for damages or loss, an action does not arise until 
the indemnitee has actually incurred a loss." Pavoni v. Nielson, 999 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah 
App. (2000). 51-SPR cannot argue that it suffered a loss as a result of EPCO not 
indemnifying it for the liens. Even if the waivers and indemnities are "absolute and 
unconditional" as 51-SPR contends, there is still an independent obligation for 51-SPR to 
pay contract balances under the construction contract. Until it pays the contract balances, 
51 -SPR has not suffered a loss. The indemnities are only given to ensure that 51 -SPR is not 
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under the necessity of paying off subcontractor liens when it has already paid EPCO. 
A careful reading of the waiver language also shows the endorser of the check is 
obligated to pay suppliers and subcontractors/rom the amounts paid. The clause above the 
indemnity provision requires the endorser to certify that the subcontractors and suppliers 
have been paid from the amounts paid by Central Bank to the endorser for labor and 
materials incurred up to the draw date. In the case at bar, just as the certification signifies, 
EPCO paid every dime to the suppliers and subcontractors from the checks to which the 
waivers applied. This was implicit in the trial court's ruling. [Lien Orders, p. 5, App. E.] 
Indeed, EPCO had little choice in the matter, since almost all the checks were joint checks. 
[Lien Orders, p. 5, App. E.] There are only two possibilities which govern the indemnity 
language. Either the indemnity agreements are: 1) stand-alone fully-integrated and complete 
mini-agreements, or 2) not integrated, and require that they be read in conjunction with other 
documents for them to be complete and for the intent of the parties to be made manifest.24 
23As of the present date, 51-SPR has failed to pay the outstanding contract 
balances on the project. Under the position taken by 51-SPR in Appellant's brief, that 
the indemnity is absolute, unconditional and enforceable, regardless of whether it paid 
contract balances as required in the contract, EPCO would be in the anomalous position 
of having to construct the building with no payment to EPCO, then also be required to 
reimburse 51-SPR for any payments made to subcontractors. The trial court properly 
found that in addition to not having suffered a loss to be indemnified for, such an 
arrangement would lack consideration and mutuality. 
24
 If each check is an integrated non-divisible agreement, the waiver and 
indemnity applies only to the amount paid, and does not discharge or require indemnity 
related to the larger construction contract. Howe Specialties, Inc. v. U.S. Construction, 
Inc., 611 P.2d 705 (Utah 1980). This result renders the indemnities pro tanto, requiring 
indemnity only for amounts that have been paid in each draw request. This is a result 
EPCO has no problem with, since it paid subcontractors and suppliers from all amounts 
it was paid. 
26 
If the agreements are divisible, they only waive claims and create an indemnity obligation 
for the amounts paid, but did not discharge or effect the larger construction contract. If the 
checks are to be read in conjunction with the larger agreement, it is clear that EPCO's 
obligation to indemnify is contingent upon the condition-precedent that EPCO be paid by 
the bank. This is the most reasonable interpretation of the indemnity and the one used by 
the trial court. 
IV. BY INCLUDING THE $78,000 AS PART OF ITS LIEN, EPCO NOT 
ONLY DID NOT FILE AN ABUSIVE LIEN, BUT ON CROSS APPEAL 
IT SHOULD BE PERMITTED RECOVERY ON ITS LIEN AND 
CONTRACT CLAIM FOR THE $78,000. 
In order to avoid redundancy, in parts A and B respectively of this section of the 
appellee's brief, EPCO will show, not only that claiming the $78,000 as a part of its lien 
claim was not abusive, but in support of its cross-appeal, EPCO will show from the record 
that EPCo is entitled to judgment for the $78,000. Specifically, EPCO will show that the 
$78,000 advanced by EPCO to Guy Hatch was a valid and enforceable partnership debt, 
ratified by a change order, to which it is entitled to reversal of the trial court's holding, and 
reimbursement from this appeal as a matter of law. 
The account of what occurred with the $78,000 change order is as follows. After 
Guy Hatch had decided upon EPCO as the general contractor for the Northshore I and II 
project, he came to Richard Ellsworth with a design rendering of the project and requested 
that EPCO give to Vintage Construction25 the sum of $78,000 to allegedly be used for the 
25
 Vintage Construction was an affiliate of Broadstone also owned by Guy Hatch. 
Vintage was tasked with the responsibility to perform all of the site work for the project, 
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civil engineering associated with the site work. [Tr. 61-65.] EPCO understood that it was 
providing a "turn-key" project, and that the scope of work involved several design 
components including electrical, structural and mechanical designs. [Tr. 61.] Hatch told Mr. 
Ellsworth that if he would advance the $78,000 costs for the civil engineering for the 
project, that he would issue EPCO a change order to the construction contract, reimbursing 
EPCO from the construction financing the $78,000 provided. [Tr. 61-65.] EPCO advanced 
the $78,000 to Vintage, and Hatch issued change order number 3 modifying the construction 
contract to reimburse EPCO for the sums advanced. [TR. 61-65; Change Order, App. F.] 
A. Filing a Lien For Work Encompassed by a Written Changer Order Authorized 
by the Owner Cannot Constitute an Abusive Lien. 
51-SPR would have this court hold that every time a contractor does not recover in 
a lien action 100% of the claimed amount, that the difference constitutes an abusive lien.26 
including the parking lots, entry ways, and building pad, leaving EPCO's responsibility 
to build the structures. [Tr. 39-40.] The concept was that since Vintage was doing the 
site work, it would pay for the civil engineering design work as part of its work. [Tr. 61-
65.] 
26
 51-SPR primarily relies upon the cases of A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & 
Heating v. Guy, 94 P.3d 270, (Utah 2004) and /. Pockynok Company, Inc. v. Smedsrud, 
80 P.3d 563 (Utah App. 2003) for the proposition that when one does not recover the full 
amount of his or her lien claim, the lien may be found to be abusive, invoking the 
penalties of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25. However, far from supporting the proposition 
suggested by 51-SPR, these cases seem to indicate an opposite holding. For example, in 
both Whipple and Pochynok, the contractors had filed liens for much greater amounts 
than they recovered at trial. The court disallowed attorney fees based upon a "reasoned 
flexibility" analysis, but did not punish, or even hint, that the contractors may have filed 
abusive liens. Id. In contrast to those cases, if one includes the subcontractor's claims 
whose liens were circumscribed by EPCO's lien, EPCO has recovered an amount far in 
excess of the face amount of its original lien claim. Yet 51-SPR argues that even though 
the recovery exceeded the lien claim, the lien was nevertheless abusive because it 
demanded an excessive amount. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25 states that a lien is abusive when "any person . . . who 
intentionally causes a claim of lien against any property, which contains a greater demand 
than the sum due to be recorded or filed: a) with intent to cloud title; b) to exact from the 
owner or person liable by means of the excessive claim of lien more than is due; or c) to 
procure any unjustified advantage or benefit. [Emphasis added.] This court will search the 
record in this case vain for any indicia on the part of EPCO of malevolent intent to cloud 
title or to extract more money than what was due. First, EPCO did not file a lien for a sum 
greater than that which was due. Its lien was for the contract amount due only, and nothing 
more. The amount due was the contract amount, as adjusted by change orders. [TR. 64; 
Change Order, App. F.] Even if the trial court disallowed a portion of the contract amount 
claimed, 51-SPR cannot attribute any sinister motive in EPCO claiming the duly-invoiced 
and owner-acknowledged contract sums appearing on its books. Accordingly, 51-SPR's 
argument does not meet the threshold requirements of the abusive lien statute of filing a lien 
for an amount more than what is due under the contract. Second, on the face of such an 
arrangement, the lien was not used to extract from the owner more than what was due, since, 
with a signed change order in hand, EPCO had at least a colorable right to refer to the 
acknowledged contract balance as set forth in numerous contract draws for the reasonable 
calculation of what was due under the lien. Finally, including the $78,000 as a part of its 
contract and lien claim was certainly not an attempt to procure an unjustified advantage, 
since the amount was justified by the change order. 
At the time the lien was filed, EPCO had only ever dealt with Guy Hatch, the 
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Broadstone construction manager. [Findings and Conclusions, p. 8 and 9, App. C] EPCO 
was not even aware of the existence of 51-SPR until after the end of the project. Id. As the 
court noted in its findings, EPCO had the right to rely on Hatch's authority, including the 
efficacy of the change order promising to reimburse EPCO for the engineering fees 
advanced, when it filed the lien. [Findings and Conclusions, p. 5-6, App. C ] To accept 51-
SPR's argument, EPCO is in the unusual and incongruent position of being punished twice: 
once for advancing to the partnership $78,000 for construction costs on the project, then 
being hit with double damages for requesting the money back by means of a lien supported 
by a signed contract change order. This fact pattern does not meet the animus and scienter 
requirements which are express and implicit in the abusive lien statute. 
In addition, the intentional clouding title and unjustified advantage components of 
the statute are directly contravened by the ultimate results in the trial. EPCO's judgment 
was for $721,215.93 on a mechanic' s lien claim of $850,651.07. [Findings and Conclusions, 
p. 8 and 9, App. C; Tr. Exhibit 13.] However, at the time the mechanic's lien was filed, 
none of EPCO's subcontractors had been paid. These subcontractors, also filed lien claims, 
and during the course of the proceedings below 51-SPR paid these claims as a result of 
judgments on the lien claims entered by the trial court. [Lien Orders, App. E.] The amounts 
were paid after two years of litigation on the doorsteps of the court. Thus, 51-SPR 
ultimately paid hundreds of thousands of dollars in excess of EPCO's initial lien claim. The 
threshold and minimum element that triggers the abusive lien statute is that EPCO must have 
demanded as part of its lien a sum greater that what it was entitled to claim. With the 
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amounts paid to subcontractors and the judgment given to EPCO, it cannot be argued by any 
stretch that the lien was overstated. Indeed, with the benefit of hind-sight, it was 
understated. Moreover, with the presence of numerous subcontractor liens, circumscribed 
within, but independent of EPCO's lien, 51-SPR can hardly demonstrate that EPCO's lien 
was extortionate, motivated by an intent to exact an unjustified advantage, or with a goal to 
wrongfully cloud 51-SPR's title. The liens were redundant, but the statute allows for liens 
to be stacked where independent lienable rights are asserted. With the presence of so many 
liens on the project paid by 51-SPR, it can hardly be said to be prejudiced or injured by a 
relatively small amount for which the trial court did not permit recovery. 
The notion that the lien was abusive also flies in the teeth of the trial courts findings 
and conclusions. [Findings and Conclusions, p. 8 and 9, App. C; Tr. Exhibit 13.] Having 
examined the demeanor of the witnesses, it entered specific and detailed findings holding 
that while it would not permit recovery thereon for the $78,000, the lien was not intended 
to be abusive. Id. The standard for appeal on this issue is whether or not there is "clear 
error" or whether there was evidence which tended to support the courts finding. A.K. & R. 
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction, 977 P.2d 518, 524 (Utah App. 1999). 
The appellant has the burden of marshaling all of the evidence supporting the finding, then 
showing that despite the evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in evidence that 
they can not support the ruling. Id. In the case at bar, the execution of the change order by 
the reputed owner, and EPCO's acting on the efficacy of that change order, without more, 
meets the prima facia evidentiary requirements for sustaining the trial court's determination 
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that EPCO's lien was not abusive. 
The abusive lien statute at § 38-1-25 is similar in terms of its "intent" requirements 
to § 38-9-1 governing wrongful liens. In Commercial Investment Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 
1105, 1110 (Utah App. 1997) the court ruled that a groundless lien was one in which there 
was no arguable basis for the filing of the lien. See, also, Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 
1218 (Utah App. 1999) (A lien may be wrongful if it is not authorized by statute). Since, 
EPCO had an arguable — if not compelling — basis for filing the lien, namely, it was an 
amount Hatch had included in the contract, its lien cannot be deemed abusive, and the trial 
court's finding should not be disturbed. 
51-SPR contends that "a lien can only be recorded against the property that was 
improved,27 regardless of what agreement the parties may have reached." [Appellant's Brief, 
p. 39.] In Trench Shore Services v. Saratoga Springs Development, LLC, 57 P.3d 241,246 
(Utah App. 2002) the owner claimed that since rental equipment provided no actual 
improvement to the property in question and the property was not directly benefitted in any 
way by the use of the equipment, the reasonable value of the equipment was not recoverable 
under the payment bond statute. This court disagreed, citing in support a mechanic's lien 
27
 51-SPR alludes to the fact that the $78,000 advanced by EPCO may have been 
used to pay for engineering on a parcel known as the Williams' property. The Williams' 
property was a nearby parcel where Guy Hatch at one time considered placing 
Northshore I and II, and had some preliminary sketches made for that site which he used 
to solicit tenants. [TR. 64.] However, Mr. Ellsworth testified, and the court made a 
finding on that testimony, that Mr. Ellsworth did not know where the $78,000 went after 
he gave it to Hatch, other than that he was told by Guy Hatch that it would be used to pay 
Hubble Engineering for the site design on the Northshore I and II project. [Tr. 65-66; 
Findings and Conclusions, p. 4-5, App. C.] 
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case from Wyoming (UnitedPacific Ins. Co. v. Martin & Luther General Contractors, Inc., 
455 P.2d 664, 669-70 (Wyo. 1969)) for the proposition that no actual improvement to the 
property is necessary and that sales entries made in the ordinary course of business as well 
as contract price make a prima facia case for the reasonable value of materials furnished 
requirement. Thus, the Trench Shoring case seems to indicate that an agreement for the 
service provided will be the best evidence to support its reasonable lienable value to a 
project, regardless of whether or not improvements are actually made. In the instant case, 
the signed change order by the duly authorized general partner represents a written contract 
supporting the claimed-for relief. That is all that is required to support the lien. 
51-SPR asks this court to impose a strict liability standard on lien claimants by 
holding that whenever a lien is found to be overstated at the end of a trial, regardless of a 
parties' intent,28 the court should impose the penalty provisions of the abusive lien statute. 
However, this argument flies in the face of literally dozens of cases where lien claimants 
have not recovered the full amounts of their lien without being deemed abusive or 
penalizing the contractor for their failing to fully recover. Such a position would eviscerate 
the remedial purposes of the lien act by creating a chilling effect and otherwise unduly 
inhibiting parties from seeking payment for the value of their labor and materials 
28
 51-SPR argues that: "the statute does not condition liability on a lien 
claimant's subjective belief whether it is seeking more than is due." [Appellant's Brief, p. 
41.] It further argues that the trial court's finding that EPCO lacked intent was 
immaterial to the analysis, thereby seeming to imply that any time a contractor does not 
foreclose the full value of its lien, the penalty should be imposed. [Appellant's Brief, p. 
42.] Neither of these arguments makes any sense in the context of a criminal statute, 
such as §38-1-25. 
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incorporated into a project. See, e.g., Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan 
Co., 98 P.2d 738 (Utah 1990) (The purpose of the lien statute is remedial in nature and seeks 
to provide protection to those proving labor or materials to construction projects). If a 
person faced an automatic penalty, as 51-SPR suggests, every time it is unable to recover 
the full amount of its lien, no party would ever seek to foreclose a lien. 
51-SPR wrongly asserts that the only intent requirement is that one intend to file the 
lien itself. [Appellant's Brief, p. 41.] It contends that specific intent to extract a sum not due 
or to obtain an unjustified advantage is not required. Id. Yet the abusive lien statute 
appearing at § 38-1-25 is itself a criminal statute, complete with criminal penalties. The 
criminal and civil penalties are conterminous with each other. Filing an abusive lien is a 
class B misdemeanor, and the criminal penalties are inflicted upon the same proof as that 
for the civil penalties. It is elementary that a criminal statute, with few exceptions, requires 
mens re, including specific mental intent. At a minimum, one would apply a "knew or 
should have known" test to determine that the lien is abusive. For this court to follow 51-
SPR's suggestion to abrogate the specific intent requirements of the abusive lien statute 
would be to render entitlement to liens useless as a practical matter. 
B. As a Part of Its Cross-Appeal, EPCO Asks This Court to Permit Recovery of 
the $78,000 Advanced by EPCO as a Partnership Debt. 
It was acknowledged in this case very early on by the owner of 51-SPR that Guy 
Hatch was the duly appointed construction manager for Northshore I and II, that he had full 
authority to enter into contracts, and to sign change orders. [JV Agreement, p. 1, App. A.] 
Mr. Chimento acknowledged both at trial and in his deposition that Hatch had full authority 
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to act on behalf of the owner, and to bind the owner in all contractual matters. [Tr. 381-82; 
R. 2256, ft. nt. 10.] Judge Schofield's order on the joint venture made a specific point of 
holding that 51-SPR was liable to EPCO for all contract amounts and change orders 
executed between EPCO and Broadstone. [JV Order, p. 12, App. B.] Indeed, the holdings 
of both Judge Schofield and Judge Stott was that as partners, 51-SPR was liable for all 
amounts found to be owed by Broadstone. [JV Order, p. 12, App. B, and Findings and 
Conclusions, pp. 3 and 9, App. C] Judge Stott allowed recovery by EPCO for tens of 
thousands of dollars in change orders, but disallowed recovery for the $78,000 change order, 
apparently believing that such funds were not a partnership debt.29 [Findings and 
Conclusions, p. 9, App. C] However, general contractors advance funds for construction 
purposes all the time on projects, including funds for the ordering of permits, paying impact 
fees, purchasing surety bonds, ordering design work (on design-build projects) and like 
costs, and all such advances are generally reimbursed through change orders or contract 
draws. There is nothing unusual or irregular about that practice. Indeed, EPCO knew it was 
providing a turn-key project which included design components. Proposal request number 
1 on Building II (which appeared as Defendant's exhibit No. 27 at trial) was the contract 
modification wherein Hatch agreed to reimburse EPCO for the $78,000. [Change Order, 
Check, p. 24, App. F.] That change order was dated by EPCO and signed30 by Broadstone 
29
 Even if the court finds that the $78,000 was not lienable despite the change 
order, it should still permit recovery to EPCO on the contract claim under principles of 
agency law and partnership law. 
30
 As can be seen by Appendix F, the change order is signed by EPCO and Guy 
Hatch but not the architect. This was a usual practice in the project and the trial court's 
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March 1, 2001 and March 3, 2001, respectively, during the height of the project, when 51-
SPR acknowledged that Hatch undeniably had full authority to act for the partnership. [Tr. 
62; 381-382.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-6 provides that M[e]very partner is an agent of the 
partnership for the purposes of its business, and the act of every partner... binds the 
partnership." See, also, Martinez v. Wells, 88 P.3d 343, 346 (Utah App. 2004) (Actions of 
duly appointed partner is binding on partnership). Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 218 (Utah 
App. 1990) (Joint venture partner is liable for debts incurred by other partner). Utah law 
requires a partnership to be bound by the acts of a partner, including the execution of an 
instrument for apparently carrying on the business of the partnership. Luddington v. 
Bodenvest, LTD, 855 P.2d 204, 207 (Utah 1993). Also, under § 48-1-13 setting forth the 
elements of partnership by estoppel, a partnership is bound for the debts incurred by the acts 
of an agent or partner which the partnership has clothed31 with authority. As noted above, 
at the time the change order was entered into, EPCO was not even aware of 51-SPR, or that 
a silent partner was acting behind the scenes. [Findings and Conclusions, pp. 5 and 8, App. 
C] At the time the $78,000 was advanced for the engineering on Northshore I and II, and 
later when the change order was signed, EPCO did not know Hatch was acting on behalf of 
Findings and Conclusions [App. C] state that the parties' waived the requirement of the 
architect's signature by processing change orders with a signature. The court allowed all 
of the change orders as extra work whether or not properly signed. 
31
 Judge Schofield noted that if there was not a partnership by estoppel, there 
was at least compelling evidence that 51-SPR understood its obligations to EPCO for 
work contracted for by Hatch. [App. A, p. 12, ft. nt. 17.] 
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a silent partner. Id. The evidence in this case is that Hatch had actual, apparent and implied 
authority to act for the partnership at the time he entered into the change order contract 
modification. [Tr. 381-382.] Signing contracts and change orders, even ones for supposed 
engineering cots, for the Northshore Project is undeniably the ordinary course of business 
and is well within the scope of a construction manager's duties. Id. Those duties were in 
direct furtherance of the partnership business. Id. With such authority, it was clear error32 
for the trial court to find the existence of a partnership, find that Hatch had full authority to 
act for that partnership, and find 51-SPR liable for hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
partnership debt, including change orders, yet deny recovery for the $78,000 change order. 
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 The argument that the $78,000 was a partnership debt incurred at a time when 
Hatch was fully empowered to bind the partnership was first presented to the trial court 
in a cross-motion for summary judgment dated January 8, 2003, and again in a motion 
for summary judgment on the change orders dated November 6, 2003. The trial court 
ignored these requests for summary judgment on this point and simply did not refer to it 
in his orders. Thus, whether or not the $78,000 was a partnership debt should be 
reviewed de novo, giving no deference to the trial court's conclusions. Armed Services 
Ins. Exchange v. Harrison, 70 P.2d 35 (Utah 2003). However, in case this court deems 
there to be a marshaling obligation, the evidence is as follows: 1) 51-SPR's agent 
negotiated several months for the purchase of the Williams' property. [Tr. Ex.20-24.]; 2) 
A sign showing it as the future site of Northshore I and II went on the William's 
property. [Tr. 60.]; 3) Architectural renderings were made of buildings on the Williams' 
site. Id.; 4) Hatch sold leases to people who now occupy Northshore I and II based upon 
renderings with buildings situated on that site. Id.; 5) Prior to the date of the JV 
Agreement (but well into the negotiations for the partnership agreement), Hatch 
approached Mr. Ellsworth telling him that, as the contractor for Northshore, he wanted 
him to advance civil engineering costs, like other engineering costs included with 
EPCO's contract. [Tr. 61-63.]; 6) EPCO was told that a change order for the design work 
would be issued to him from the construction contract. Id.; 7) Mr. Ellsworth never knew 
whether the money went to pay for engineering on the old or new site, or indeed, if the 
money was spent on engineering at all. Id.; 8) True to his agreement, Mr. Hatch issued a 
change order increasing the contract by $78,000 to reimburse EPCO for the funds 
advanced. [Change Order, App. F.] 
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It is of no consequence to this court's analysis whether or not the $78,000 was 
actually used by the partnership to pay for engineering as was represented by Hatch. 
Provided that Hatch's authority was intact at the time the change order written, and upon his 
representation that the monies would be used for the partnership purpose of paying for civil 
engineering, the partnership is bound by that indebtedness, regardless of whether or not the 
funds were actually used for that purpose. Allen v. Smedley 2004 Ut. App. 408 (Case No. 
2002065 3C A) (Not for publication case which held that the act of partner in selling property 
passed title, even though it was against the other partner's wishes). In the same vein, 51-
SPR has argued in the past that the $78,000 advance cannot be a partnership debt, because 
the advance by EPCO was made prior to the date when the JV Agreement appearing in 
Appendix A was entered into.33 However, this argument is of no avail, since the parties 
acknowledge that the change order was executed by Hatch at the time that his authority to 
bind the partnership was fully intact, regardless of when the advance occurred. Hatch and 
51-SPR acted to ratify the obligation on the part of the partnership, when Hatch executed 
the change order (along with numerous other change orders for which the trial court granted 
recovery) on behalf of the partnership. Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 85,89 (Utah 
1995). Thus, regardless of whether or not the advance was made at a time before a 
33
 The contention that the $78,000 was advanced before the existence of the 
partnership is itself a dubious contention. While the advance pre-dated the JV 
Agreement, it was made at a time when Hatch was finalizing his relationship with 51-
SPR, and when all parties knew that the amount was for construction of Northshore I and 
II, regardless of its ultimate location. Trial exhibits 20-24 show the owners of 51-SPR 
and Hatch holding themselves out as partners many months before Mr. Ellsworth 
advanced the $78,000. 
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partnership was formally formed, there was nothing to prohibit Hatch from binding the 
partnership after its creation by entering into a formal written agreement to pay the 
indebtedness back to EPCO. The trial court should be reversed on this point, and judgment 
awarded to EPCO. 
V. THE ATTORNEY FEES AT TRIAL WERE PROPERLY 
AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT, AND EPCO IS ENTITLED 
TO ATTORNEY FEES RELATED TO THE PROSECUTION OF 
THIS APPEAL 
A. EPCO's attorney fees were factitiously allocated between compensable and 
non-compensable claims 
51 -SPR contends at page 43 of its appellant's brief that since EPCO failed to allocate 
its fees between compensable and non-compensable claims, that the attorney fees should be 
reversed. While EPCO takes no quarrel with the proposition espoused to the effect that 
counsel should differentiate between those fees that are recoverable under a contract or a 
statute, and those that are not recoverable under such a statute, 51-SPR is just plain wrong 
when it argues against the record that the fees were not allocated. Attached to this brief as 
Appendix G is a copy of the Affidavit of Mark L. Poulsen34 setting forth how the fees were 
allocated. That affidavit shows approximately 2 pages of single-spaced entries which were 
determined to be non-compensable and were backed out of the fee request. [Poulsen 
Attorney Fee Affidavit, pp. 5 and 6, App. G.] The trial court determined that all of the 
remaining entries where either directly related to proving the mechanic's lien claim, or were 
34
 While the affidavit appears in Appendix G, the invoices themselves are not 
attached due to their volume. However, both the affidavit and the summary of fees 
appear in the record at as 8331 through 8302. 
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inextricably tied to the mechanic's lien claim such that the fees were permitted. See, First 
General Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480 (Utah App. 1996). Significantly, neither at trial 
[R. 8316.] nor on this appeal (with the exception of one entry),35 does 51-SPR identify a 
single entry out of hundreds of billing hours that were claimed and allowed as a part of the 
fee award but that should not have been awarded. If 51-SPR is aware of a mis-allocation 
which resulted in the fee award being excessive, it is obligated to bring those miss-allocated 
fees to the court's attention. They did not point them out to the court below, nor do they 
point them out now on appeal, because they do not exist. 
The trial court wrote nearly four pages of its findings and conclusions setting forth 
its ruling on the attorney fees. [Findings and Conclusions, pp. 15-19, App. C] The court 
used the "flexible reasoned" approach to determine who was the prevailing party as required 
by Pochynok v. Smedsrud, 80 P.3d 563 (Utah App. 2003). The court held that since EPCO 
had recovered most of its claim (and including an amount in excess of its complaint, if the 
subcontractor claims are included), that it, indeed, was the prevailing party on the 
mechanic's lien claims. [Findings and Conclusions, pp. 15-19, App. C] The court also 
found that the fees had been properly allocated as required by A.K. R. Whipple Plumbing 
&Heatingv. Aspen, 977 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1999). [Findings and Conclusions, pp. 15-19, 
App. C ] Finally, the court engaged in a lengthy Dixie State Bank v. Broken, 764 P.2d 
35
 51-SPR asserts at page 47, ft. nt. 23, that the entry appearing at R.8229 (billing 
for $1,564 for working on a failure-to-obtain-bond claim) was claimed as part of the fee 
award in this case. However, the affidavit at App. G, p. 6, clearly shows this entry as 
having been removed from the fee request. The entry, like all of the entries, was 
thoroughly allocated between compensable and non-compensable claims. 
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985,990 (Utah 1988) analysis to determine the extent to which the fees were reasonable. 
[Findings and Conclusions, pp. 15-19, App. C] Based upon the Dixie State Bank factors,36 
the court found that allocated fees of $164,993.60 were appropriate. 
51-SPR argues at page 47 of its brief, that the tnal court committed reversible error 
by permitting recovery on claims for which there was no fee provision, such as the breach 
of contract claim. However, the trial court determined that 51 -SPR was a joint venturer with 
Broadstone, but it did not determine the amount owed under the contract or liens. With 
liability established on the contract claim, the mechanic's lien and the contract claim were 
co-terminus issues for purposes of determining damages. The court decided the damages 
amount for the lien in the same order and using the same evidence as the breach of contract 
claim. In First General Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480 (Utah App. 1996), the court held 
that when compensable and non-compensable claims are closely related, attorney fees are 
recoverable for the related claims and defenses.37 See, also, Brown v. Richards, 987 P.2d 
470 (Utah App. 1999) (When issues are closely related, attorney fees are recoverable 
proving facts related to both issues). The trial court specifically found that: 
36
 Including the fact that during this same period of time, 51-SPR incurred 
$427,249 in fees. [Findings and Conclusions, pp. 15-19, App. C] 
37
 51-SPR refers to claims appearing in the complaint, which it asserts EPCO lost 
at trial, such as quantum meruit, fraud, tortious interference, etc. However, there were no 
fees incurred in these claims, and no claims related thereto were requested or granted. 
51-SPR fails to point out that there were numerous claims and defenses brought by 51-
SPR, such as fraud, wrongful lien, abusive lien, not being licensed, not being registered 
as a corporation, lien waivers, and like defenses which would have reduced EPCO's lien 
if 51-SPR had prevailed at trial on these issues. However, it did not prevail on these 
issues at trial. All of these defenses required the expenditure of EPCO's attorney fees. 
These factors were all taken into account in the court's analysis. 
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Many of the issues presented in the form of motions and trial work evidence were 
inextricably tied to the mechanic's lien claims. This included the entries for such 
issues as the lien waivers, the timeliness of the liens, the writ of attachment, the legal 
work related to alternate security, and like matters. [Findings and Conclusions, p. 
18, App. C ] 
The court also noted that 51-SPR asserted numerous counter-claims which could 
have defeated the liens if 51-SPR had prevailed on those counter-claims. [Findings and 
Conclusions, p. 18, App. C] As noted in First General Services, 918 Supra, at 487, the 
court held that fees incurred in defeating counter-claims and defenses tied to an off-set of 
the lien claim are recoverable by the prevailing party. With 51-SPR unable to marshal any 
of the evidence necessary to show entries that should not have been permitted by the trial 
court, this court should not superimpose its discretion on that of the trial court in making its 
fee determination. The fees were well supported in the record, and the trial court closely 
followed the Utah Supreme Court's guidelines for granting the fees. Under such 
circumstances, 51-SPR's request to remand for further proceedings related to the attorney 
fees should be denied. 
B. EPCO Is Entitled to its Attorney Fees Associated with this Appeal 
"An appeal from a suit brought to enforce a [mechanic's] lien claim qualifies as part 
of 'an action' for purposes of [Section 38-1-18]." Richards v. Security Pacific National 
Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 612 (Utah App. 1993) cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). If 
EPCO prevails on this appeal, it should be entitled to its attorney fees in prosecuting the 
appeal. Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 221 (Utah App. 1990) (Attorney fees allowed to a 
prevailing party on appeal in a mechanic's lien action). J.V. Hatch Construction, Inc. v. 
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Kapros, 971 P.2d 8, 16 (Utah App. 1998) (Fees incurred on appeal in an mechanic's lien 
action are recoverable to the prevailing party). As part of its cross-appeal, EPCO requests 
that it be awarded attorney fees on appeal if it prevails in this appeal. 
VI. EPCO CROSS-APPEALS THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION 
THAT IT IS NOT ENTITLED TO PRE-JUDGMENT CONTRACTUAL 
INTEREST. 
A. The Trial Court Erred When it Blurred the Distinction Between Prejudgment 
Interest Which Must Be Liquidated, and Contractual Interest, Which is an 
Automatic Element of Damages for Breach of Contract. 
In its findings and Conclusions, the trial Court stated that it was refusing to permit 
pre-judgment interest because "the court is unable to fix a date 38 as to the time for 
calculation of interest."39 [Findings and Conclusions, f 40, App. C] The court also stated 
38
 Judge Stott's Findings and Conclusions noted that toward the end of the project, 
Guy Hatch disappeared, apparently going to Hawaii. [Findings and Conclusions, % 6, 
App. C] Because the project had over $200,000 worth of change orders on both 
buildings, the last construction draws were never finalized. [Tr. 293-98.] As noted 
previously, because Guy Hatch could not be located, and their was no one left to process 
the change orders, EPCO literally had to finish the project without any owner 
representative to whom to send draws, approve work, or process extra work orders. 
[294.] In addition, because the bank funds had run out, Broadstone had quit paying 
draws months before. [Tr. 294-98.] The trial court held that since EPCO had not timely 
invoiced three of its draws, the interest calculation was unliquidated, so no interest was 
permitted. [Findings and Conclusions, f 6, App. C] At issue is $188,401.33 dollars in 
interest, which EPCO calculated from 30 days past November 1, 2001, the 
acknowledged completion date, and which the trial court disallowed. [Reconsideration 
Denial, App. H.] 
39
 The parties submitted three calculations of interest to the court. [R.8373-74.] 
These three calculations were not disputed by either party as being accurate. The only 
dispute was as to which was the correct formula: 1) $188,401 as the amount claimed by 
EPCO. This represented the interest on all of the invoices, including, interest on draw 
No. 9 on Building I, and draw Nos. 9 and 10 on Building II, none of which were 
submitted to Broadstone. [Interest Schedules (EPCO), p. 1, App. I.] The $188,401 also 
included interest on amounts paid to subcontractors on the eve of trial; 2) $144,496, 
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that it could not simply "pick a date," from which to run interest. [Findings and Conclusions, 
<j[ 39, App. C] Paradoxically, the court went on to say, "However, the Court does find that 
EPCO is entitled to pre-judgment contractual interest on its breach of contract claim as 
requested....[Emphasis added.] [Findings and Conclusions, ^ 40, App. C.] 51-SPR objected 
to the Findings insofar as they related to the interest permitted. [R.8317.] The trial court 
agreed with the objection by 51-SPR, finding that, interest damages were too speculative 
and unliquidated to permit recovery. [R. 8371.] EPCO sought clarification of the denial of 
a portion of the interest on the grounds that since interest was permitted by contract, it 
constituted an automatic component of damages which was inherently liquidated, and non-
discretionary. [R. 8385-80.][Reconsideration Denial, App. H.] 
The parties' AIA form contracts (which were identical for both buildings) contained 
the following clause at Article 7.2: "Payments due and unpaid under the contract shall bear 
interest from the date payment is due at the rate stated below. Or in the absence thereof, at 
the legal rate prevailing from time to time at the place where the project is located. Ten 
(10%) per annum thirty (30) days after the date of the Invoice for payment." [Contract, p. 
4, Article 7, App. J.] [Emphasis in original.] Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4(2) states that: "Any 
judgment entered into on a lawful contract, shall bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, 
which shall be specified in the judgment." The "shall" language appearing in the above 
representing the interest calculation referred to above, minus the interest on amounts paid 
to subcontractors. [Interest Schedules (EPCO), p.l, App. I.]; and 3) $57,864, 
representing interest on all draws, except the three draws which were not submitted, 
[Interest Schedules (51-SPR), p. 2, App. I.] The court adopted the last calculation. 
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statute does not admit of any discretion. Stroud v. Stroud, 733 P.2d 649, 650, (Utah App. 
1987) (The language "shall" in §15-1-4 means 'mandatory,' and the trial court does not have 
discretion to limit or eliminate the rate agreed to between the parties). Mont Trucking v. 
Entrada Industries, 802 P.2d 779 (Utah App. 1990) (With the word "shall" in §15-2-4, trial 
court was obligated, as a matter of law, to award the interest at the specified rate). Where 
the parties pre-defined the interest rate applicable for non-payment, and the court expressly 
found that 51-SPR had failed to pay contract balances, and was jointly and severally liable 
with Broadstone for $483,821 in contract balances, EPCO was entitled as a matter of right 
to contractual interest on the above sums from 30 days after the payments became due. 
Such interest is pre-liquidated by the parties' agreement, and is inherent in the contract. It 
is as much a part of the contract damages as is the principal amount found to be owed. For 
the court to disallow such interest, it would have to reform the parties' contract. 
By contrast to contractual interest, pre-judgment interest is discretionary, optional, 
and fact-dependant upon a finding that the debt is liquidated. Consolidation Coal v. 
Division of State Lands, 886 P.2d 514. 524 (Utah 1994). The trial court blurred the 
distinction between "pre-judgment interest,"40 which requires the debt to be liquidated and 
40
 51-SPR would also be liable for pre-judgment interest at the legal rate, even if 
the contract did not specify the payment of interest at ten percent. The contract amounts 
in this case were liquidated, complete, and easily fixed as of a date certain. Bjork v. April 
Industries, 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977). Indeed, out of dozens of cases that have 
permitted pre-judgment interest for breach of contract, counsel's informal survey failed 
to turn up a single case where the court did not permit pre-judgment interest in a breach 
of contract action. It was reversible error for the trial court to disallow contractual 
interest or pre-judgment interest in this case on the grounds that the obligation was 
unliquidated. 
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which is discretionary, and contractual interest, which is a matter of right upon a finding of 
a breach of a contract for the non-payment of a contract which includes an interest charge 
for late or non-payment. In the case of Famsworth v. Jensen, 217 P.2d 571, 503-03 (Utah 
1950), the Supreme Court of Utah cited from Am. Jur., and approved the following 
distinction between contractual interest, which is automatic, and pre-judgment interest which 
is discretionary: 
15 Am. Jur., Section 159, page 577, contains the following explanation of the 
nature of interest: "Generally speaking, interest is of two kinds: (1) That 
which is given by reason of a contract by the parties providing for the same, 
and (2) that which is given by way of damages." 30 Am. Jur., Section 2, page 
6, defines interest as follows: "... interest is the compensation allowed by law 
or fixed by the parties, for the use, detention, or forbearance of money, or its 
equivalent. It is the premium or recompense paid for money. Conventional 
interest in the ordinary acceptation of the term is such interest as the parties 
to a contract have agreed upon as part of their contract, and is as much an 
integral part of the debt as the principal itself; and while it forms an element 
in computing the amount of recovery, it does so in the way that a provision of 
the contract limiting liability, or any other contractual provision as to the 
amount involved in the contract, does. Interest by way of damages, or 
moratory interest, as it is sometimes called, is interest allowed in actions for 
breach of contract or in actions for tort as damages, for the unlawful detention 
of money found to be due. It depends not upon any express contractual 
obligation to pay interest, but upon the theory that the party breaching the 
contract or committing the tort became bound at the time of the breach to 
make reparation; and for this delay in making such reparation, the injured 
party is entitled to such interest, as will recompense him therefor." [Emphasis 
appears in original opinion.] 
The question thus comes down to 51-SPR's and the trial court's contention that 
EPCO's failure to submit the final three draws41 on the project precludes its recovery of 
41
 The draws which were not submitted to Broadstone and which 51-SPR failed to 
pay, (and which formed a portion of the judgment in this case) include: Northshore I, 
Draw No. 9 in the amount of $76,234.93; Northshore II, Draw No. 9 in the amount of 
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interest on those three draws. This dubious argument is flawed on several grounds. First, 
it was Broadstone's own default and non-performance in disappearing before change orders 
were processed and could be finalized which occasioned EPCO's inability to submit the 
draw requests. "A person cannot avoid liability for non-performance of its obligation by 
placing such performance beyond his control by his own voluntary act." Cannon v. Stevens 
School of Business, Inc., 560P.2d 1383,1385 (Utah 1977). Hertzv. Nordic, LTD., Inc., 761 
P.2d 959, 963 (Utah App. 1988) (A breaching party cannot avail himself of the non-
performance of the other party, who has himself occasioned the non-performance. Quoting 
Cannon, supra). Broadstone's refusal to process draws and change orders is undeniably the 
sole cause for the draws not being submitted. Because it was Broadstone's own default 
which occasioned the lack of invoicing at the end of the project, EPCO should not be 
punished by having its contractual interest disallowed. In a similar vein, in addition to the 
draws that could not be processed due to the owner's absence from the site, several prior 
draws had not been paid even when Guy Hatch was present at the project. Thus, for EPCO 
to submit draws when the proceeding invoices had been ignored, would have been an 
exercise in futility. It is an elementary principal of contract law that the non-breaching 
party's performance is excused under the contract by the other party's breach. See, e. g., 
$197,079.64 and Draw No. 10 in the amount of $78,465.15. [Interest Schedules, pp. 1 
and 2, App. I] In order to alleviate any concern the trial court had with calculating the 
appropriate date upon which interest should run on the invoices not processed by 
Broadstone, EPCO has selected the end of November, 2001 as the date from which 
interest should run. This was 30 days after the last date upon which the project was 
completed, accepted, and occupied. 
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Wagstaffv. Remco, Inc., 540 P.2d 931,933 (Utah 1975); DarrellJ. Dickersen & Sons, Inc., 
v. Magna Water, 613 P.2d 1116,1118 (Utah 1980) (Both cases hold that failure of an owner 
to pay even a single construction draw excuses further performance on the part of the 
contractor). 51-SPR's persistent failure to pay in accordance with the contract excused 51-
SPR's obligations to try and finalize and submit draws when no owner was present to 
receive such draws, and the draws were being ignored. EPCO elected to race through an 
finish the project, despite the fact that it was not being paid. To accept the trial court's 
conclusion of the matter, EPCO should be punished for its completion work by not being 
paid the delinquency interest rate set forth in the parties' agreement. Given the fact that the 
draws before the un-invoiced ones were not paid, 51-SPR can hardly claim that it was 
prejudiced by EPCO's lack of billing. By the end of the project, 51-SPR knew the debts 
were not getting paid, yet it repudiated the obligation in its entirety. How, under such 
circumstances, can the contractor be legally denied contractual interest from a date 30 days 
after project completion and contract repudiation for not billing in a timely manner? Lastly, 
whatever might have been the justification for EPCO not sending the last three billings by 
the end of November, 2001 (the date EPCO claims the interest began to accrue), liens had 
been filed, and demands had been made to both 51-SPR and Broadstone. Both partners 
knew the debt was due, and knew the amounts. The notion that interest was tolled for the 
period of time the invoices were not sent is somewhat understandable, but here the interest 
claimed is from 30 days after the project was occupied, and the $70,000 per month in rents 
were being paid. 51-SPR has repudiated any obligation to pay any monies under the 
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contract, both at the time the work was performed, at the end of the project, and up through 
the date of this appeal. The trial court disallowed interest on nearly $500,000 in contract 
balances which remained unpaid for over two years (amounting to over $130,000 worth of 
interest alone). If a mortgage company or bank note holder fails to forward an installment 
invoice on a given monthly payment, it does not create a waiver, forfeiture, or otherwise 
obviate the obligation for the debtor to pay interest on the mortgage or note for the month 
the invoicing was missed. To the same extent, EPCO's inability to process the last three 
draws (for reasons due solely to the actions of 51-SPR or its agent) should not preclude the 
contractual interest on those draws for the time period in question.42 
B. It Would Be Improper for the Trial Court to Set-off EPCO's Contractual 
Entitlement to Interest by Pre-judgment Interest Paid to Subcontractors on the 
Eve of Trial 
A much closer question than issue of EPCO's entitlement to contractual interest is 
the question of whether or not EPCO should receive interest on its full contractual amount 
at the time of trial, or whether any interest amounts paid to EPCO's subcontractors must be 
taken out.43 As noted above, three interest calculations were submitted to the trial court. 
[Interest Schedules, App. I] The amounts were agreed to by counsel for both parties, but the 
42
 Interest on agreed-upon amounts must be allowed in order that the breaching 
party is not unjustly enriched by its failure to pay amounts due under the contract. 
Canyon Country Store v., Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989). Also, "paying money 
later with interest is, in effect, precisely the same as paying it when it became due 
without interest." Mont Trucking v. Entrada Industries, 802 P.2d 799, ft. nt. 1 (Utah 
App. 1990). That is why recovery for interest is automatic, since without it, the non-
breaching party is not made whole. 
43
 This apparently a matter of first impression in Utah, as counsel could find no 
case which has specifically addressed the issue. 
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legal entitlement thereto remained in dispute through judgment. These amounts were: First, 
$ 188,401, representing the interest owed from 30 days after project completion date through 
trial at 10% per annum on all contract balances (including those portions of EPCO's prime 
contract that were ear-marked for payments to subcontractors); Second, $144,496, if the 
interest amounts paid to subcontractors on the eve of trial are subtracted out; and Third, 
$57,863.94, which is what the trial court permitted, and which allows for no interest on the 
last three unpaid draws through trial. [Interest Schedules, App. L] 51-SPR has argued that 
since it has had to pay interest to the subcontractors on their respective claims, for EPCO to 
get its full contractual interest would be for it to receive a windfall or double recovery. [R. 
8123-8125.] However, this view44 assumes that EPCO was somehow legally obligated to 
pay interest to the subcontractors, which may or may not be the case. The flaw in the 
argument is that it fails to take into account that the interest paid to the subcontractors in 
settlements and judgments on the eve of trial was pre-judgment interest which was allowed 
under the mechanic's lien statute (§ 38-1-3) and the failure-to-obtain-a-bond statute § 14-2-
1). This interest was the result of independent statutory obligations 51-SPR owed to the 
subcontractors, which were non-contractual in nature, and did not implicate 51 -SPR' s duties 
to EPCO. By contrast, the amounts owed to EPCO for interest is contractual interest, which 
44
 A trial court's decision on entitlement to interest presents a question of law, 
which is reviewed for correctness. Baily-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 427 
(Utah App. 1994). Quoting Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 848 P.2d 
171,177 (Utah App. 1993). 
50 
is triggered as an automatic right on the full contract balances owed.45 This is so whether 
or not EPCO pays interest to its subcontractors, compromises the interest, or pays double 
interest to subcontractors. The issue is one of exclusivity of contract between EPCO and its 
subcontractors and EPCO and 51-SPR. For example, assume EPCO did not owe interest 
to its subs (which, pursuant to is subcontract agreements, it did not owe interest), it was not 
thereby obligated to forgo the interest previously agreed-to from 51-SPR. Conversely, if 
EPCO owed 24% interest to its supply houses, it would not be entitled to receive 24% from 
51-SPR for its non-payment, but only the agreed-to amount. However, the supply house 
may have a direct right of action under the lien or bond laws, but it would recover interest 
at the prejudgment rate, not necessarily its contractual rate with EPCO. 
The only contract before the trial court was the stand-alone agreement between EPCO 
and Broadstone, which permitted recovery at 10% on the entire contract balance until paid. 
In determining the contractual interest due to EPCO, the trial court should apply the face of 
the contract governing interest on contract balances without set-off or deduction for pretrial 
interest found independently owing to those below EPCO. Stated differently, if a lien or 
bond claimant successfully recovers prejudgement interest against an owner, the prime 
contractor's entitlement to contractual interest is not derogated or diminished by such 
collateral payments. The situation is analogous to a prime contractor who obtains a bid from 
45
 Of course, EPCO acknowledges that it cannot get interest on amounts paid to 
subcontractors after payments are made, and that its contract balances are reduced by the 
amounts paid directly to subcontractors. However, the interest debt to EPCO should 
continue up to the date the subcontractors were paid, whether or not the subcontractors 
independently obtained interest as part of their separate claims. 
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a subcontractor, but then later gives the subcontract to a less expensive tradesmen. The 
owner's contract is not correspondingly reduced, nor under such a scenario is the benefit 
side considered a windfall or double-recovery to the prime contractor. It is the prime-
contract, and the prime-contract alone, which governs, and it would be error for the trial 
court to set-off the judgment by amounts paid to others prior to trial. Based upon the 
forgoing, EPCO requests that its judgment be augmented by $ 188,401 in contractual interest 
disallowed by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the forgoing arguments, EPCO requests by way of affirmative relief as 
set forth in its cross-appeal: 1) that the court allow the judgment to be augmented by the 
$78,000 paid by EPCO to the partnership, and which the partnership contracted to repay by 
means of a written change order signed by the managing partner; 2) that the judgment be 
augmented by $188,401in pre-trial contractual interest calculated at 10% per annum and 
running from the date the project was completed; and 3) that EPCO be awarded its attorney 
fees on appeal. EPCO further asks the court to deny the relief sought by 51-SPR in its 
appeal. 
Dated this ^ J L day of March, 2005. 
NELSONrSNUFFER, PAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
Mark L.^oulsen 
Bret W. Reich 
Attorney's for Appellee and Cross-Appellant 
Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company 
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THIS ADDENDUM V2 TO REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT BETWEEN 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LLC AND 5T1 SOUTH PORTLAND MALTY CORP. DATED 
JUNE IS, 2000 
RE; Auto Mall Development 
The terms and conditions of this Addendum #2 are hereby incorporated in the above 
Real Estate Purchase Contract as it set forth et length therein. 
This memorandum shall summanre the terms of the agreements reached regarding the 
above development project and set forth the same in contractual form, Intending to bind the 
parties wRh regard thereto, as dosing of title on tht real estate Is needed by 6/15/00; 
thereafter more detailed agreements In appropriate form will be prepared *nd executed 
reflecting the following terms: 
- Utah title company as nominee fcr 51 South Portland Realty,
 f a New York 
corporation (Chimento), and __, • UUh LLC fUtah LLC) (Guy Hatch and , hts 
partner will own this, see below as to restrictions,) will acquire tide as ten?nts*ln*common (with 
a S0% Interest »o each) to the entire 6.58 acre parcel from Ford investment Enterprises 
Corpc anon for the purchase pr\z? of $1,750,000.00 (the "Land"). 
- Chlmento will contribute as capital to the project the sum of $2,900,000.00 to be 
transferred to and held by UUh Title Company as a Qualified Intermediary CQO *™* applied 
as follows: 
$1,750,000 -
5,000(7) -
87,000 -
545,000 • 
suoflon 
to purchase 
To costs of purchase 
Commission to Re Max 
To srte Improvement costs 
To bonding construction costs (see following) 
Total * !,900,000 
- Utah LLC shaH be the project manager In charge of obtaining remaining needed 
construction financing and Institutional permanent financing for Buildings I and u (hereinafter 
"office buikflngs''), construction supervision, l«*sJng of the buttdings, sate of the statbn/store 
sfta, and operation of the venture. Utah LLC wtM receive a fte of $135,000.00 for such services, 
payable in three installments of $45,000.00 on July 15, 2000, September 1, 2000 and October 
15, 2000, 
- Utah LLC wHI provide financing for needed construction monies for the office butfdtng 
sod remaining cash needs of the project. Guy Hatch will guaranty such finarvdng. 
- Gwoento will execute mortgage as to its tenancy in common interest to secure 
institutional construction financing but wiH not be obligated on any Note or by way of guarantee 
at any titr*? 
- Ch&mento funds for site development and construction costs "hard* costs only not 
"soft" costs except the Utah LLC fees or interest) wtll be utilized prior to any other construction 
C>XYDOCVl*reMJ\wr>t*lJ&5f K£TPM%HOJ0QC ^ ^ f f l B f e E E f i B K J k f t ^ S l ^ M 
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financing, on a standard draw schedule with 10% r e t a i n s (inclusive), to be released by QI 
after inspection approval by a Chimento engineer to b* retained by Chimento and paid as a 
project cost. 
- Utah LLC sbafl be a single member, single purpose LLC satisfactory to N3 counsel for 
Chimento whose ownership interest and control shall be pledged to Chimento to secure Utah 
LLC's and Hatch's obligations, with a restriction agreement In recordabl* fprm satisfactory to M 
counsel in favor of Chimento es to the LLC and the LLCs tenancy in common interest in the 
land. 
- Utah LLC shall mortgage its tenancy in common interest in the land to Chimehto to 
secure the pledge and restriction agreements as well Hatch's obligations pursuant to this 
memo. Chimento shall subordinate its mortgage only with respect to institutional constructs 
Hnencing. chimento will release this mortgage will be released upon completion of the project 
and dosing of permanent Institutional financing. 
Note: ChJmerrto's acquisition of its ioterest in the project is through a uUke-KbxT exchange and 
where the term Chimento Is usedf QI shall act as Chimeric's nominee until Chimento may take 
title pursuant to IRS regulations. 
The parties intend that following completion of the project and at the time of permanent 
financing but not earlier than 1/1/2001, as they may hereafter agree, Chimento and Utah LLC 
may transfer their Interests to a new Utah LLC to be owned equafly by them, otherwise 
consistent with the terms of this memo, but in any event the project shaH be held for 
investment and all actions by the parties shall be In furtherance of that goal. (New Utah LLC 
documents to be satisfactory to rt) counsel for Chimento). 
- The development project shall be on a cash basis with a calendar year end. 
- Chimento shall rtc*fv« a 10% return on its capital commencing December 1, 2000 
through the end of the first year following dosing on the und , to be paid monthly commencing 
on 1/1/2001. Hatch shall guaranty such return, to be paid from operating income of the project 
if sufficient, and if not, then from proceeds of sale of a portion of the land - the 
station/convenience mart, if any, Utah LLC shall contribute any and all sums to the project 
needed for payment of such return. 
- Any net operating income remaining in the first year, to Hatch. 
• Chimento shall have the option to receive a 10% return on its capital for a second year 
on terms set forth abov« for year l, or to share 50/50 in net operating income of the project for 
the year following dosing on the Land, 
- Thereafter Chimento and Utah, LLC shall share SO/50 in net operating income of the 
project. 
- Permanent financing w 1 "take out" all financed construction costs (including soft costs 
and teasing costs) (Ho brokerage is to be paid to Hatch or affiliated entities) and the project or 
buiWings 'mdMduatty w* secure the same if financed as to the whole or individually. The parties 
agree to consult as to the amount of permanent financing which may exceed the above and, if 
51-SPR 00191 
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ayeed, such excess to be applied as follows: to Chimento to reimburse in the following order 
as available, (i) land dosing costs; (il) allocated construction costs, S.t. building 1 and building 
2; (H!) allocated site improvement costs, i.e., building 1 and building 2; and (iv) allocated tend 
costs, I.e. buildup 1 *nd 2; and after Chimento capital repaid In full, to each 50/50. 
- Subsequent capital transactions (refinances, sates, casualty or condemnation) after 
debt repayment to- (i) remaining unpaid Chimento capital; and thereafter (»i) to each 50/50 
Distributions of net operating Income after completion of construction, to be made not less than 
quarterly. 
Distribution from capital transactions no later than 20 days after receipt. 
All decisions regarding the project shall be mutually made after consultation. 
Monthly construcbon zmi leasing reports to be submitted by Hate*. 
Quarterly statements to be submitted wfchin 30 fays of close of quarter. 
Year end statements to be submitted within 45 days of dose of year 
Tax reruns to be prepared, and delivered to tenants-In-common within 75 days of close of 
Surh returns shaft reflect i^A the property is heW as tenan&^n-commcn interests and not as a 
partnership. All such tiecttons sh^ JI be mad* to be consistent with this. 
Hatch's development entity (not Utah LLC) shaH enter Into a consulting agreement with 
Chlmentos, individually, wfth regard to property development Inclusive of the project, to a term 
running through March l, 2001, for a fee of $24,000,00 per month payable montHy 
commencing Jury 1, 2000 (except the Jury 1, 2000 payment shall be $12,000.00). 
The provisions of this Addendum shall survive closing of title. 
51 SOUTH PORTIANQ REALTY CORP. 
8ROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LLC 
C<WY twcvM^Hi^^wTitirirti v*r»^M*Ko*>oc 3 
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MaikL Poulsen (5424) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, 
DAHLE & POULSEN, P C 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone (801)576-1400 
Fax (801)576-1960 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and 
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah 
limited liability company, CENTRAL BANK, a 
Utah banking corporation, 51-SPR-LLC , a 
Utah limited liability company, ALLSTATE 
ELECTRIC, a Utah corporation, HUBS TILE, 
INC , a Utah corpoiation, WESTWOOD MILL 
& CABINET, INC , a Utah corpoiation, 
DEBRA A BURNETT and MICHAEL L 
BURNETT, dba ALARM TECH. 
HALVERSON MECHANICAL, INC , a Utah 
corporation, MASCO CONTRACTOR 
SERVICES CENTRAL, INC , a Utah 
corporation dba HANSEN-ALL SEASONS 
INSULATION, DECORATIVE 
LANDSCAPING, INC , a Utah coipoiation, the 
DAN PARKINSON FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, Guy HATCH, an individual, 
JOHN DOES 1-20 and all other persons 
unknown claiming any interest to the subject 
real property, 
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST 51-SPR ON ISSUE OF 
LIABILITY AS JOINT 
VENTURER WITH AND 
PARTNER OF BROADSTONE 
Civil No 020400442 
Civil No 010405059 
Consolidated into 
Civil No 010405059 
Judge Schofield 
Defendants 
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT to Ellsworth Paulsen 
Construction Company on the issue of 51 -SPR LLC's liability as joint venturer, partner or successor 
in relation to Broadstone Investments, LC based upon a ruling by the Court dated December 30, 
2002 
This case is before the court on Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Service's ("EPCO") May 24, 
2002 motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of defendant 51-SPR-LLCs ("51-SPR" or 
"Chimento") liability as ajoint venturer, partner, or successor in relation to Bioadstone Investments, 
LC ("Broadstone") l 51-SPR opposes the motion 
Having reviewed the parties' respective memoranda, and the evidence on file, and heard oral 
argument on the matter, I now issue this ruling granting the motion 
In essence, EPCO asserts that it has not been paid certain sums due for construction services 
perfoimed on the Northshore I and II commercial real estate development project (the "Project") 
pursuant to contracts and related change orders signed by Broadstone or its agents If Broadstone 
and 51 -SPR were partners or joint venturers on the Project, 51 -SPR is jointly and severally liable for 
all debts chargeable to the partnership or joint venture, including the sums due to EPCO under the 
contracts to develop the Project See Utah Code Ann §48 1 lOto 12, Hothv Wlute, 799 P 2d 213, 
218 (Utah App 1990) (citing Utah Code Ann §§48 1 10 tp 12) 
1
 The central issue before the court has been cast principally as one of joint ventuie 
However, in footnote 2 of its supplemental supporting memorandum, counsel for EPCO correctly 
notes that "partnership law and joint venture law are essentially indistinguishable " (citing 
Nupetco Assoc v Jenkins, 669 P 2d 877, 882 fn 3 (Utah 1983) See also Utah Code Ann § 48-
\-3\,Hothv White, 799 P 2d 213, 218 (Utah App 1990) (ct[§48 1-3 1] provides that joint 
ventures are governed by the partnership act ") 
2 
Summary Judgment Standard. 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving partv is entitled to judgment as a mattei of law " Rule 56(c), Utah 
Rules of Civil Proceduie Where the motion for summary judgment is supported by evidence and 
sworn testimony, as is the case here, the party opposing summaiy judgment may not rest upon mere 
allegations, but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of fact to be tned See 
Hall v Fitzgerald, 671 P 2d 224 (Utah 1983) 
Whether or not there was a joint venture relationship is a factual question Rogers v M 0 
Bitner, Co , 738 P 2d 1029, 1932 (Utah 1987) However, in this case, wheie the "facts are not in 
dispute the relationship of the parties is a matter of law " Bassett v Baker, 530 P 2d 1 (Utah 
1974) 
Joint Venture Factors. 
The Utah Code defines "joint venture" as ccan association of two or more peisons to carry on 
as co owners of a single business enterprise " Utah Code Ann §48-1-3 1 The Utah Supreme Court 
has declared Bassett v Baker, 530 P 2d 1 (Utah 1974) to be the "leading case in Utah defining the 
elements essential to a joint venture " Betenson v Call Auto & Equipment Sales, 645 P 2d 684, 686 
(Utah 1982) Bassett states 
A joint venture is an agreement between two or more persons 
ordinarily but not necessanly limited to a single transaction for the 
purpose of making a profit The requirements for the relationship are 
not exactly defined, but certain elements are essential The parties 
must combine their property money, effects, skill laboi, and 
3 
knowledge AS a general rule, there must be a community of interest 
in the performance of the common purpose, a joint proprietary 
interest in the subject matter, a mutual right to control, a nght to share 
in the profits, and unless there is an agreement to the contrary, a duty 
to share in any losses which may be sustained 
530 P 2d at 2-3 (footnotes omitted) In Rogers v. M O Bitnei, the court states that "[a] joint venture 
does not always nse pursuant to formal agreement, rather, it is a relationship voluntarily entered by 
the parties and may be proven by the actions taken by the parties The characterizations given by the 
parties are certainly not determinative of the issue " 738 P 2d 1029, 1032 (emphasis added) 
In this case both the written agreements and the parties' undisputed actions indicate that 51-
SPR was not merely Broadstone's creditor, but that 51 -SPR was actively involved with Broadstone 
in the business of developing and maintaining the Project in anticipation of earning a profit While 
Broadstone was the principal supplier of skill, labor, and knowledge as an on-site project manager, 
51-SPR was the principal supplier of capital to the venture Both parties had a common inte4rest 
in the Project and each expected to participate in the profits expected to follow 
Background and Addendum #2. 
In April 2000, Guy Hatch (of Broadstone) and Chimento met with Ford Motor Company 
("Ford") for the purpose of acquinng the real property upon which the Northshore I and II buildings 
weie constructed While 51-SPR insists that Hatch met with Ford befoie Chimento did, Chimento 
admits to being "involved in the acquisition of the property, in putting it undei contiact " The leal 
estate purchase agreement ("RESPA") lists the purchase pnce of the Northshore property at 
$1,750,000 00 On June 12, 2000, Ford conveyed the Northshoie property to Broadstone by 
warranty deed 
4 
It is undisputed that Broadstone and 51 South Portland Realty executed Addendum #2 to the 
RESPA (the "Agreement"), labeled "DATED June 15, 2000" at the top of the document It is also 
undisputed that all of 51 South Portland Realty's interest in the Agreement is row owned by 51-SPR 
and that the term "Chimento" in the Agieement refers to 51 South Portland Realty 
The Agreement undisputedly pi ovides that 1) The parties would own the Northshore property 
as tenants in common, 2) 51-SPR would contribute $2 9 million, of which $1 75 million would be 
used to acquire the land, and anothei $1 2 million would be applied to site work and construction 
costs, 3) Broadstone would be the "project manager " would "opeiate the venture," would obtain 
long term financing, enter into construction contracts, supervise construction, and obtain leases on 
the buildings, 4) Chimento would execute a mortgage to secure institutional construction financing, 
5) Chimento funds for site development and construction costs ("hard" costs only) would be utilized 
"on a standard draw schedule after inspection approval by a Chimento engineer", 6) Broadstone 
would be a single member single purpose company, w hose "ownership interest and control shall be 
pledged to Chimento to secure [its] obligations' , and 7) Broadstone would "mortgage its tenancy in 
common interest to Chimento [51 ]SPR] to secui e the pledge and restnction agreements as well [as] 
Hatch's obligations "2 
The Agreement also provides 
[ 1 ] The parties intend that following completion of the project but not earlier that 
1/1/2001, as they may hereafter agree, Chimento and [Broadstone] may transfer their 
interests to a new Utah LLC to be owned equally by them, otherwise consistent with 
See 51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial 
summary judgment, pp 8-9 These are the undisputed characterizations of the items in 
Addendum #2 
5 
the terms of this memo, but in any event the project shall be held for investment and 
all actions by the parties shall be in furtherance of that goal (Agreement p 2, f4), 
[2] Chimento shall receive a 10% return on its capital commencing December 1, 
2000 through the end of the first year following closing to be paid monthly 
Hatch shall guaranty such return, to be paid from operating income of the project, 
if sufficient, and if not, then from proceeds of a sale of a portion of the land if 
any, [Broadstone} shall contribute any and all sums to the project needed to payment 
of such return (Agreement p 2, <][6), 
[3] Any net operating income remaining in the first year [shall be paid] to Hatch [of 
Broadstone] (Agreement p 2, (fl7), 
[4] Chimento shall have the option to receive a 10% return on its capital for a second 
year on terms set forth above for year 1, or to share 50/50 in net operating income of 
the project (Agieement p 2, <J8), 
[5] Thereafter Chimento and [Broadstone] shall share 50/50 in net operating income 
of the project (Agreement p 2, %6), 
[6] Permanent financing will "take out" all financed construction costs the project 
will secure the same The parties agree to consult as to the amount of 
permanent financing which may exceed the above and, if agreed, such excess to be 
applied as follows to Chimento to reimburse the following order as available, (I) 
land closing costs, (n) allocated construction costs, I e building 1 and building 2, (in) 
allocated site improvement costs, I e building 1 and building 2, and after Chimento 
capital repaid in full, to each 50/50 (Agreement p 2, ^10, 
[7] Subsequent capital transactions (refinances, sales, casualty or condemnation) after 
debt repayment to (I) remaining unpaid Chimento capital, and thereafter (n) to each 
50/50 (Agreement p 3,^1), 
[8] All decisions regarding the project shall be mutually made after consultation 
(Agreement p 3,^3), 
[9] Monthly construction and leasing reports to be submitted by Hatch (Agreement 
p 3, <I4), and 
[10] Hatch development entity (not Utah LLC) shall enter into a consulting 
agreement with Chimentos, individually, with regard to property development 
inclusive of the project, to a term running through March 1, 2001, for a fee of 
6 
$24,000 00 per month payable monthly commencing July 1, 2000 (except the July 
1 2000 payment shall be $12,000 00 (Agreement p 3, 19) 
Joint proprietary interest in the subject matter. 
While joint tenancy alone does not of itself create a joint venture or pdiineiship,351-SPR's 
piopnetary inteiests in the Pioject severely undernames its assertions that it was merely a "cieditoi" 
or "investoi" on the Project 51-SPR doe^ not dispute that both parties had ownership inteiests in 
the Pioject, at the outset4 And since December 13, 2000, 51-SPR has owned the property in fee 
simple except for one day 5 It is undisputed that as of November, 2002, "[t]he Northshore building 
II is 100% occupied, and the Northshore Building I is approximately 70% occupied [and] 51 SPR 
receives about $70,000 per month for tenants, but pays $20,000 or $30,000 to the bank to debt 
sei vice the construction loan "6 
Mutual right to control. 
' Utah Code Ann §48-1-4 
4
 According to counsel for 51-SPR, "Mr Chimento testified that, after discovering 
Broadstone and Hatch's misappropriation, breach of duty, and fraud, he believed that 
Broadstone's interest in the property should be surrendered to 50-SPR " 51-SPR's response to 
EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial summary judgment, p 15 However, 
"the surrender of Broadstone's interest in the Property has been called into question by Dan 
Parkinson" Id (citing Chimento Aff at 525) I note that regardless of the current ownership 
status of the pioperty (at worst 51-SPR retains a one-half interest), the undisputed facts satisfy 
the "joint piopnetary interest" factor in determining joint venture status 
5
 51-SPR does not dispute that at the end of January, 2001, it conveyed the property to 
Broadstone and Broadstone reconveyed the Property to 50-SPR the next day 51-SPR's response 
to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial summary judgment, p 12 
6
 W , p 16, % 11 (citing Chimento Dep P 125-26) 
7 
As an owner of the Project property, 51-SPR had the right to control the activities relating 
to the Project Nothing in the parties' Agreement abrogated 51-SPR's nght to control, but only 
insured that nght While Broadstone had authority to obtain long term financing, enter into 
construction contracts, supervise construction, and obtain leases on the buildings, it was required to 
"pledge" its "ownership interest and control to Chimento" (Agreement p 2, ^l) (emphasis 
added)7 Significantly, the Agreement provided "All decisions regarding the project shall be 
mutually made after consultation " (Agreement p 3, %3) (emphasis added) 
51-SPR asserts that Chimento rarely visited the construction site, and did not actually 
"approve" construction draws, and that he did not believe he had veto power over the tenants on his 
property Even if these assertions are true, the degree of control actually exercised by 51-SPR is not 
determinative of the control factor The terms of the Agreement, together with 51-SPR's ownership 
of the property, unquestionably gave 51 -SPR the nght to exercise mutual control on "all decisions 
legarding the project" 
In addition, 51-SPR had the nght to receive monthly reports from Broadstone under the 
Agreement It is undisputed that Chimento visited the construction site at least six times, and 
reviewed leases and construction draws to "keep abreast of the management" of the Project8 Given 
both the terms of the Agreement and the actual control9 exerted by 51-SPR in this case, I simply 
7
 This suggests that Broadstone was an agent for 51-SPR 
8
 51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial 
summary judgment, p 24 
9
 Counsel for 51-SPR admits that when 51-SPR "discovered Broadstone's fraud" it then 
"executed the Termination of Co-Ownership Agreement" and now collects monthly rents on the 
8 
cannot credit 51 -SPR's conclusory allegation that Broadstone "had sole responsibility and authority 
to develop and manage the Property."10 
Right to share in the profits. 
Utah law provides "the receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima 
facie evidence that he is a partnei in the business," Utah Code Ann § 48-1-4(4) While 1 do not 
address whether "profits" were actually received in this case, the Agreement gave both parties the 
right to share in the profits from the Project The Agreement provided that 51-SPR would receive 
a monthly 10% "return on its capital" to be guaianteed by Broadstone. Any net operating income 
remaining in the first year would go to Broadstone 1 he second year, 51 -SPR would have the option 
to receive a 10% "return on its capital" or to share 50/50 in net operating income of the project 
Thereafter the parties were "to share 50/50 in net operating income of the project." (Agreement p 
2, ^8) (emphasis added) Mr. Chimento himself, acknowledged the 50/50 arrangement in his 
deposition.11 
A duty to share in any losses which may be sustained. 
51-SPR argues that it "never agreed to share in any losses incurred by Broadstone," but that 
it "merely agreed to seive as an investor or financier in the development of the Property "12 Mi 
property 
10
 51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial 
summary judgment, p 24 
11
 Chimento Dep pp 137-138. 
12
 51-SPR's response toEPCO's supplemental memorandum m support of partial 
summary judgment, p 20 
9 
Chimento's affidavit sates "51-SPR was not liable or responsible foi any losses, liabilities, or 
responsibilities relating to the Property, and under its arrangement with Broadstone, stood to lose 
only its investment in the Property and nothing more "13 While these bald assertions contradict 
EPCO's position, they do not create any genuine issue of material fact 51 -SPR's denials of liability 
ai e simply conclusory allegations which are sharply contradicted by both the terms of the Agreement 
and the undisputed facts 
The terms of the Agreement, 51-SPR's ownership interest in the Project, and 51-SPR's 
undisputed actions all gave nse to 51-SPR's duty to share in any losses which may be sustained by 
the Project There is no indication from the facts that the parties expected the Project to be anything 
less than profitable, thus it is no surprise that loss-shanng duties were not spelled out in detail 
However, the Agreement essentially put 51-SPR's $2 9 million immediately at risk should the 
venture completely fail In addition, the Agreement made 51-SPR one half owner14 of a tenancy in 
common with all the accompanying liabilities of a real property owner, including applicable tax and 
toil liabilities The Agreement did not purport to limit Chimento's duty to shaie losses by providing 
that "Chimento will execute mortgage as to its tenancy in common interest to secure institutional 
construction financing but will not be obligated on any Note or by way of guarantee at any time " 
13
 Chimento affidavit, % 10 
14
 In addition, by its terms, the Agreement required that Broadstone's "ownership interest 
and contiol shall be pledged to Chimento to secure [its] and Hatch's obligations," and that 
"[Broadstone] shall mortgage its tenancy in common interest to Chimento " (Agreement, p 2 
n i-2) 
10 
(Agreement, p 1,17) (emphasis added) 15 However, 51-SPR apparently ignored or waived this 
provision when it agreed with Central Bank in April, 2002 to guarantee "Broadstone's" #4 3 million 
construction loans 
Simply put, the Agreement. nd the undisputed facts demonstrate that this is not a case of 51-
SPR acting as a simple creditor to Bioadstone 51-SPR insists that it only guaranteed Broadstone's 
loans to avoid foreclosuie One may wondei, however, whether foreclosure would have been so 
great a concern if, as it alleges, 51 -SPR was merely a secured creditor in a priority position In fact, 
however, 51-SPR voluntanly conveyed the Project property to Broadstone for one day in January 
2001 so that Broadstone could secure additional financing for the Project In doing so, 51-SPR 
voluntanly put its own property at greater nsk of loss in furtherance of the joint venture 
The parties' characterizations. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that "[t]he charactenzations given by the parties 
are certainly not determinative" of the joint venture relationship Rogers v M O Bitner, 738 P 2d 
1029, 1032 Thus, it is not dispositive to the joint venture or partnership determination that the 
Agreement provided that the project would merely be "held foi investment" or that the parties' tax 
leturns would "reflect that the property is held as tenants-m-common interests and not as a 
partnership " ,6 In contrast, 51-SPR's letter wntten by Robert Chimento to Richard Ellsworth on 
15
 A partial limitation on 51-SPR's liability for losses would not preclude a finding of 
joint venture under the Basset factors In making the joint venture determination, the duty to 
shaie losses is a factor "unless there is an agreement to the contrary " Bassett v Bakei, P 2d 
(emphasis added) 
16
 Agreement, p 2,<j[4andp 3,f][7-8 
11 
October 9, 2001 is telling Mr Chimento's letter discusses the "handling" of the pioject by Guy 
Hatch and later states 
Please realize that it was never our intent to be late in our payments to anyone, and 
we certainly had good reasons to support the statements we made to you that led you 
to believe that you would be paid by now If not for the economic uncertainty 
resulting from the 9/11 attacks, our Buyer and/or our permanent financing would 
have closed by now 
(emphasis added) 
Whether these written statements create partnership by estoppel,17 they demonstrate Mr Chimento's 
understanding of 51-SPR's joint obligation to EPCO for work performed on the Project 18 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the undisputed material facts, I grant EPCO's motion for partial summary 
judgment 51-SPR is liable to EPCO as a joint venturer or partner with regard to sei vices rendered 
pursuant to the contracts and change orders executed between Broadstone and EPCO relating to the 
Project 19 
17
 See Utah Code Ann §48-1-13 "When a person by words spoken or written or by 
conduct represents himself to anyone as a partner he is liable to any such person to whom 
such representation has been made who has on the faith of such representation given credit to the 
actual or apparent partnership When a partnership liability results, he is liable as if he were 
an actual member of the partnership When no partnership liability results, he is liable jointly 
with the other persons so consenting to the representation as to incur liability, otherwise 
separately " Id 
18
 Interestingly, in the same letter, Mr Chimento suggests that "[a]nother possibility" to 
ensure EPCO's receipt of payment "is a partnership of some kind " Chimento suggests, "perhaps 
we could both make a profit " 
19
 While 1 believe it may be possible to conclude that 51 -SPR was the principal owner of 
the Project with Broadstone merely acting as its agent, I do not make that finding today Because 
I find 51-SPR liable to EPCO as a partner or joint venturer with Broadstone, I do not reach the 
12 
Dated this 4 Day of January, 2003. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and 
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
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vs 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No 010405059 
Judge Gary D Stott 
On December 8, 9, and 10, 2003, this Court conducted a three-day bench trial 
Arguments were presented to the court concerning various motions submitted by Ellsworth 
Paulsen Construction Company ("Ellsworth Paulsen"), and 51-SPR LLC ("51-SPR") At the 
trial, the following issues were addressed (1) the status of certain change ordeis, (2) abuse of 
hen right under U C A §38-1-25, (3) wrongful hen under U C A §38-9-1, (4) contract damages, 
and (5) attorney's fees 
1 
Pnoi to the trial, both parties submitted memoranda of points and authorities in further 
support of their positions After considenng the arguments presented by the parties at the 
hearing, the Couit requested additional briefing on issues related to Ellsworth Paulsen's 
recoverability of the value of extra work and pre judgment interest calculation The Court has 
considered all memoranda submitted by the parties the arguments presented at tnal, the relevant 
case law and statutory provisions, and being fully advised in the matter, issues the following 
ruling 
BACKGROUND 
51 SPR, as a joint venture with Guy Hatch and Broadstone Investments, L C 
("Broadstone") entered into an agreement with Ellsworth Paulsen to construct two commercial 
buildings, Northshore Building I and Northshore Building II, on leal property located in 
American Fork, Utah 
Richard Ellsworth has been the sole owner of Ellsworth Paulsen since 1984 Mr 
Ellswoith has his general contractor's license and is an engineer Guy Hatch was the apparent 
ownei of the project in question Prior to the commencement of the project in question, Mr 
Hatch and Ellsworth Paulsen had participated in the construction of a project in American Fork 
that consisted of approximately six buildings Mr Hatch acted as the construction manager of 
the American Fork project and also functioned in that capacity for the North Shore project 
Ellsworth Paulsen contends that the North Shore project was ultimately completed as required 
and monies are due and owing from Broadstone and 51 SPR 
To finance construction of Building I and Building II, Broadstone obtained construction 
loans for each building from Central Bank During the course of construction, Ellsworth Paulsen 
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oi Broadstone would submit periodic diaw requests to Central Bank requesting payments for 
Ellsworth Paulsen and the subcontractors for work performed on the buildings The 
subcontractors Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate, prepared and submitted diaw requests for 
Ellsworth Paulsen, and Ellsworth Paulsen prepared comprehensive payment -equests which were 
submitted to Broadstone Broadstone then prepared a payment request which was submitted to 
Central Bank and Central Bank prepared checks for payment to Ellsworth Paulsen and the 
subcontractors Once the diaws were approved, joint checks were issued b\ Central Bank and 
forwarded to Broadstone and Ellsworth Paulsen for disbursement to the it pccuve 
subcontractors 
Because the subcontiactors and Ellsworth Paulsen were not iullv paid tor the services 
and materials provided to Building 1 and/or Building II, each recorded mechanic's hens against 
the property in the office of the Utah County recordei Ellsworth Paulsen also filed a Notice of 
Lien on November 13, 2001 and filed an amended Notice of Lien on November 16, 2001 with 
the Utah County Recorder's Office Ellsworth Paulsen sent a copy of the Notice of Lien filed on 
November 16, 2001, to the reputed owner of the property, Broadstone Investments, via certified 
mail and to Robert Chimento of 51-SPR via certified mail Ellsworth Paulsen also filed a timely 
lis pendens 
Judge Schofield previously determined that 51-SPR and Broadstone were in a joint-
venture and that 51-SPR was liable for the amounts owed Ellsworth Paulsen, if any, by reason of 
its relationship with Broadstone The parties are well-aware of the historical ielationship 
between Broadstone and 51-SPR This Court finds it unnecessary to further recite information 
with respect to that relationship and the historical information in the litigation that has brought 
3 
the parties to the time of trial Rather, this Court focuses specifically on its findings and 
decisions as to issues that were addressed at the time of trial 
FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
A. Change Orders 
1 The balance due and owing on North Shore Building I is in the amount of 
$199,830 53 The balance due and owing on Noith Shore Building II is in the amount of 
$364,991 26 These amounts are reflected by information contained in Plaintiffs Exhibits 5 and 
6, respectively 
2 As to the pioperty referred to as the Williams property, the evidence establishes 
that Guy Hatch contacted Mr Ellsworth showing to him drawings which proposed the 
development of the Williams property including Buildings I and II on the property in question 
Mr Hatch, the primaiy principal and owner of the property for Buildings I and II, lequested that 
Mr Ellsworth enter into an agreement with him wherein Ellsworth Paulsen paid the sum of 
$110,000 to Vintage Construction for what Mr Ellsworth assumed was to be for engineering 
design work and other costs for the Williams property and possibly for Building II 
3. Ellsworth Paulsen gave a check to Vintage Construction for $110,000 which 
included $32,000 for the Broadstone project and $78,000 for the Williams North Shore project 
The evidence establishes that Mr Hatch did not inform Mr Ellsworth how the money was to be 
used and where the funds were to go Mr Ellsworth assumed, based on his conversations with 
Mr Hatch, that the monies would go to those two respective projects Mr Hatch instructed Mr 
Ellsworth that a change order for Building II in the amount of $78,000 could be applied in that 
fashion 
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4 As the result of a conversation with Mr Hatch Mr Ellsworth was unsure how the 
$78,000 was to be used but was informed that Hubble Engineeung would be involved on the 
project and Mr Hatch further represented that Ellsworth Paulsen would be repaid the $78,000 
5 Mr Ellsworth paid the $78,000 as per the instruction of Mr Hatch, without 
determining wheie the money was going and how it was going to be applied to the project Mr 
Ellsworth idied upon representations of Mr Hatch, as the owner and construction manager of 
the project, as to how the money would be used with assurances that Broadstone would be 
responsible for the repayment to Ellsworth Paulsen 
6 During the course of the project, Mr Hatch disappeared Ellsworth Paulsen 
attempted to find Mr Hatch but for a significant period of time was unable to do so As of 
Novembei 2001 Ellsworth Paulsen became aware that 51-SPR was somehow involved in the 
project, but did not know their status or relationship with Mr Hatch Mr Hatch was eventually 
found by representatives of Ellsworth Paulsen to be living in Hawaii A number of change 
orders had been requested by Mr Hatch for the project in question, the work had been done by 
Ellsworth Paulsen, and yet the change orders had not been signed Eventually, Mr Hatch agreed 
to sign all the change ordeis sent to him in Hawaii for that purpose 
7 The evidence establishes that Mr Hatch would directly contact the subcontractors 
working on the project, in most instances without first communicating with Ellsworth Paulsen, 
and would make requests for changes The work and changes requested by Mr Hatch were 
completed and in many cases Ellsworth Paulsen found out about the changes after the fact 
8 The evidence establishes that all of the requests for change orders by Mr Natch 
were performed by the subcontractors and Ellsworth Paulsen with work being completed as 
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requested and Ellsworth Paulsen ultimately being assured by Mr Hatch on behalf of Broadstone 
that the subcontractors would be paid for their work The change orders took place in this 
fashion in both Building I and II It was not the custom or practice of Ellsworth Paulsen or Mr 
Hatch/Broadstone, to communicate with the architect for approval of the change orders In fact, 
the process for requesting change orders and having them approved involved eliminating the 
aichitect from that procedure both by Ellsworth Paulsen and by Broadstone 
9 As to the information reflected in Defendants' Exhibit 64 pertaining to Building 1, 
all of the work requested in Mr Hatch's change orders on behalf of Broadstone was completed 
by Ellsworth Paulsen 
10 Although the evidence establishes that the parties entered into the agreement for 
the development of the project to construct Building I and II using AIA document forms, this 
Court finds that the custom and practice between Ellsworth Paulsen and Broadstone resulted in a 
deviation from the requirement for change orders as contained in the AIA documents As the 
general custom and practice, and as a result of the relationship between Ellsworth Paulsen and 
Mr Hatch/Broadstone, all of the change orders were not written and signed off on prior to the 
time work began The change orders were done at the request of Mr Hatch without consultation 
by him with the architect, and as established in many instances, without consulting with 
Ellsworth Paulsen Instead, Mr Hatch directly communicated and instructed the subcontractors 
to make changes 
11 By reason of the agreed upon procedure and process for processing change orders 
Broadstone waived any claim that all the change ordeis must be signed and the court finds that 
all work requested by Mr Hatch/Broadstone of the subcontractors and Ellsworth Paulsen was 
completed 
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12 The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen cannot collect fiom 51-SPR the $78,000 it 
paid Mr Hatch/Bioadstone Mr Hatch's activity and participation w ith respect to the Williams 
property did not relate to his agreements with Mr Chimento and 51-SPR for the development of 
the Auto Mall/Nonh Shore project, nor was the Williams property part of the development of the 
two North Shore buildings 
B. Mr. Wilson 
13 The evidence establishes that Mark Wilson \va>» the aichitect on the project and Mr 
Hatch asked him to design Northshore Buildings 1 and 11 Mr Wilson contracted with 
Broadstone and Mi Hatch lor work he did on the pioject The eudence does not indicate that 
Mi Wilson evei dealt with 51-SPR as to any work he perfoimed on the project 
14 The evidence establishes that on occasion, Mr Hatch would meet with Mr Wilson 
and discuss the status of the project But Mr Hatch, on behalf of Broadstone, left Mr Wilson 
out of the loop in lequesting and approving change orders Mr Hatch himself contacted the 
subcontractors directly without prior consultation with Mr Wilson Mr Wilson was eventually 
informed by Mr Hatch of the change orders that were requested and work that was performed on 
both Buildings of the Northshore project 
15 Mr Wilson based upon his meetings with Mr Hatch believed that all of the work 
required by Mr Hatch from Ellsworth Paulsen was performed according to the change order 
lequest On rare occasion, the evidence establishes that Ellsworth Paulsen brought change 
orders to Mr Wilson ior his approval and signature 
C. Mi Chimento 
16 Mr Chimento is a real estate developer residing in California 51-SPR is an entity 
established by Mr Chimento Mr Chimento and his biother met Mr Hatch in approximately 
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1999 and over a period of time discussed with him the development of what Mr Chimento 
ieferred to as the Auto Mall property in American Fork The testimony of Mr Chimento 
establishes that as of approximately August 2001, as a result of discussions between Mr 
Chimento on behalf of 51 -SPR and Mr Hatch, on behalf of Broadstone, that Mr Hatch 
voluntarily surrendered all of his interest in the project involving Buildings I and II The 
evidence establishes that at all times during the development and construction of Buildings 1 and 
II, Mr Hatch had the authority for an acted on behalf of Mr Chimento and 51-SPR 
17 The evidence establishes that Ellsworth Paulsen had no reason to submit the 
change orders for approval by 51-SPR because Ellsworth Paulsen was unaware of 51-SPR's 
interest in the project 
18 Shortly befoie the completion of the project, Mr Ellsworth became aware of Mi 
Chimento and communication ensued between Mr Ellsworth and Mr Chimento Mr Ellsworth 
advised Mr Chimento that Ellsworth Paulsen had not been paid for its work on the project and 
Mr Chimento assured Mr Ellsworth that he would look into the matter and determine what 
needed to be done to assure payment to Ellsworth Paulsen and complete construction on the 
project 
D. Notice of Interest 
19 The evidence establishes that the Notice of Interest, Defendants' Exhibit 22, was 
prepared and filed by Ellsworth-Paulsen on or about April 2, 2001 The Notice of Interest was 
filed because Broadstone was delinquent in its payments to Ellsworth Paulsen Subsequent to 
the filing of the Notice of Interest and after discussing the same with counsel, Ellsworth Paulsen 
released the Notice of Interest on or about February 28, 2002 as per Plaintiffs Exhibit 26 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATED 
TO THE PARTIES' CLAIMS 
I Breach of Contract 
20. This Court has previously determined that, as Broadstone's partner and joint-
venturer, 51-SPR is liable to Ellsworth Paulsen for Broadstone's contract debts. The evidence 
establishes that 51-SPR failed and refused to pay the June, July, and August 2002 draw requests, 
thereby breaching its contract with Ellsworth Paulsen. The court further finds that Ellsworth 
Paulsen completed all of the required work, and there is no evidence to establish that any of the 
work is defective or otherwise has problems. 
21. Therefore, this Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to the amounts set 
forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit 27 less the $78,000 Williams property request. 
II Abusive Lien 
22. 51-SPR has made a claim pursuant to LLC.A. §38-1-25 for abuse of lien right in 
which it has characterized as a malicious lien claim. This claim pertains to activity associated 
with the Williams property and the recordation of a lien by Ellsworth Paulsen in the amount of 
$78,000. In determining whether 51-SPR is entitled to relief under 38-1-25, the Court adopts the 
findings previously recited herein with respect to the Williams property and the $78,000 paid by 
Ellsworth Paulsen to Mr. Hatch and Broadstone. 
23. Section 38-1-3 of the Utah Code provides the following: 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing 
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration or 
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner . . . shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they 
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or 
equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively . . . 
This Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen believed it was entitled to lien, because the lien was 
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put in place at the instruction of Mr Hatch in order to ensure reimbursement to Ellsworth 
Paulsen for the $78,000 At the time the $78,000 was paid and at the time the hen was filed, 
Ellsworth Paulsen did not know how much of the $78,000 was used or applied to the 
construction of Buildings I and II Ellsworth Paulsen acted m good faith and upon the 
instructions of the owner of the property when placing its hen 
24 Section 38 1-25 of the Utah Code describes the penalties to be imposed upon 
those parties who commit an abuse of hen right This Section states 
(1) Any person entitled to record or file a hen undei Section 38 1-3 is guilty ol a 
class B misdemeanor who intentionally causes a claim of lien against any 
property, which contains a greater demand than the sum due to be lecorded or 
filed 
(a) with the intent to cloud the title, 
(b) to exact from the owner or person liable by means of the excessive 
claim of lien more than is due, or 
(c) to procure any unjustified advantage or benefit 
(2) In addition to any criminal penalties under Subsection (1), a person who 
violates Subsection (1) is liable to the owner of the propeity or an original 
contractor or subcontractor who is affected by the hen for the greater of 
(a) twice the amount by which the wrongful hen exceeds the amount 
actually due, or 
(b) the actual damages incurred by the owner of the propeity 
The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen did file a hen against the property in question, 
however, Ellsworth Paulsen did not intend to cloud the title to exact more than it believed was 
due or procure an unjustified advantage 
25 The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen acted in good faith in claiming the $78,000 
based upon the instruction and direction given by Mr Natch and Broadstone The Court finds 
that Ellsworth Paulsen's only intent in filing the hen was to ensure payment of the $78,000 it had 
given to Vintage Construction at the direction of Mr Hatch, the owner of the property The 
recording of the hen was done solely at the direction of Mr Hatch to ensure that Ellsworth 
Paulsen would be reimbursed for the $78,000 it paid At the time the $78,000 was paid and at 
10 
the time the hen was filed, Ellsworth Paulsen as a result of its conversations with Mr Hatch, did 
not know how much of the $78,000 was used or would be applied to the constiuction of 
Buildings I and II This Court finds that the hen was not intended to extiact from the owner 
more than was due or procure an unjustified advantage because the lien was filed for the amount 
to be reimbuised to Ellsworth Paulsen 
26 Ellswoith Paulsen did not cause the hen to be filed with the intent to cloud the 
property to exact moie than it believed was due or procure an unjustified advantage, thus this 
Court finds no violation of U C A §38-1-25(1) Since the Couit does not find a violation of 
Subsection (1) the penalties in Subsection (2) do not apply However, Ellsworth Paulsen is not 
entitled to judgment against 51-SPR for such amount 
111. Wrongful Lien 
27 As to the wrongful hen claim, the evidence establishes that Mr Ellsworth filed the 
Notice of Interest because Mr Hatch/Broadstone were delinquent on the payments due Ellsworth 
Paulsen, and someone in his office told him it was a good idea The Notice remained a matter of 
public record from the time of filing, on April 2, 2001, until it was removed on February 28, 
2002, immediately following Mr Ellsworth's consultation with counsel The Court finds that 
the Notice of Interest was not authorized by the owner of the real property, Mr Hatch, and was 
not a proper document to have been filed by Ellsworth Paulsen 
28 In order for 51-SPR to claim civil liability for the filing of a wrongful hen against 
Ellsworth Paulsen 51-SPR must qualify under U C A §38-9-1, as either the record inteiest 
holder or record owner of the property in question According to U C A §38-9-1 (6) 
'Wrongful hen" means any document that purports to create a hen or 
encumbrance on an owner's inteiest in certain real property and at the time it is 
recorded or filed is not 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute, 
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(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the state, or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the ownei of 
the real property 
Utah Code Ann §38-9-1(6) (emphasis added) 
29 The Court finds that there is no evidence of a recorded mteiest by 51-SPR during 
the time in question Based on the evidence produced, the Court finds that there was a real estate 
purchase agreement between Broadstone and 51-SPR pertaining to the property in question dated 
June 15, 2000 (See Defendants' Exhibit 56), but there is no evidence of recordation of ownership 
interest in 51-SPR during the time in question The evidence only establishes an unrecorded real 
estate agreement without any notice to Ellsworth Paulsen of 51 SPR's interest in the North 
Shore project 
30 The record owner at the time of iecording of the wrongful hen was 
Hatch/Broadstone 51-SPR was not the record owner at the time the Notice of Interest was filed 
The Notice of Interest was filed and recorded in Apnl 2, 2001 The release was filed on 
February 28, 2002 There has been no evidence presented for the Court to find that 51-SPR was 
the record owner as defined by U C A §38-9-1 at the time of the recording of the document, nor 
has there has been any evidence to establish that a wrongful hen had any negative impact on 51-
SPR's subsequent ownership of the property 
31 Section 38-9-4 of the Utah Code sets forth the damages and civil liability for filing 
a wrongful hen The language of the statute provides that 
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or for treble 
actual damages, whichever is gieater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs, 
who records or files or causes to be lecorded or filed a wrongful hen as defined in 
Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real property, 
knowing or having reason to know that the document 
(a) is a wrongful hen, 
(b) is groundless, or 
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(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim 
Utah Code Ann §38-9-4(3) 
The Court finds that the Notice of Interest was an improper document to have been filed by 
Ellswoith Paulsen 
32 Furthermore, no request was made by Hatch or Broadstone to lemove the Notice 
and, under the applicable statute Ellsworth Paulsen would be liable to the iecord owner at the 
time of the recording of the document 51-SPR did provide notice to Ellsworth Paulsen by a 
letter from Mr Chimento dated November 29, 2001 to remove the Notice of Interest (See 
Defendants' Exhibit 51), and the claim was subsequently removed on February 23, 2002 
33 There has been no evidence to establish that as of the date of Mr Chimento's letter 
to Ellsworth Paulsen, that 51-SPR was a "record interest holder" of the real property The only 
evidence of ownership to the real piopeity presented at the time of trial consisted of the deed of 
trust and promissory notes to Buildings I and II establishing Broadstone as the owner without 
any refeience to 51-SPR 
34 The Notice was released at the direction of Ellsworth Paulsen's counsel and no 
actual damages were proved Also, no evidence of attorney's fees were proved by 51-SPR in 
connection with the removal of the wrongful hen This Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen is 
liable to 51-SPR in the amount of $3,000 Any claim for attorney's fees under U C A §38-9-4 is 
denied 
IV. Retention and Retention Interest 
35 As to the issue of retentions, the evidence produced by Ellsworth Paulsen 
establishes that the claimed retentions for Building I were m the amount of $92,939 39 The 
claimed retentions for Building II were in the amount of $47,142 77 
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36. The Court finds that the custom and practice of Ellsworth Paulsen was to submit 
requested draws to Central Bank or Broadstone, Central Bank was to make payments based on 
these draws. The retentions represent amounts not actually paid by Central Bank Ellsworth 
Paulsen's position is that it is entitled to interest on those amounts as retained amounts by 
Centra] Bank and/or Broadstone. The evidence establishes that such monies were never 
physically accounted for and retained and identified as such by Central Bank or Broadstone The 
amounts claimed as retained monies do not exist 
37 As to the calculation of retention interest amounts, the evidence does not support a 
finding that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to its claim for retention interest against 51-SPR The 
monies claimed by Ellsworth Paulsen for retention were never withheld, never identified as 
retained funds by Central Bank or 51-SPR. 
38. Furthermore, Ellsworth Paulsen's claim against 51-SPR for retention interest is 
denied U C.A. §13-8-5(10)(b)(i) requires that Ellsworth Paulsen prove Broadstone and or 51-
SPR knowingly and wrongfully withheld a retention in order to recover. U.C.A §13-8-5(l)(b) 
states 
(b)(i) Any owner, public agency, original contractor, or subsequent who 
knowingly and wrongfully withholds a retention shall be subject to a charge of 
2% per month on the improperly withheld amount, in addition to any interest 
otherwise due. 
The Court finds that Broadstone and 51-SPR did not withhold retention proceeds, nor did 
they attempt to do so knowingly or wrongfully. The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen failed to 
present sufficient evidence to support a finding that §13-8-5 requires 51-SPR to be responsible 
for the payment of such monies. 
V. Pre-judgement Interest 
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39 With regard to Ellsworth Paulsen's claim for pre-judgment interest, the Court finds 
that Ellsworth Paulsen cannot recovery its claim for pre-judgment interest against 51-SPR It is 
undisputed that Ellsworth Paulsen never submitted to anyone its final payment application on 
Building I or the final two applications on Building II These three applications remain 
unsigned It is not possible foi the Court to set a specific date on which payment of the three un 
submitted applications became due The court has considered the information submitted by the 
parties subsequent to the time of trial with lespect to calculation of pre-judgment interest and the 
court cannot, as Ellsworth Paulsen suggests, simply "pick a date" from which interest begins to 
acciue 
40 The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen has not been successful in marshaling 
evidence 01 law to support a claim for pre-judgment interest and the court is unable to fix a date 
as to the time for calculation of that interest Based on the evidence presented at the time of trial, 
it is clear that a date cannot be sufficiently calculated Ellsworth Paulsen cannot recover its 
claim for pre-judgment interest on its three un-submitted payment applications 
41 However, the Court does find that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to pre-judgment 
contractual inteiest on its breach of contract claim as requested, but denies Ellsworth Paulsen's 
claim for interest on its mechanic's lien foreclosure claim 
VI. Attorney's Fees 
42 Attorney's fees are generally awarded to the prevailing party U C A §38-1-18(1) 
explains that a Court is allowed to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party 
(1) Except as piovided in Section 18-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action 
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful pa? ty shall be 
entitled to lecovei a reasonable attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court, which 
shall be taxed as costs in the action 
Utah Code Ann §38-1-18(1) (emphasis added) 
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43 By reason of the claims made by 51-SPR, this Court must make a determination as 
to which of the parties is the prevailing party entitled to make a claim for attorney's fees Under 
Pochvnok v Smedsrud, et al , 2003 UT App 375, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that the 
trial court was m a better position to determine which party was the prevailing party 
Considering all of the factors and formulas discussed in Pochynok, the Court finds from all the 
evidence presented, that Ellsworth Paulsen is the prevailing party in the case and is entitled to 
attorney's fees and costs The factors the Court relies on to support its findings that Ellsworth 
Paulsen is the prevailing party are as follows 
A Ellsworth Paulsen's breach of contract claim is granted 
B. The work was performed by Ellsworth Paulsen and the subcontractors on 
North Shore Buildings I and II at the direction of the owner, Mr Hatch 
and Broadstone, both under the terms of the contract and through change 
orders, with full compliance by Ellsworth Paulsen in performing all of the 
work requested by the owner 
C. Judge Schofield previously found that 51-SPR, by reason of a joint 
venture with Broadstone and Mr Hatch, stood in the same position as 
Broadstone 
D. The Court has reviewed all of the evidence produced with respect to the 
amounts claimed regarding the mechanic's hen claim and has evaluated 
those amounts at issue and determined that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to 
its claim on the mechanic's hen claim for amounts less the $78,000 
associated with the Williams property 
44 Considering the totality of all the evidence, even though a portion of the claimed 
amount was denied to Ellsworth Paulsen, the facts support a finding that Ellsworth Paulsen is the 
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prevailing party Funhermore, in this case, the facts distinguish the application of the Pochynok 
case, in Pochynok, there was an offer of judgment submitted which the Court of Appeals relied 
upon to reach its determination as to which party ultimately prevailed m the lawsuit Here, there 
was never an offer of judgment by 51-SPR or Broadstone 
VI. Reasonableness of Attorney Fees 
45 After the Court deteimined that Ellsworth Paulsen was the prevailing paity, and as 
such was entitled reasonable to attorneys fees Ellsworth Paulsen's counsel submitted an 
affidavit setting forth what it suggests are the reasonable attorney fees in this case As required 
by the case of A K & R Whipple Plumbing & Heating v Aspen Construction, 977 P 2d 518 
(Utah App 1999), Ellsworth Paulsen has allocated in its affidavit those attorney fees which are 
recoverable under the hen statute, from those fees which were incurred pursuing legal claims and 
theories for which it would not be entitled to a fee awaid As set forth in the affidavit of counsel, 
Ellsworth Paulsen, is claiming that it is entitled to $164,993 60 for fees which are related directly 
or indirectly to its mechanic's lien claim The Court has reviewed the affidavit using the factors 
set forth m Dixie Slate Bank v Broken, 764 P 2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988) These factors are 1) 
Was the legal work actually performed 7 2) How much of the work was reasonably necessary to 
prosecute and defend the matter7 3) Was the attorney's billing rate reasonable in light of the 
locality and type of services rendered7 4) Are there other factors requiring special 
consideration7 
46 As to the first factor, the court finds that the attorney fees presented by Ellsworth 
Paulsen represent fees for work actually performed The fees requested are not disproportionate 
to the amounts claimed or recovered This is particularly so considering the amounts which were 
originally claimed by Ellsworth Paulsen, before several of the subcontractors were eliminated 
from the case through settlement The court has reviewed the entries for the work claimed, and 
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recognizes that most of such work related to work being presented in one form or another in 
open court In this case, many of the issues presented in the form of motions and trial work 
evidence were inextricably tied to the mechanic's lien claims This includes the entries for such 
issues as the hen waivers, the timeliness of the hens, the writ of attachment, the legal work 
related to the alternate security, and like matters The court finds also that the amounts claimed 
by Ellswoith Paulsen as allocated to the claims foi which it can recover is reasonable in the 
amount of $164,993 60, and that the work reflected for those fees was actually performed 
47 As to the second issue of what legal work was reasonablely necessary to prosecute 
the case, the evidence supports the reasonableness of the fees as to this factor This action was 
complex from the beginning, with at least twelve different parties involved The record shows 
that there were approximately 21 depositions taken, and approximately 90 motions filed 51 
SPR asserted numerous counter claims, which could have defeated recovery under the hen, but 
which were defeated by Ellsworth Paulsen, primarily through motions 51 SPR has filed an 
affidavit in support of its default judgment against Broadstone and Hatch claiming fees in this 
case, and a much smaller related case, of $427,249 As such, the evidence supports Ellsworth 
Paulsen's contention that $164,993 60 is an appropriate and reasonable fee under the 
circumstances 
48 The Court also finds that the hourly rates charged by Mr Poulsen and Mr Reich, 
the attorney fees for Ellsworth Paulsen, are billing rates which are customarily charged by 
attorney's of their experience Mr Poulsen's rate through all but the last two months of this case 
was $170 per hour, and Mr Reich's rate was $140 per hour These rates are customary and usual 
for this type of legal work m Utah and Salt Lake Counties 
49 Finally, as to any special factors which support the award of fees in this case the 
court reiterates those points referred to above when it found that Ellsworth Paulsen was the 
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prevailing party m this case Those factors included the fact that 51-SPR breached the contract 
by failing to pay contract balances, and that all of the work, including the extra work, was 
properly and timely performed and contained no defects Accordingly, as Broadstone's joint 
venture partner, the work should ha\e been paid for by 51-SPR 
VII. COSTS 
50 Ellswoith Paulsen has submitted a \enfied memorandum of costs in which it seeks 
reimbursement for its costs in the amount of $7 467 73 The claimed costs consist of expenses 
for filing the action, services of piocess, witness lees, deposition transcripts, and certain limited 
duplication and blow-up charges for trial exhibits The court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen is only 
entitled to get the costs of depositions on those persons who actually testified at trial Ellsworth 
Paulsen has claimed costs for two deponants who did not testify at trial Those persons were 
Kyle Spencer whose deposition costs were $162, and Angela Solberg who deposition costs were 
$477 60 These sums are reduced out of Ellsworth Paulsen's claim for costs, leaving net costs 
allowed to Ellsworth Paulsen for costs of $6,828 13 
ORDER 
Based upon the forgoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows 
1 Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to a judgment in this matter on its breach of contract 
claims and mechanic's lien claims in the principle amount of $199,830 53 on Northshore 
Building 1 Ellsworth Paulsen is also awarded judgment for $364,991 26 on Northshore 
Building II, minus $78,000 for the change ordei iepresentmg amounts paid for work on the 
Williams property, and $3,000 for filing the Notice of Interest This leaves a net judgment of 
$483,821 79 ($364,991 26 + $199,830 53 = $564,821 79 minus $78,000 and minus $3,000 - Net 
Judgment $483 821 79) 
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2 Ellsworth Paulsen is further entitled to contractual interest of $57,863 94 in 
accordance with the attached Schedule "A This interest rate should be augmented by the 
interest which has accrued since December 22, 2003, (the day that Schedule "A" was prepared) 
through the date of this order, which sum is $7,768 47, for a total pre-judgment amount of 
$65,632 41 
3 Ellsworth Paulsen is also entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party in this 
case The reasonable attorneys fees awarded to Ellsworth Paulsen is $164,933 60 through 
February 17lh, 2004, to be taxed as costs as required by Utah Code Ann §38-18 1(1) 
4. Finally, Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to $6,828 13 to be taxed as costs 
In summary, Ellsworth Paulsen is awarded a judgment in the total amount, including 
principle, interest, attorney fees and costs of $721,215 93 Based upon the 10% per annum 
interest rate set forth in the parties' contract, this judgment shall continue to bear interest post-
judgment at 10% per annum, and any judgment rendered herein may be augmented by Ellsworth 
Paulsen's reasonable attorney fees through collection The total judgment rendered in this case 
may be enforced against the Alternate Security Bond on file with the Court in which Capitol 
Indemnity Coiporation is the surety 
Dated this (If day of V ^ f c o 0 4 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
R Stephen Marshall 
Erik Olsen 
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SUMMARY OF INTEREST DUE ON ELLSWORTH PAULSEN'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS 
Pay Request # 
Building 1 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
8 
9 
Building II 
2 
3 
7 
7 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
9 
10 
Date 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
4/16/2001 
none 
12/15/2000 
1/11/2001 
5/31/2001 
5/31/2001 
7/17/2001 
7/17/2001 
7/17/2001 
7/17/2001 
7/17/2001 
none 
none 
Due Date 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
5/16/2001 
none 
1/14/2001 
2/10/2001 
6/30/2001 
6/30/2001 
8/16/2001 
8/16/2001 
8/16/2001 
8/16/2001 
8/16/2001 
none 
none 
Date Paid 
4/16/2001 
5/7/2001 
6/27/2001 
7/5/2001 
7/18/2001 
7/26/2001 
7/31/2001 
8/10/2001 
12/31/2002 
10/14/2003 
12/10/2003 
not paid 
not paid 
not paid 
2/2/2001 
2/21/2001 
7/31/2001 
10/15/2003 
12/31/2002 
10/15/2003 
10/15/2003 
12/10/2003 
not paid 
not paid 
not paid 
Invoice Amount 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
47,429 87 
27,938 67 
8,000 00 
26,974 91 
10,343 70 
34,260 58 
3,961 18 
11,139 70 
800 80 
2,089 02 
16,133 59 
36,457 43 
87,138 17 
76,234 93 
345,284 19 
260,050 42 
7,342 50 
1,71086 
10,601 00 
119,425 00 
32,978 00 
59,509 41 
83,146 18 
197,079 64 
78,465 15 
Days Late 
11 
32 
83 
91 
104 
112 
117 
127 
635 
922 
979 
991 
950 
0 
19 
11 
31 
837 
502 
790 
790 
846 
858 
0 
0 
Interest Rate 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
TOTAL 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
TOTAL 
GRAND TOTAL FOR BOTH BUILDINGS 
Interest Due 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
142 94 
244 94 
181 92 
672 53 
294 72 
1 051 28 
126 97 
387 60 
-
-
9,898 44 
22,679 80 
-
35,681 15 
1 797 37 
783 71 
62 36 
-
-
-
-
19,539 35 
-
-
22,182 79 
57,863 94 
Hansen seitlement 
Westwood settlement 
Halverson settlement 
never submitted 
Allstate settlement 
Hansen settlement 
Allstate settlement 
Westwood settlement 
I lalver^in settlemenl 
nevei submitted 
never submitted 
lis 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT0 ^ ° 'n- LVfi^*/ 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, 
et al , 
Defendants 
FINDINGS AND ORDER 
Case No 010405059 
Judge Gary D Stott 
On March 6, 2003 oral arguments were presented to the court concerning various motions 
and cross-motions for summary judgment submitted by 51-SPR LLC ("51-SPR"), Central Bank, 
Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company ("Ellsworth"), Allstate Electric, Inc ("Allstate"), 
Westwood Mill & Cabinet, lnc ("Westwood"), and Halverson Mechanical, Inc ("Halverson") 
At the hearing, 51-SPR was represented by R Stephen Marshall and Erik A Olson, Central Bank 
was represented by Bruce A Maak, Ellsworth was represented by Mark L Poulsen, Allstate was 
represented by Conrad H Johansen, Westwood was represented by David R Nielson, and 
Halverson was represented by Dana T Farmer The three issues addressed were (1) lien waivers, 
(2) timeliness of hens, and (3) failure to post a payment bond 
After considering the arguments presented by the parties at the hearing, the information 
filed by the parties, and the relevant case law and statutory provisions, the Court issued its written 
ruling on April 7, 2003 Counsel for Halverson was to prepare an order consistent with the 
Court's ruling within 20 days from the date of the ruling Halverson's counsel submitted its 
proposed order on May 8, 2003 51-SPR also submitted a proposed order Objections to 51-
SPR's proposed order were filed and/or joined by Halverson, Westwood, Allstate, and Ellsworth 
51-SPR filed an objection toHalverson's proposed order After considenng counsels' objections 
to the proposed orders, and finding good cause for said objections, this Court issues its own 
Findings and Order as follows 
FINDINGS 
1 51-SPR, as a joint venture with Broadstone, entered into an agreement with 
Ellsworth Paulsen to construct two commercial buildings, Northshore Building 1 and Northshore 
Building II, on real property located in Amencan Fork City, Utah County, State of Utah and more 
particularly described as (the "Property") 
2 Ellsworth began work on Building I on June 23, 2000 and began work on Building 
II on September 26, 2000 
3 Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate entered into subcontract agreements with 
Ellsworth to provide materials and labor for the construction of Building I and Building II 
4 Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate entered into separate subcontracts with 
Ellsworth for each building 
5 In addition, Broadstone contracted directly with other contractors, including 
Allstate, to provide construction materials and services for the two buildings 
6 Dunng the entire course of bidding, contracting, and construction, the 
subcontractors and Ellsworth were properly licensed contractors by the State of Utah 
7 To finance construction of Building I and Building II, Broadstone obtained a 
construction loan for each building from Central Bank 
8 After work on the project commenced, Central Bank recorded its first trust deed 
against the American Fork Property upon which the buildings were to be built on January 3 1, 
2001 
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9. During the course of construction, Ellsworth or Broadstone would submit periodic 
Draw Requests to Central Bank requesting payments for Ellsworth and the subcontractors for 
work performed on the buildings. 
10 The subcontractors, Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate, prepared and submitted 
draw requests to Ellsworth, and Ellsworth prepared comprehensive payment requests which were 
submitted to Broadstone Broadstone then prepared a payment request which was submitted to 
Central Bank and Central Bank prepared checks for payment to Ellsworth and the subcontractors 
11 Each of the checks prepared by Central Bank included language regarding the 
release of hen rights The operative portion of the release stated 
In consideration of payment of this check, payee by negotiating this check waives, 
releases, and relinquishes all rights of lien or claims payee may have up to the date of the 
draw request described on the reverse side hereof (the "Draw Date75), upon the Property 
described on the reverse side hereof (the "Property") 
* * * 
This instrument shall not be negotiable if any of the above language has been stricken or 
modified by the payee or endorser 
12 While it is disputed whether or not the "Draw Date" and the "Property" 
description were identified on the reverse side of any Central Bank checks, Central Bank and 51-
SPR concede that this information was not described on the reverse side of all checks 
13 Each Central Bank check identified an "Account Number" and a "Customer 
Name" on the face of the Check 
14 Once the draws were approved, joint checks were issued by Central Bank and 
forwarded to Broadstone and Ellsworth for disbursement to the respective subcontractors 
15 When Ellsworth presented checks to the subcontractors they were also required to 
execute an Ellsworth document entitled "Waiver of Lien" wherein it was clearly indicated which 
of the two buildings the payment was intended to apply toward and the date through which the 
waiver was to apply 
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16 On or about June 29, 2001, Central Bank issued checks to Ellsworth jointly 
payable to several of the subcontractors, including Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate 
17 Those checks were tendered by Ellsworth and accepted by Halverson, Westwood, 
and Allstate as payments for matenals and services provided to Building I 
18 The subcontractors and Ellsworth endorsed each check and credited it as payment, 
believing the checks were payment for matenals and services on Building I through the following 
dates Halverson, February 23, 2001, Westwood, February 28, 2001, and Allstate, March 22, 
2001 
19 These checks were the last checks received as payment on Building I 
20 The last draw date request that was paid to the subcontractors for materials and 
services provided on Building II was for the draw requests for matenals and services through the 
following dates Halverson, March 23, 2001, Westwood, no payments received, and Allstate, May 
31, 2001 
21 Subsequent draw requests from Ellsworth and the subcontractors for Building 
I and Building II have not been paid 
22 The following work represents the last work performed on Building I AT&T 
Sheetmetal, a subcontractor to Halverson, was working on Building 1 as late as September 20, 
2001, Ellsworth employees and its subcontractors were performing work on Building I in 
September and October 2001 
23 The following represents the last work performed on Building II Kimco Fire 
Protection, Inc , a subcontractor hired by Ellsworth to install a fire spnnkler system, provided 
work through September 6, 2001, Clayco, Inc , a subcontractor hired by Ellsworth to install 
drywall, provided work on Building II through approximately September 28, 2001, Design West 
Acoustics, a subcontractor hired by Ellsworth to install acoustical ceilings, provided work on 
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Building II through October 16, 2001, and Allstate provided work on Building II through 
October 16,2001 
24 Because the Subcontractors and Ellsworth were not fully paid for the services and 
materials provided to Building I and/or Building II, each recorded mechanic's liens against the 
Property in the office of the Utah County recorder 
25 Specifically, the following liens were filed against the property Allstate Lien 
#97623 2001 filed 9/26/01, Allstate Lien #113169 2001 filed 11/2/01, Halverson Lien # 
122267 2001 filed 11/26/01. Halverson Lien #122268 2001 filed 11/26/01, West wood Lein # 
122532 2001 filed 11/26/01, Ellsworth Lien # 117013 2001 filed 11'13/01, and Ellsworth 
Amended Lien #119260 2001 filed 11/16/01 
26 On December 7, 2001, within 30 days after filing the hen, Halverson delivered by 
certified mail a copy of the notices of lien to Broadstone as the reputed owner of the Property 
27 Broadstone was reputed to be the owner of the Property on Halverson's 
subcontracts with Ellsworth 
28 Also on December 7, 2001, Robert Chimento, acting as the managing member of 
51-SPR, sent a demand to Halverson asking that Halverson remove its liens from the Property 
and acknowledging 51-SPR's possession and knowledge of Halverson's liens 
29 A copy of Westwood's notice of lien was sent via certified mail, return receipt 
requested, to 51-SPR at the address on the latest Real Property assessment roles of Utah County. 
30 Westwood recorded a lis pendens against the Property with the Utah County 
recorder on March 15, 2003 
31 A copy of Allstate's notices of lien were sent via certified mail, return receipt 
requested, to 51-SPR at the address on the latest Real Property assessment roles of Utah County 
as the reputed owner and were received by an agent of 51-SPR on or about September 25, 2001 
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and November 3, 2001 respectively 
32 Allstate recorded a lis pendens against the property with the utah County recorder 
on April 17, 2002 
33 Ellsworth Paulsen sent a copy of the Notice of Lien filed on November 16, 2001, 
to the reputed owner of the property, Broadstone Investments via certified mail and to Robert 
Chimento of 51-SPR via certified mail 
34 Ellsworth Paulsen filed a Notice of Lien on November 13, 2001 and filed an 
amended Notice of Lien on November 16, 2001 with the Utah County Recorder's Office 
35 Ellsworth filed a lis pendens with the office of the Utah County recorder on April 
3, 2002 
36 The costs of the construction, alteration, or improvement to Building 1 and 
Building II each exceeded $2,000 00 
37 Neither 51-SPR nor Broadstone obtained a payment bond prior to contracting for 
the improvements to the Property 
38 51 -SPR contracted with Broadstone for the improvement of the Property 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows 
1 Lien Waivers By endorsing the Central Bank checks, Ellsworth, Halverson, 
Westwood, and Allstate waived their claims and lien rights for work performed prior to the date 
that their draws were requested, but not for work performed subsequently The date of the draw 
request is the date on which each such contractor or subcontractor requested the draw, not the 
date the check was received or cashed 
2 Timeliness of Liens The work performed on the Property after May 31, 2001, 
was not trivial It involved a significant amount of labor and services and was done at the request 
of the owner The time as to work completion did not begin to run until the job was done as per 
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the request of Broadstone and/or 51-SPR Having sufficiently specified the date of work 
completion with respect to each building, Halverson's lien is determined to be timely filed 
Moreover, since no dispute has been raised with respect to Allstate's lien, Allstate's lien is also 
considered to be timely Halverson's and Allstate's motions for summary judgment as to the 
timeliness of their liens are granted Attorney fees are also granted to Halverson and Allstate. 
The Court reserves for future determination the issue of whether the mechanic's liens of 
Westwood and Ellsworth are timely 
3. Failure to Post a Payment Bond The motions for summary judgment of 
Halverson, Allstate, and Westwood are granted The Court concurs with the December 30, 2002 
Ruling of Judge Schofield where 51-SPR was held to be an owner and joint venturer with 
Broadstone with respect to the Property, and therefore is jointly liable for all the liabilities 
incurred by Broadstone in furtherance of the joint venture, specifically, its failure to post a 
payment bond Attorney fees are also granted as allowed by statute As to Ellsworth's motion 
for summary judgment, the Court has not received sufficient evidence to find that it is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on the payment bond issue and therefore denies the same 
DATED this U day of June, 2003 
BY THE COURT 
Gary^yStott / 
Fourth DistricKludgek^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 010405059 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail DANA T FARMER 
ATTORNEY DEF 
4 72 3 HARRISON BLVD #2 00 
SUITE 200 
OGDEN, UT 84403 
Mail CONRAD H JOHANSEN 
ATTORNEY DEF 
45 W 10000 S #300 
SANDY UT 84 07 0 
Mail BRUCE A. MAAK 
ATTORNEY DEF 
18 5 SOUTH STATE, SUITE 13 00 
P.O. BOX 11019 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84147 
Mail R. STEPHEN MARSHALL 
ATTORNEY DEF 
111 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 900 
111 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 900 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Mail DAVID R NIELSON 
ATTORNEY DEF 
45 W 10000 S #300 
SANDY UT 84 070 
Mail MARK L POULSEN 
ATTORNEY PLA 
10885 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SANDY UT 84 07 0 
Dated t h i s 10 day of JuKlj , 20 ^ 3 -
Deputy Courtr C l e rk 
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UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, 
etal , 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case No. 010405059 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs5 and Defendants' motions for summary 
judgment. The Court having heard oral argument on March 6, 2003, having considered the 
information filed by the parties and the relevant case law and statutory provisions, and being folly 
advised, issues the following: 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
Defendant Broadstone Investments, L.C., ("Broadstone") entered into two agreements 
with the plaintiff, Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company ("Ellsworth Paulson"), under which 
Ellsworth Paulsen agreed to act as general contractor in the construction of two buildings on a 
real estate development located in American Fork, Utah known as the North Shore Project (the 
"Property"). The contract for construction of the first building was dated March 22, 2000, and 
the contract for construction of the second building was dated September 12, 2000. To fond the 
construction of the two buildings ("Building I" and "Building IT'), Broadstone entered into two 
separate loan agreements with Central Bank, and Central Bank recorded a separate Deed of Trust 
for each building. 
Ellsworth Paulsen entered into agreements with various subcontractors, including, 
Halverson Mechanical, Inc., ("Halverson"), Allstate Electric, Inc., ("Allstate"), Westwood Mill & 
Cabinet., ("Westwood"), and Masco Contractor Services, Inc., dba Hansen-All Seasons 
Insulation ("Hansen"), to provide labor and/or services for the construction of the buildings. 
During construction, Ellsworth Paulsen or Broadstone would submit periodic Draw Requests to 
Central Bank requesting payments for Ellsworth Paulsen and its subcontractors for work 
performed on the buildings. Ellsworth Paulsen or Broadstone dated each Draw Request and 
specified on the Draw Request whether the draw was for Building I or Building II. Ellsworth 
Paulsen or Broadstone also periodically completed and submitted to Central Bank the AIA 
Document G702, an Application and Certificate for Payment ("AIA Payment Application"), 
which set forth in detail the total work completed with respect to the construction agreement, the 
amounts of approved change orders, and any payment due for the relevant time period. 
An appropriate bank officer would review each Draw Request and AIA Payment 
Application received by Central Bank and give approval before Central Bank could disperse the 
loan proceeds to Broadstone, Ellsworth Paulsen, or any subcontractors. After approval, Central 
Bank provided to Ellsworth Paulsen corresponding checks drawn on either the Building I loan or 
the Building II loan, as appropriate, which Ellsworth Paulsen could then distribute to its 
subcontractors. The face of each check bore the account number for the respective loan on which 
they were drawn, and above the endorser signature line on the reverse side of each check was the 
following lien release provision: 
In consideration of payment of this check, payee by negotiating this check waives, 
releases, and relinquishes all right of lien or claims payee may have up to the date of the 
draw request described on the reverse side hereof (the "Draw Date"), upon the property 
described on the reverse side hereof (the "Property"). The payee certifies that this check 
is payment for labor and materials that were actually performed upon and furnished to the 
Property. Payee warrants and guarantees under penalty of fraud that payment in full has 
been made by payee to the suppliers of all labor and materials to the Property incurred up 
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IU me uraw uaie at tne insistence ot payee. Payee agrees to indemnity and hold harmless 
the owner of the Property and Central Bank or its assigns from any loss, claims, or 
expenses incurred by them of or rising out of any liens or claims made against the Property 
by any supplier of labor or material at the insistence of payee. This instrument shall not be 
negotiated if any of the above language has been stricken or modified by the payee or 
endorser. 
Ellsworth Paulsen, Halverson, Westwood, Allstate, and Hansen allege that they have not 
been paid for all work performed on the Property, and have filed mechanic's lien notices for the 
unpaid labor or services to the Property. Central Bank and 51-SPR-LLC (a51-SPR"), co-owner 
and joint venturer with Broadstone, argue that such liens are invalid based upon the lien waiver 
language printed on the reverse side of the Central Bank checks and the alleged untimeliness of 
the mechanic's liens. The lien holders, however, assert that the liens were filed timely and that the 
lien waiver language on the checks is ambiguous and unenforceable, and in any event, 51-SPR is 
liable for the amount owed under the liens because it failed to obtain a payment bond as required 
by statute. Summary judgment is sought on the matter by all parties. 
ANALYSIS 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Fire Insurance Exchange v. Estate of Therkelsen, 27 P.3d 555, 558 (Utah 2001) 
(citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Under this standard, the Court will review the following issues: 
whether the Plaintiffs waived their right to file mechanic's liens on the Property; whether the 
mechanic's liens were timely filed; and whether Defendant was required to obtain a payment 
bond. 
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E. LIEN WAIVERS 
51-SPR and Central Bank claim that Ellsworth Paulsen, Halverson, Westwood, and 
Allstate waived all claims and lien rights for work performed on the Property up to the time that 
they endorsed and negotiated the Central Bank checks based upon the language printed on the 
reverse side of the checks To support their position, 51-SPR and Central Bank rely on 
Neiderhauser Builders and Development Corp v Campbell, 824 P 2d 1193 (Utah Ct App 
1992) In that case a contractor endorsed and negotiated a check on which was printed the 
following* 
In consideration of the payment of this check, the payee by endorsing, causing to be 
endorsed, stamping this check with a deposit stamp, waives, releases and relinquishes all 
right of lien or claims payee now has to date upon the premises described on the reverse 
side hereof 
The contractor in Neiderhauser argued that by endorsing and negotiating the check, he only 
released claims for the services for which payment was made by that particular check. See id. at 
1194-95. However, the court held that "[t]he lien waivers unambiguously waive all lien rights 
accrued to the date of the waiver/' 
In the instant case, the contractor and subcontractors argue that they only waived the right 
of lien for labor or services performed to the date of their draw request They also contend that 
the waiver language at issue in this case is ambiguous and unenforceable With respect to the 
effective date in which claims are barred, this Court agrees. The waiver language at issue here 
provides: "payee by negotiating this check waives, releases, and relinquishes all right of lien or 
claims payee may have up to the date of the draw request described on the reverse side hereof 
(the "Draw Date7'), upon the property described on the reverse side hereof (the "Property") 
Central Bank and 51-SPR concede that the draw date and property description was not 
always described on the reverse side of the check but maintain that the contractor and 
Ruling Page 4 
suocontractors snould have inquired as to the meaning of the "draw date" before negotiating the 
checks. This Court disagrees. The language "right of lien or claims payee may have up to the 
date of the draw request" implies exactly what a reasonable contractor or subcontractor would 
logically infer; the date of the draw request is the date the contractor or subcontractor requested 
the draw, not the date the check was received or cashed which could be, and was at times in this 
case, many months after the request. 
Regardless of whether the facts in Neiderhauser are similar or distinguished from the facts 
in the present case, the language at issue in Neiderhauser stated that the payee waives right of lien 
or claims payee "now has to date" upon the premises. The language at issue in this case states 
that the payee waives right of lien or claims payee may have "up to the date of the draw request". 
The distinction is significant. This Court finds that by endorsing the Central Bank checks, 
Ellsworth Paulsen, Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate may have waived their claims and lien 
rights for work performed prior to the date that their draw was requested but not for work or 
services performed subsequently. 
The contractors and subcontractors in this case performed certain labor or services to the 
Property and then requested payment for the work performed, which represented the amount 
owed as of the date the request was made. Neither the waiver language on the reverse side of the 
Central Bank checks, nor the trade custom in the construction industry, support the notion that 
the contractor or subcontractors, by accepting payment for work performed up to the date 
requested, somehow acted as an agreement to waive all claims for unpaid labor performed 
subsequent to that date. 
ffl. TIMELINESS OF LIENS 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(b), a notice of mechanic's lien must be filed within 90 
days from the date of final completion of an original contract or the lien is invalid. 51-SPR and 
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Central Bank claim that, according to Ellsworth Paulsen's final AIA payment application, 
Building I was 100% complete by May 31, 2001. Ellsworth Paulsen, Halverson, and Westwood's 
liens on Building I were each filed in November 2001, more than 90 days after May 31. 
However, the plaintiffs argue that work was performed on Building I subsequent to May 31, 
2001, and that the liens on both buildings were timely filed. 
While all plaintiffs do not describe the particular building, Ellsworth Paulsen claims that it 
performed work on the Property up until December 5, 2001 and its lien was filed on September 7, 
2001. Ellsworth Paulsen also asserts that it filed an amended lien on November 13, 2001, and 
November 16, 2001. In addition, after 51- SPR claimed that Ellswoth Paulsen's liens were 
defective for failing to recognize 51-SPR as the reputed owner of the Project, Ellsworth Paulsen 
filed another lien on February 21, 2002. (Ellsworth Paulsen's Second Amended Complaint for 
Foreclosure of Lien, filed April 29, 2002 p. 6). Halverson claims that it performed work on 
Building I up until September 20, 2001, and worked on Building II up until August 23, 2001. Its 
Mechanic's Lien was filed November 26, 2001. (Affidavit of Blair Halverson, filed May 28, 
2002). Westwood claims that it worked on the Project up until November 23, 2003 and filed its 
Mechanic's Lien on November 24, 2001. 
Central Bank and 51-SPR concede that labor or services were performed on the Property 
after May 31, 2001, but claim that the work performed after May 31, 2001 was trivial and not a 
continuation of the original contract. However, Plaintiffs argue that 51-SPR's partner, 
Broadstone, insisted that certain labor and/or services be performed on the Property after May 31, 
2002 before it would pay as agreed under the contract. (Blair Halverson depo, pp. 60-64). In 
Interiors contracting. Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs., 827 P.2d 963 (Utah App. 1992), a 
tenant informed the landlord that the tenant had completed improvements as agreed under 
contract. After inspection, it was determined that four minor items remained to be completed. A 
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mechanics's lien was then filed within the statutory period with respect to the four minor items 
but after the statutory period with respect to the date that the tenant informed the landlord that 
the work was complete. 
The trial court found that the lien was not timely because "the subsequent work was 
insubstantial, trivial, and could not be used to extend the statutory lien filing period." Id. at 965. 
On appeal, the court disagreed and held that a contract is not "completed" with respect to the 
statutory filing requirement until it has been accepted by the owner. Id. It stated that "the 
homeowner cannot be heard to say that this work, done at the request of his agent in order to 
complete the contract, was not a continuation of the previous work done under the same 
contract." Id. at 968. The court further stated that "[w]here a property owner will not accept 
lienable work as completed and refuses to pay for the same until satisfactory corrective work is 
done, such property owner is estopped from asserting that the contracted work had been 
completed as of an earlier date." Id. 
Considering all the information, this Court finds that the work performed on the Property 
after May 31, 2001 was not trivial; it involved a significant amount of labor and services and was 
done at the request of the owner. The time as to work completion did not run until the job was 
done as per the request of Broadstone/51 SPR. Nevertheless, with the exception of Halverson, 
who specified the date of work completion with respect to each building, and Allstate, whose 
timeliness was not disputed at the hearing, this Court cannot find from the evidence provided at 
this stage of the case that the liens were timely filed. Therefore, Halverson and Allstate's 
motions for summary judgment as to the timeliness of the liens are granted, but Ellsworth Paulsen 
and Westwood's motions for summary judgment as to this issue are denied. A date certain shall 
be set for Ellsworth Paulsen and Westwood to put on evidence regarding completion dates with 
respect to Building I and Building II. 
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IV PAYMENT BOND 
The Utah Code requires an owner to obtain a payment bond from the general contractor 
guarantying that the contractor's suppliers and subcontractors will be paid before the owner 
enters into a contract with the contractor if the cost exceeds $2,000 00 See Utah Code Ann § 
14-2-l(2)(a) (2001) "[A]n owner who fails to obtain a payment bond is liable to each person 
who performed labor or service or supplied equipment or materials under the contract for the 
reasonable value of the labor or service performed " § 14-2-2 Section 14-2-2 also provides 
for attorneys fees to the prevailing party in an action for failure to obtain a bond 
Under Section 14-2-1, Broadstone, as an owner, was required to obtain a payment bond 
before entering into a contract with Ellsworth Paulsen that exceeded $2,000 00 Broadstone 
failed to obtain the required bond and is therefore liable to Halverson, Westwood, Allstate, and 
Hansen for the reasonable value of the labor or service performed by them While all parties 
recognize Broadstone's liability under the statute, 51-SPR argues that it is not liable under the 
statute because Ellsworth Paulsen, the general contractor, was hired by Broadstone and not 51-
SPR However, in the December 30, 2002 Ruling of Judge Schofield, 51-SPR was held to be an 
owner and joint venturer with Broadstone with respect to the Property, and therefore is jointly 
liable for all the liabilities incurred by Broadstone in furtherance of the joint venture This Court 
concurs with that finding. Based on all of the evidence provided, this Court finds that 51-SPR is 
liable under the above statute as an owner and joint venturer with Broadstone and is therefore 
responsible to provide the payment bond as required by U C A § 14-2-2 
Therefore, the motions for summary judgment filed by the subcontractors in this case with 
respect to 51-SPR's obligation to obtain a bond are granted Attorneys fees as allowed under 
U C.A. § 14-2-2 are also granted As to Ellsworth Paulsen's position, however, this Court has 
not received sufficient evidence to find that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the 
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payment bond issue A date certain shall be set for the parties to put on evidence to address this 
issue 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, this Court grants (1) Ellsworth Paulsen, Halverson, Westwood, 
and Allstate's motions for summary judgment with respect to the issue of lien waiver; (2) 
Halverson and Allstate's motions for summary judgment as to the timeliness of the liens, and 
attorneys fees granted; and (3) Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate's motions for summary 
judgment regarding the issue of failure to obtain a payment bond, with attorneys fees as allowed 
by statute All other motions for summary judgment are denied Counsel for Halverson is to 
prepare an order consistent with this ruling within twenty (20) days of the date of this ruling and 
submit it to the Court for signature 
DATED this / day of April, 2003 
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Mark L. Poulsen (5424) 
Bret W. Reich (9542) 
NELSON,SNUFFER, 
DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
Fax: (801) 576-1960 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and 
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah 
limited liability company; CENTRAL BANK, 
a Utah banking corporation; 51-SPR-L.L.C, a 
Utah limited liability company; ALLSTATE 
ELECTRIC, a Utah corporation; HUBS TILE, 
INC., a Utah corporation; WESTWOOD 
MILL & CABINET, INC., a Utah corporation; 
DEBRA A. BURNETT and MICHAEL L. 
BURNETT, dba ALARM TECH; 
HALVERSON MECHANICAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation; MASCO CONTRACTOR 
SERVICES CENTRAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation dba HANSEN-ALL SEASONS 
INSULATION; DECORATIVE 
LANDSCAPING, INC., a Utah corporation; 
the DAN PARKINSON FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP; Guy HATCH, an individual; 
ORDER GRANTING 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
THE RULING ON THE 
TIMELINESS OF THE 
MECHANIC'S LIENS 
Civil No. 010405059 
Judge Stott 
Defendants. 
After reviewing the parties briefs regarding Ellsworth Paulsen's motion to reconsider the 
ruling on timeliness of its mechanic's lien, that the mechanic's lien is timely, valid and 
enforceable, the Court grants plaintiffs motion to reconsider and rules as follows 
FINDINGS 
1 AT&T sheetmetal, a subcontractor to Halverson, was working on Buidlmg I as late 
as September 20, 2001 Ellsworth employees and its subcontractors were working on Building 
I in September and October 2001 
2 Krmco Fire Protection, Inc , a subcontractor hired by Ellsworth to install a fire 
sprinkler system, provided work through September 6, 2001, Clayco, Inc , a subcontractor 
hired by Ellsworth to install dry wall, provided work on Building II through approximately 
September 28, 2001, Design West Acoustics, a subcontractor hired by Ellsworth to install 
acoustical ceilings, provided work on Building II through October 16, 2001, and Allstate 
provided work on Building II through October 16, 2001 
3 Ellsworth Paulsen filed a mechanic's lien against the property on November 13, 
2001 (Lien #117013 2001) and an amended hen on November 16, 2001 (Lien #119260 2001) 
4 Ellsworth Paulsen sent a copy of the Notice of Lien filed on November 16, 2001 to 
the reputed owner of the property, Broadstone Investments via certified mail and to Robert 
Chimento of 51 SPR via certified mail 
5 Ellsworth Paulsen filed a lis pendens with the office of the Utah County recorder on 
April 3, 2002 
2 
BASED UPON the foregoing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the work performed on the proerty 
after May 31, 2001 was not trivial It involved a significant amount of labor and services and 
was done at the request of the owner The tune as to work completion did not begin to run 
until the job was done as per the request of Broadstone and/or 51-SPR Having sufficiently 
specified the date of work completion with respect to each building, Ellsworth Paulsen's hen is 
timely filed and the hen is otherwise valid and enforceable Ellsworth Paulsen's motion for 
summary judgment as to the timeliness of its hen is granted Attorney fees are also granted to 
Ellsworth Paulsen 
DATED this ? day of ~ ^ ^ ^ - , 2003 ,v - ^ ^ 
i Yitt& \ 
Judge Gi5y D>Sott S t/.^J / 
Fourth District Judge s^J 
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Mark L. Poulsen (5424) 
Bret W. Reich (9542) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, 
DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 576-1400 
Fax: (801) 576-1960 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and 
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah 
limited liability company; CENTRAL BANK, 
a Utah banking corporation; 51-SPR-L.L.C, a 
Utah limited liability company; ALLSTATE 
ELECTRIC, a Utah corporation; HUBS TILE, 
INC., a Utah corporation; WESTWOOD 
MILL & CABINET, INC., a Utah corporation; 
DEBRA A. BURNETT and MICHAEL L. 
BURNETT, dba ALARM TECH; 
HALVERSON MECHANICAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation; MASCO CONTRACTOR 
SERVICES CENTRAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation dba HANSEN-ALL SEASONS 
INSULATION; DECORATIVE 
LANDSCAPING, INC., a Utah corporation; 
the DAN PARKINSON FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP; Guy HATCH, an individual; 
ORDER DENYING 51-SPR'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
THE RULING ON THE 
TIMELINESS OF BUILDING I 
LIENS 
Civil No. 010405059 
Judge Stott 
Defendants. 
Based upon the briefing submitted by the parties, the Court hereby denies 51 -SPR's motion 
to reconsider the ruling on the timeliness of Building I liens. 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 51 -SPR's motion to reconsider the ruling 
on the timeliness of Building I liens is denied. 
DATED this _ 3 _ day of '^)jjjj kjy 
J u 
, 2003 
~£M4J\/ 
x N \ 
JudgTCjaryp. Stott « . t ^ g p 
Fourth Disttict Judge 'v* ' " / ^ g g ^ ' / ? j 
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ELLSWORTH - PECK 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
195 East 600 South American Fork, UT 84003 
Rione 801-756-0404 FAX 801-756-0411 
Proposal Request #: ^ 
Proposal Date 2/28/01 
Date Pnnted 2/28/01 
Project Number 0016 
* < 
PROPOSAL REQUEST 
North Shore Office Building ^ V2, 0 
Submitted To 
Broadstone Investments L L C 
P O Box 385 
American Fork, Utah 84003-
Telephone ( ) 492 9646 
Fax ( ) 492 9645 
Mobile (801)360 8850 
TOTALS: 
Total Subcontractor 
We hereby submit the following 
ITEM 
Engineering Costs 
Subcontractor 
Ellsworth Peck Construction 
Engmeenng Costs 
QUANTITY 
1 Lump Sum 
UNIT PR4CE 
$78 000 00 
TOTAL 
$78 000 00 
$78,000 00 
TIME 
The time provided in the contract shall be changed by 0 Calendar Days 
Total of Subcontractor, $78,000 
TOTAL COST ESTIMATE: 
APPROVED: 
ENGINEER 
Mark Wi l son & Associates 
Mark Wilson 
By 
l A L L U O l t ^ U M A I t : - ^ 
PL WW. ^> J^i ^ ha*tY^ A- v**&L*x% ™^ 
1
 CONTRACTOR ( r ^ OWNER 
$78,000 
Architect 
Date 
El lswor th Peck Const ruct ion Company Broadstone Investments, L L C 
Allen W o o h b u a ^ ' \ y Guy Hatch 
By ^ 
Project Manager 
Date ' f \ I /VU ] Date 
ua^ -—^" i er 
<
^ ^ T W?i<*»ZSr By {2, 
, / office buildings ( , 
Page 1 of 1 for Change Proposal #7 pnnted on 2/28/01 Project Number 0016 
51-SPR 00695 
VUN1 AOfc CONSTRUCTION LLC invoice 
765 E 340 S ST. 203 
AMERICAN FORK, UT 84003 
DATE 
8/24/99 
INVOICED 
VC107 
BILL TO 
HPCO - Broastcnc Square BV 
pbascIV 
PO NO TERMS PROJECT 
MTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
Site Work 
fy/^ 
5 ^ it® 
Water, Sewer and Earthwork 110,000 00 110,000 00 
f/4 ^ 
Total sno.cccoo 
ELLSWORTH - PECK 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
195 Ess* 600 SoIrth • Ainsilean For* Utsli &4O03 
(BOI) 75&-040-4 • Fax (801) 766-0111 
ZIONS Rnsr NATIONAL BANK 
608 Easl Stale Rood r 
Amertain Fonk, Utah' &4063 
31-S/1240 
5 6 5 3 1 
0 8 / 2 7 / 1 9 9 9 * * * 1 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
PAY 
TO THC 
ORDER 
OF 
THE SUM OF ONE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS 
VINTAGE CONSTRUCTION 
ft THE HE'/EHSE SIDE OP THIS DOCUMENT INCLUDES AM ARTIFICIAL WATERMARK - HOLD A f AN ANGIE TO VIEW 
n'osss3in- i:i!i,oooo5t,i: as OOODU &»• .''00 1 1000000/ 
<0 
x5 &-
^ IV> 
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Mark L Poulsen (5424) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, 
DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone (801)576-1400 
Fax (801)576-1960 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and 
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah 
limited liability company; 51-SPR-L L C , a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MARK L. POULSEN IN 
SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY FEE 
AWARD 
Civil No 010405059 
Judge Gary D Stott 
ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Mark L Poulsen, being first sworn and under oath, states as follows 
1 I am an attorney licensed to practice law within the State of Utah and AM a shareholder 
of the law firm of NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P C 
2 At all times relevant hereto, 1 have been counsel to Ellsworth Paulsen Construction 
Company ("Ellsworth"), the plaintiff m the captioned case This affidavit is submitted pursuant to 
a Memorandum Decision and Findings entered on February, 3, 2004, by the Honorable Gary D 
Stott, awarding judgment, including attorney fees, to the Ellsworth as the prevailing party m a 
mechanic's hen case 
3 1 have been piacticmg law since 1982 1 am a member of the Utah and Illinois Bar 
Associations Since 1992,1 have been a shaieholdei in two previous law firms and my current law 
firm During the 21 yeais that I have piacticed law, 1 have specialized in construction disputes and 
constiuction litigation, with appioximately 90% of my piactice in those areas 1 am a membei of 
the Construction Arbitration Panel of the Amencan Arbitiation Association, and the Construction 
and Surety Sections of the American Bar Association I am also a member of the Construction 
Section of the Utah State Bar Association, and the Surety Association of Utah I have lectured and 
written articles on construction law, mechanic's lien law, and suiety law on numerous occasions 
4 I am generally familiar with the billing rates charged by attorneys in the Salt Lake and 
Utah County communities for services similar to those which 1 and my firm performed as counsel 
to Ellsworth 1 know the rates self forth below to be equivalent to the standard of the legal 
community, if not below, those of the vast majority of attorneys with similar expenence and 
expertise to myself and the associate with whom 1 worked on the captioned case 
5 My hourly rate during all times that ai e pertinent to this action has been $ 170 00 per hour, 
(except for the months of January and February 2004, when 1 changed my billable rates to $185 00 
per hour) There has been one associate who participated with me on this case His name is Bret 
Reich Mr Reich has been practicing law (m and outside the State of Utah) for ten years, and is an 
associate with my firm Mr Reich's hourly attorney fee is $140 per hour 
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6 Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "A1' is a true and correct copy of the attorney fees 
which I and my firm have generated in this case to the date of February 12lh, 2004 on behalf of 
Ellsworth This invoice consists of woik entnes kept contemporaneously with the dates the woik 
was done, and weie enteied daily m the oidmary course of business dining the duration of the case 
7 The bills appealing in Exhibit "A" depict all of the actual legal tasks undeitaken by 
myself and my firm dining theovei twoyeai and thiee month penod that this case has been pending 
The amount of time expended in each task, and the dollar amount associated therewith is sepai ately 
itemized The initials appearing on the bills aie those of Mai k Poulsen, Bret Reich, with four entries 
by a legal assistant named Mary Andeison who enteied a small amount of billable time for 
document contiol 
8 In my view, each of the tasks performed and identified in Exhibit "A" were reasonable 
and necessary to the proper prosecution of this case Specifically, they were necessary in order to 
foieclose the hens and otherwise defend the extensive allegations which were associated with this 
case For example, the record will reflect that there have been approximately ninety-six (96) 
motions filed m this case While Ellsworth's counsel was not involved in each of these, 1 was 
intimately involved in most of these motions in terms of briefing In addition, there were 
approximately 21 depositions which weie taken in the case I attended nearly all of them 
9 Numeious defenses and counterclaims were raised by 51-SPR during the course of the 
actions Some of these include allegations of Ellsworth not being licensed, allegations of fraud and 
misrepresentation, allegations of not being properly registered with the State, allegations of 
collaborating with Guy Hatch, wrongful hen and abusive hen claims, and like allegations, all of 
which Ellsworth has prevailed upon Under the holding of Perkins v First Geneial Sendees, 918 
P 2d 480 (Utah App 1996), when considering a fee affidavit, a court should allow recovery to the 
prevailing party for those fees inclined in deieating defenses and counterclaims, which would tend 
to extinguish or dimmish a hen claim 51-SPR filed a 31-count complaint dated appioximately 
September 18, 2002, against Ellsworth and others in which it was seeking unspecified damages, but 
which appear to total hundieds of thousands of dollais 
9 During several phases of this case, counsel foi Ellswoith attempted to get 51-SPR to 
settle the case so as avoid the e\ti aoidmary litigation costs which wei e being incurred For example, 
I requested mediation with 51-SPR several times within the First months of filing the case I have 
made several settlement overtures during the course of the case, including at least one m writing, all 
of which were rebuffed In affidavits filed by two subcontractors last September, they stated under 
oath that they had similar expenences in trying to resolve the case and shorten the litigation Very 
early in the case (May 2002), Ellsworth brought a motion for summary judgment on the hen claims 
and the joint venture claims 51 -SPR opposed the motion on the grounds that the case needed further 
discovery before the motions could be entertained The court permitted additional discovery under 
Rule 56(f), which then resulted m over six months of intensive deposition, document production, and 
interrogatory discovery 
10 In December 2002, at the close of discovery, Ellsworth Filed a new round of motions on 
the hen and joint venture claims, based upon the discovery to that point On January 2, 2003, Judge 
Schofield entered an order that 51-SPR was the partner and joint venturer of Broadstone At that 
point, 51 -SPR's liability for all unpaid contract amounts was Fixed and certain, yet it continued for 
4 
another year to contest the amount of damages Although its contractual liability was clear, 51 -SPR 
committed the parties to an intensive law and motion piactice, in ordei to determine the validity of 
the hens, and to keep the alternate security m place (o secuie an> ultimate judgment m the case In 
September 2003, the lemainmg subconti actors pi e\ ailed on their hen claims, and final judgments 
weie entered foi the subconti actois The months of Octobei Novembei and December weie 
occupied with pietnal motions trial and post tnal motions by both sides 
11 In the prepaiation of this affidavit foi iees, Ellswoith has allocated and separated its 
attorney fees to separate out fiom Exhibit LtA" those fees that aie reasonably connected to the 
theories of recovery to which Ellsworth is entitled to by virtue of it being the prevailing party on its 
hen claims, from those claims to which it is not entitled to lecover attorney fees For example, 
Ellsworth has separated out those attorney fees that are dn ectly i elated to the failure to obtain a bond 
claim, speaking to Utah County Detectives about the Criminal investigation of Guy Hatch, releasing 
the Notice of Interest, and like matters that do not tie to the entnes upon which Ellsworth is entitled 
to fees The entnes that Ellsworth has backed out of its request for fees aie as follows 
02/16/02 Wrote audit letter to Dames and Rasmussen, Legal Services 4 hrs 
@170/hr = 68, 02/19/02 Prepared release of Notice of Interest Reviewed file and 
scheduled appointment with title company in American Fork Researched merger 
doctrine m Utah Legal Services 3 5 hrs @ 140/hr - 490, 08/05/02 Spoke at length 
to Olympus Glass and to Oldcastle Glass trying to solve their claims Spoke to 
Brent Legal Services 3 his @ 170/hr - 51, 09/25/02 Reseaiched issue of 1031 
Exchange Was it valid? Legal Services 5 hrs @ 170/hr - 85, 09/30/02 Drafted 
motion to amend complaint to include claim against 51-SPR for failure to obtain a 
bond , Legal Services 5 his @ 140/hr = 70, 10/07/02 Finalized motion to amend 
complaint to include failure to obtain a bond claim against 51 -SPR Drafted motion 
and memorandum in support of motion and third amended complaint Legal 
Services 1 2 hrs @ 140/hr = 168, 10/11/02 Finalized motion to amend complaint, 
Legal Services 1 0 hrs @ 140/hr = 140, 11/08/02, Drafted notice to submit motion 
to amend and proposed order Legal Services 5 hrs @ 140/hr = 70, 12/11/02 Had 
5 
a 20-minute conversation with Decorative Landscapmg's attorney re his summary' 
judgment and how we intend to coordinate same Worked on issues for summary 
judgment as to failure to obtain a bond claim and related matters, Legal Services 1 3 
Ins @ 170/hr = 221,12/17/02, Worked on memorandum m support of judgment foi 
lailuie to obtain a bond Legal Services 6hrs@ 170/hr = 102,12/18/02 Reseaiched 
and finished wnting memorandum m support of motion for summary judgment on 
the fail me to obtain a bond claim Reviewed numerous cases that might ha\e 
application ,egal Seivices 5 2 hrs @ 170/hi = 884, 12/02/02 Reviewed documents 
recently produced by 51 -SPR regarding 1031 exchange and acquisition of Northshoi e 
development on 47 acre paicel and 6 acie parcel, Legal Services 2 0 hrs @ 140/hi 
- 280 12/17/02 Diafted failure to obtain a bond claim against 51 SPR, Legal 
Sen ices 3 0 Ins @ 140/hi = 420 12/18/02, Completed failure to obtain a bond 
summary judgment motion Legal Service 2 5 his @ 140/hr = 350, 01/20/03, Met 
with Richard Ellsworth in the morning to provide a leport to him Spent the entne 
rest of the day writing reply to 51-SPR's memorandum m opposition to EPCO's 
failui e to obtain a bond Legal Services 9 2 hrs @ 170/hr - 1564, 03/05/03 Prepared 
documents and exhibits for hearing on mechanic's hen and failure to obtain a bond 
claim, Legal Services 2 2 hrs @ 140/hr = 308, 03/06/03, Prepared for and attended 
heanng on mechanic's hen, failure to obtain a bond and hen waivers, Legal 
Services 3 8 hrs @ 140/hr = 532, 04/25/03, Spoke to County Attorney investigator 
about case against Hatch Legal Service 2 hrs @ 170/hr = 34, 05/23/03 Spoke to 
Brent Openshaw about concerns with interview with County investigator Called 
investigator and discussed issues with him at length Called Brent back and later 
spoke with Richard about his meeting with investigator, Legal Services 6 hrs @ 
170/hr = 102,07/15/03, Drafted and sent subpoena to Kent Mommsen for pi oduction 
of documents pertaining to the acquisition of the Williams property and the $78,000 
in engineering fees, Legal Services 5 hrs @ 140/hr = 70, 11/13/03 Worked for 
entire day and into the night researching and wntmg renewed motion foi summary 
judgment on the failure to obtain a bond claim, Legal Services 9 2 hrs @ 170/hr = 
1,564 
Total - $7,573 
12 Other than the $7,573 of fees referred to above that are not recoverable, the balance of 
the fees in the amount of $172,546 are directly or indirectly related to recovery in connection with 
the hen claims upon which Ellsworth has prevailed For example, there are a number of entnes 
related to prosecuting the joint venture claim These entnes are reasonably and inextricably tied to 
the hen claims This is so because, as the court knows, before a mechanic's hen can attach to the 
owner's interest, it must be shown that the work was performed at the "instance of the owner " See, 
Utah Code Ann § 38-1-18 Linking 51-SPR as a partner permits a showing that the work was 
6 
beme dene at the instance and knowledge of the owner Interior Conti actm* Inc v Navalco, 648 
P 2d 1382 (Utah 1982)(Case determined that lessee was agent 01 representative of the owner when 
it oideied improvements, thereby subjecting owner's property to a hen) Similaily, a gieat deal of 
fees in this case weie incurred m such motions as the wnt of attachment (which was gi anted by the 
court) and m securing the alternate security bond i elated to the leleasmg of the hens These issues 
weie dnectly 1 elated to 51-SPR's attempt to extucate itself from the hens Entnes refenmg to the 
subcontractors involved unifying defenses, addi essing hen waivei issues, motions on the timeliness 
of hens, and like issues which were piosecuted jointly with the subconti actoi s, so that all of the hens 
would be enforced jointly All of the time enteied at depositions, trial, collecting on the change 
oiders were allowed m terms of liability by the court as apart of the hen claims In addition, nearly 
all of Ellsworth's motions, and most of the motions brought by 51-SPR, were inextricably tied to 
the hen claims, as the hen issues were part and parcel of those claims and defense Finally, 
numeious entries are related to defeating motions by 51-SPR related to the wrongful hens, abusive 
hens, hen waivers, change orders, alternate security, timeliness of hens, and other claims which 
Ellsworth was required to defeat m order to collect on its hen claims 
13 With the $7,573 taken out of the $172,546 60 appearing as the total on Exhibit tcA", 
Ellsworth is claiming $164,993 60 ($172,546 60 - $7,573 = $164,993 60) in attorney fees as the 
prevailing party as of the date of February 12, 2004 
14 As noted above, all of the $164,933 60 fees requested herein were reasonably and 
necessanly connected to the advancement of this mechanic's hen foreclosure case The Mechanic's 
Lien Act §38-1-18 (1994) states that the court shall award attorney fees to the prevailing party The 
court has awarded such fees in its Memorandum Decision, including the specific findings upon 
which the attorney fees were awarded 
7 
15 Ellsworth's fees are a fraction of the $427,249 00 fees incurred by 51-SPR m this case 
(and the much smaller related case with Dan Paikmson) See Affidavit of Erik Olsen dated m 
suppoit of Default Judgment against Broadstone and Guy Hatch An award of Ellsworth's fees in 
the amount requested is consonant with the natuie and extent of the *ees the Court awarded to the 
subcontractois m this case At the time of the fee awaid to the subcontiactois, the Court noted that 
the vanous claims and defenses claimed by the subcontiactois weie inextricably tied to their 
mechanic's hen claims To be in harmony with those findings, the Court should permit the fees 
lequested herein 
16 Based upon the forgoing, Ellswoi th i espectfulty requests that its judgment be augmented 
by $164,933 60 m attorney fees, with a provision that the judgment maybe augmented by any future 
fees associated with collecting its judgment It further requests that any such awaid of fees and costs 
shall be recoverable from the Alternate Security Bond, naming Capitol Indemnity Corporation as 
the Surety, and Ellsworth as an obligee of that bond currently on file with the Court in this case 
Dated this [_J__ cfoy of February, 2004 
Mark L Poulsen L 
On this / / day of February, 2004, there appeared before me the individual who I know to 
be Mark L Poulsen, and witnessed to me that the forgoing affidavit was true and correct, and signed 
the forgoing m my presence 
tOTARY PUBLIO 
8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
] hereby certify that I caused to be served, via U S Postage, prepaid, facsimile, or hand-
delivery, a tiue and conect copy of the foiegomg AFFIDAVIT OF MARL L. POULSEN IN 
SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY FEES, on the following 
'£> 
R Stephen Marshall Sent via 
DURHAM, 10NES & PINEGAR Mail 
111 East Bioadway, Suite 900 Facsimile 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 X Hand-delivery 
Attorneys foi defendant 51-SPR. L L C 
DATED this (Y^day of Febiuary, 2004 
9 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT . ^ ! 3 , ^ ? i t 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case No. 010405059 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Clarify Ruling and/or 
Reconsider Ruling on the Applicable Interest. The Court has reviewed the file, the memoranda 
submitted by the parties, and being fully advised, issues the following ruling. 
RULING 
On March 8, 2004, this Court heard oral argument regarding objections to the final 
judgment. Plaintiff, Ellsworth Paulsen, submitted their Motion to Clarify Ruling and/or 
Reconsider Ruling on the Applicable Interest on March 11, 2004. 51 -SPR filed their Opposition 
on March 26, 2004. 
In its' Motion, Ellsworth Paulsen asks this Court to reconsider or clarify the applicable 
amount of interest to be awarded. Ellsworth Paulsen has submitted three potential calculations: 
(1) $188,401, based upon 10% interest from 30 days after payments became due on un-submitted 
draws, including amounts paid to subcontractors; (2) $144,496, based upon 10% interest from 30 
days after payments became due on un-submitted draws, not including amounts paid to 
subcontractors; and (3) $57,864, based upon an amended Schedule A. 
This Court finds that the issue of interest was specifically addressed, argued, and resolved 
at the March 8, 2004 hearing. The Court ruled, at the March 8. 2004 hearing, that Schedule A 
would be accepted regarding pre-judgment interest. The Court further indicated that the Plaintiff 
was not entitled to interest claimed for the subcontractors. Ellsworth Paulsen offers no new 
argument on its claims for a different valuation of interest or amounts already paid to 
subcontractors. Thus, this Court finds that Schedule A will be accepted regarding pre-judgment 
interest. 
Both Plaintiff and Defendant acknowledge in their briefs that Schedule A should be 
amended to increase the pre-judgment interest from an award of $53,254 56 to $57,863.94. 
$19,929.97 in extra work and disputed change orders was omitted from the original interest 
calculation in Schedule A. The Court finds that Schedule A shall be amended to include this 
amount. The Court finds that the pre-judgment interest award is $57,863.94, which amount 
should be reflected by the amendment of Schedule A. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. The pre-
judgment interest shall be as outlined in Schedule A, which will be amended to reflect the amount 
of $57,863.94. Counsel for 51-SPR shall prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit 
it to the Court for signature within twenty (20) days of the date of this ruling. 
DATED this ¥[ day of April, 2004. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 010405059 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail R. STEPHEN MARSHALL 
ATTORNEY DEF 
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR 
111 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 90 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail MARK L POULSEN 
ATTORNEY PLA 
NELSON SNUFFER DAHLE & 
POULSEN 
10885 South State Street 
SANDY UT 84 070 
Dated this c^O day of (A'/O/UJL^ 20 <P £ ^^£^, 
V 
Deputy Court Cl^-
V 
-~ ——^* »*-
Page 1 (last) 
R Stephen Marshall (2097) 
Erik A Olson (8479) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
] 11 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801)415-3000 
Facsimile (801)415-3500 
Attorneys for 51-SPR-LLC 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, L C , et 
al , 
Defendants 
51-SPR-LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, L C , et 
al, 
Defendants 
ORDER DENYING ELLSWORTH 
PAULSEN'S MOTION TO CLARIFY 
RULING AND/OR RECONSIDER 
RULING ON THE APPLICABLE 
INTEREST 
Civil No 010405059 
Judge Stott 
Civil No 020400442 
(Consolidated) 
Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company filed a Motion to Clanfy Ruling and/or 
Reconsider Ruling on the Applicable Interest on March 11, 2004 51 -SPR-LLC filed its 
memorandum in opposition to the motion on March 26 2004 The Court took the matter under 
advisement without a heanng On April 19, 2004, the Court enteied its Ruling, denying the 
motion to leconsider Having enteied its Ruling, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows 
1 Ellsworth Paulsen Constiuction Company's Motion to Clarify Ruling and/oi 
Reconsidei Ruling on the Applicable Lnteiest is denied, 
2 Interest is awarded to Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company m the amount of 
$57,863 94 Schedule A, previously filed by 51-SPR-LLC, shall be amended to leflect this 
amount of interest due 
DATED this _ jT day of Ap^j 2004 
BY THE COURT 
By 
Gary Stott 
District Cotdl Judge 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the L> day of Apnl, 2004,1 caused a copy of the foregoing 
ORDER DENYING ELLSWORTH PAULSEN'S MOTION TO CLARIFY RULING 
AND/OR RECONSIDER RULING ON THE APPLICABLE INTEREST to be mailed by 
U S Mail, postage prepaid, to the following 
Mark L Poulsen 
NELSON SNUFFER DAHLE & POULSEN 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
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' I J) f i t ^ S U M M A R Y OF INTEREST DUE ON ELLSWORTH PAULSEN'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS 
Pay Request # 
Building 1 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
8 
9 
Building II 
2 
3 
7 
7 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
9 
10 
Date 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
3/6/2001 
4/16/2001 
none 
12/15/2000 
1/11/2001 
5/31/2001 
5/31/2001 
7/17/2001 
7/17/2001 
7/17/2001 
7/17/2001 
7/17/2001 
none 
none 
Due Date 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
4/5/2001 
5/16/2001 
none 
1/14/2001 
2/10/2001 
6/30/2001 
6/30/2001 
8/16/2001 
8/16/2001 
8/16/2001 
8/16/2001 
8/16/2001 
none 
none 
Date Paid 
4/16/2001 
5/7/2001 
6/27/2001 
7/5/2001 
7/18/2001 
7/26/2001 
7/31/2001 
8/10/2001 
12/31/2002 
10/14/2003 
12/10/2003 
not paid 
not paid 
not paid 
2/2/2001 
2/21/2001 
7/31/2001 
10/15/2003 
12/31/2002 
10/15/2003 
10/15/2003 
12/10/2003 
not paid 
not paid 
not paid 
Invoice Amount 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
47,429 87 
27,938 67 
8,000 00 
26,974 91 
10,343 70 
34,260 58 
3,961 18 
11,139 70 
800 80 
2 089 02 
16,133 59 
36,457 43 
87,138 17 
76,234 93 
345,284 19 
260,050 42 
7,342 50 
1,710 86 
10,601 00 
119,425 00 
32,978 00 
59,599 41 
63,513 28 
197,079 64 
78,465 15 
Days Late 
11 
32 
83 
91 
104 
112 
117 
127 
635 
922 
979 
991 
950 
0 
19 
11 
31 
837 
502 
790 
790 
846 
858 
0 
0 
Interest Rate 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
TOTAL 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
10 0% 
Interest Due 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
142 94 
244 94 
181 92 
672 53 
294 72 
1 051 28 
126 97 
387 60 
-
-
-
9,898 44 
22,679 80 
-
35,681 15 
1,797 37 
783 71 
62 36 
-
-
-
-
-
14,929 97 
-
-
Hansen settlement 
Webtwood settlement 
Halvurson settlement 
never submitted 
Allblate settlement 
Hansen settlement 
Allstate settlement 
Westwood settlement 
Halveison settlement 
aftei deducting $19,632 90 
in invalid COs (Def Ex 37) 
never submitted 
nevei submitted 
TOTAL $ 17,573.42 
GRAND TOTAL FOR BOTH BUILDINGS $ 53,254 56 
Tab J 
Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and 
C o n t r a c t o r where the basis of payment is a S T I P U L A T E D S U M 
AIA Document A101-1997 
1997 Edit ion -Electronic Format 
THIS DOCUMENT HAS IMPORTANT LEGAL CONSEQUENCES CONSULTATION WITH AN ATTORNEY IS ENCOURAGED WITH RESPECT TO ITS 
COMPLETION OR MODIFICATION AUTHENTICATION OF THIS ELECTRONICALLY DRAFTED AIA DOCUMENT MAY BE MADE BY USING AIA 
DOCUMENT D401 
AJA Document A201 1997, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction is adopted in this document by reference Do not use with other general conditions 
unless this document is modified 
This document has been approved and endorsed by The Associated General Contractors of America 
Copyright 1915 1918, 1925, 1937, 1951 1958 1961, 1963, 1967, 1974, 1977, 1987, © 1997 b> The American Institute of Architects Reproduction of the material 
herein or substantial quotation of its provisions without wnnen permission of the AIA violates the copyright laws o rthe United States and will subject the violator to 
legal prosecution 
AGREEMENT made as of|hTl2th day of September in the year of 2000 ' 
(In words indicate day month andyear) 
BETWEEN the Owner 
(Name address and other information) 
3roadstone Investments LC 
>26 South State 
American Fork, UT 84003 
and the Contractor 
(Name address and other information) 
Ellsworth Peck Construction Company 
195 East 600 South 
American Fork, UT 84003 
The Project is 
Northshore II Office Buik3frn<£ 
BU)6. 2-
5D0 EnsnSrrre *~**^ 
American Fork, Utah 
The Architect is 
rName address and other information) 
Mark Wilson Architects 
\6 West Mam 
Lehi, UT 
The Owner and Contractor agree as follows 
ARTICLE 1 THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 
The Contract Documents consist of this Agreement, Conditions of the Contract (General, Supplementary and other Conditions), 
Drawings, Specifications, Addenda issued prior to execution of this Agreement, other documents listed in this Agreement and 
MA DOCUMENT AlOl -OWNER - CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT - 1997 EDITION - AIA - COPYRIGHT 1997 - THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF 
ARCHITECTS, 1735 NEW YORK AVENUE N W , WASHINGTON, D C 20006-5292 WARNING Unlicensed photocopying violates U S copyright laws and 
.vill subject the violator to legal prosecution This document was electronically produced with permission of the AIA and can be reproduced without violation until the 
iate of expiration as noted below 
Electronic Format A101-1997 
User Document* NORTHSHORE2.DOC - 9/12/2000 AIA License Number 110220, which expires on 10/6/2000 - Page #1 
hereto and supersedes prior negotiations, representations or agreements, either written or oral An enumeration of the Contract 
Documents, other than Modifications, appears in Article 8 
ARTICLE 2 THE WORK OF THIS CONTRACT 
The Contractor shall fully execute the Work described in the Contract Documents, except to the extent specifically indicated in 
the Contract Documents to be the responsibility of others 
ARTICLE 3 DATE OF COMMENCEMENT AND SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION 
3.1 The date of commencement of the Work shall be the date of this Agreement unless a different date is stated below or 
provision is made for the date to be fixed in a notice to proceed issued by the Owner 
(Insert the date ofcorng^r^j^aj^f^^ffersfrdm rhe date of this Agreement or if applicable slate that the date will be fixed in a nonce to proceed ) 
C^^onimencernent to begin September 25. 2000 This date of commencement is contingent upon a "fast track" building permit 
being issued by the City of American Fork bythis date It is understood that the Architect and pertinent engineers are contracted 
directly with the Owner and that the Contractor is dependent upon the Owner furnishing plans sufficient for the City that will 
allow Contractor to obtain the necessary building permits through all stages of construction 
If, prior to the commencement of the Work, the Owner requires time to file mortgages, mechanic's hens and other security 
interests, the Owner's time requirement shall be as follows see above 
3.2 The Contract Time shall be measured from the date of commencement 
3.3 The Contractor shall achieve Substantial Completion of the entire Work not later ffianl 82 calendardays from the date of 
commencement, or as follows In the event the commencement date is postponed due toro^fl t t^f t^r^actor , the amount of 
time of the postponement shall be added to the Date of Substantial Completion 
(Insert number of calendar days Alternatively a calendar date may be used \ihen coordinated with the date of commencement Unless stated elsewhere in the 
Contract Documents insert any requirements for earlier Substantial Completion of certain portions of the Work ) 
None 
, subject to adjustments of this Contract Tune as provided in the Contract Documents 
*flrlseriprovisions,^f^J^Jor liquidated damages, relating ^lojatlure^o^ompIetejjyn-lJJT^e\QrJor bonuspayments for early completion of the Work ) 
Contractor shall pay.a^erfalrV^fTive hundred ($500 00) dollars per working da^lT^oTlris-nQt-^Substantially Completed per 
Article 3 3 above Said penalty to apply only if delay is the fault of Contractor or it's subcontractors "~~~ ~ 
ARTICLE 4 CONTRACT SUM 
4.1 The Owner shall pay the Contractor the Contract Sum in current funds for the Contractor's performance <)fth^Contract The 
Contract Sum shall be One million eight hundred sixteen thousand seven hundred ninety Dollars ($ L816,790 00 ), subject to 
additions and deductions as provided in the Contract Documents ^^^'*rn-~»»r*^r^'***^ 
4.2 The Contract Sum is based upon the following alternates, if any, which are described in the Contract Documents and are 
hereby accepted by die Owner 
(State the numbers or other identification of accepted alternates If decisions on other alternates are to be made by the Chvner subsequent to the execution of 
this Agreement attach a schedule of such other alternates showing the amount for each and the date when that amount expires) 
4.3 Unit prices, if any, are as follows 
ARTICLE 5 PAYMENTS 
5.1 PROGRESS PAYMENTS 
5.1.1 Based upon Applications for Payment submitted to the Architect by the Contractor and Certificates for Payment issued 
by the Architect, the Owner shall make progress payments on account of the Contract Sum to the Contractor as provided below 
and elsewhere in the Contract Documents 
LA DOCUMENT AlOl -OWTJER - CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT - 1997 EDITION - AlA - COPYRIGHT 1997 THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF 
^CHITECTS, 1735 NEW YORK AVENUE N W , WASHINGTON, D C 20006 5292 WARNING Unlicensed photocopying violates U S copyright laws and 
II subject the violator to legal prosecution This document was electronically produced with permission of the AlA and can be reproduced without violation until the 
date of expiration as noted below 
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5.1.3 Provided that an Application for Payment is received b\ the Arcnitect not later than the lQthday of a month, the Owner 
shall make payment to the Contractor not later than the 25th day of the same month If an Application for Payment is received by 
the Architect after the application date fixed above, payment shall be made by the Owner not later than 20 days after the Architect 
receives the Application for Payment 
5.1.4 Each Application for Payment shall be based on the most recent schedule of values submitted by the Contractor in 
accordance with the Contract Documents The schedule of values shall allocate the entire Contract Sum among the various 
portions of the Work The schedule of values shall be prepared in such form and supported by such data to substantiate its 
accuracy as the Architect may require This schedule, unless objected to by the Architect, shall be used as a basis for reviewing 
the Contractor's Applications for Payment 
5 1.5 Applications for Payment shall indicate the percentage of completion of each portion of the Work as of the end of the 
period covered by the Application for Payment 
5.1.6 Subject to other provisions of the Contract Documents the amount of each progress payment shall be computed as 
follows 
1 Take that portion of the Contract Sum properly allocable to completed Work as determined by multiplying the 
percentage completion of each portion of the Work by the share of the Contract Sum allocated to that portion of the 
Work in the schedule of values, less retamage of none percent ( 0 %) Pending final determination of cost to the 
Owner of changes in the Work, amounts not in dispute shall be included as provided in Subparagraph 7 3 8 of AlA 
Document A201-1997, 
.2 Add that portion of the Contract Sum properly allocable to materials and equipment delivered and suitably stored at 
the site for subsequent incorporation in the completed construction (or, if approved in advance by the Owner, 
suitably stored off the site at a location agreed upon in writing), less retamage of none percent ( 0 %), 
.3 Subtract the aggregate of previous payments made by the Owner, and 
.4 Subtract amounts, if any, for which the Architect has withheld or nullified a Certificate for Payment as provided in 
Paragraph 9 5 of AlA Document A201-1997 
5.1.7 The progress payment amount determined in accordance with Subparagraph 5 l 6 shall be further modified under the 
following circumstances 
.1 Add, upon Substantial Completion of the Work, a sum sufficient to increase the total payments to the full amount of 
the Contract Sum, less such amounts as the Architect shall determine for incomplete Work, retamage applicable to 
such work and unsettled claims, and n/a 
(Subparagraph 9 8 5 of AlA Document A20I 1997 requires release of applicable retamage upon Substantial Completion of Work with consent 
of surety if any) 
.2 Add, if final completion ot the Work is thereafter materially delayed through no fault of the Contractor, any 
additional amounts payable in accordance with Subparagraph 9 10 3 of AlA Document A201-1997 
5.1.8 Reduction or limitation of retamage, if any, shall be as follows 
(If it is intended prior to Substantial Completion of the entire Work to reduce or limit the retainage resulting from the percentages inserted in Clauses 5 16 1 
and 5 16 2 above and this is not explained elsewhere in the Contract Documents insert here provisions for such reduction or limitation) 
n/a 
5.1.9 Except with the Owner's prior approval, the Contractor shall not make advance payments to suppliers for materials or 
equipment which have not been delivered and stored at the site 
5.2 FINAL PAYMENT 
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when 
1 the Contractor has fully performed the Contract except for the Contractor's responsibility to correct Work as 
provided in Subparagraph 12 2 2 of AlA Document A201-1997, and to satisfy oiher requirements, if any, which 
extend beyond final payment, and 
.2 a final Certificate for Payment has been issued by the Architect 
5.2.2 The Owner's final payment to the Contractor shall be made no later than 30 days after the issuance of the Architect's final 
Certificate for Payment, or as follows 
ARTICLE 6 TERMINATION OR SUSPENSION 
6 1 The Contract maybe terminated by the Owner or the Contractor as provided in Article 14 of AlA Document A20M997 
6.2 The Work may be suspended by the Owner as provided m Article 14 of AlA Document A201-1997 
ARTICLE 7 MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
7.1 Where reference is made in this Agreement to a provision of AIA Document A201-1997 or another Contract Document, the 
reference refers to that provision as amended or supplemented by other provisions of the Contract Documents 
7.2 Payments due and unpaid under the Contract shall bear interest from the date payment is due at the rate stated below, or in 
the absence thereof, at the legal rate prevailing from tune to tune at the place where the Project is located 
(Insert rate of interest agreed upon if any) 
Ten (10%) percent per annum thirty (30) days after the date of the Invoice for payment 
(Usury laws and requirements under the Federal Truth m Lending Act similar stale and local consumer credit laws and other regulations at the Owner's and 
Contractor's principal places of business the location of the Project and elsewhere may affect the validity of this provision Legal advice should be obtained 
with respect to deletions or modifications and also regarding rpqwrements such ai written disclosures or waivers ) 
7 3 The Owner's representative is 
(Name, address and other information) 
Guy Hatch 
826 South State 
American Fork, UT 84003 
7.4 The Contractor's representative is 
(Name address and other information) 
Richard Ellsworth 
address same as Contractor 
7.5 "Neither the Owner's nor the Contractor's representative shall be changed without ten days wrmen notice to the other party 
7.6 Other provisions 
ARTICLE 8 ENUMERATION OF CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 
8.1 The Contract Documents, except for Modifications issued after execution of this Agreement, are enumerated as follows 
8.1.1 The Agreement is this executed 1997 edition of the Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor, AlA 
Document A101-1997 
8.1.2 The General Conditions are the 1997 edition of the General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, AlA Document 
A201-1997 
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See Addendums 
i me Pages 
8.1.4 The Specifications are those contained in the Project Manual dated as in Subparagraph 8 l 3, and are as follows 
(Either list the Specifications here or refer to an exhibit attached to (his Agreement) 
Section Title Pages 
03300 to I269Q Divisional 
8.1.5 The Drawings are as follows, and are dated unless a different date is shown below 
(Either list the Draw, ings here or refer to an exhibit attached to this Agreement) 
Number Title Date 
See Addendums 
8.1 6 The Addenda, if any, are as follows 
Number Date Pages 
Portions of Addenda relating to bidding requirements are not part of the Contract Documents unless the bidding requirements are 
also enumerated in this Article 8 
8.1.7 Other documents, if any, forming part of the Contract Documents are as follows 
(List here any additional documents that ore intended to form part of the Contract Documents AlA Document A201 1997 provides that bidding requirements 
such as advertisement or invitation to bid Instructions to Bidders sample forms and the Contractor's bid are not part of the Contract Documents unless 
enumerated in this Agreement They should be listed here only if intended to be part of the Contract Documents ) 
As plans and specifications are completed bv Architect and approved bv Owner and Contractor, they will become Addenda \Q 
this Aereement 
This Agreement is entered into as of the day and year first written above and is executed m at least three original copies, of which 
one is to be delivered to the Contractor, one to the Architect for use in the administration of the Contract, and the remainder to the 
Owner 
< ^ 
O W N E R Agndure) C O N T R A C T O R (Signature) 
Guv Hatch, Managing Member Richard Ellsworth, President 
(Printed name and title) (Printed name and title) 
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OWNER / CONTRACTOR RESPONSIBILITY CHECKLIST 
PROJECT NAME . , , . ^ nt _ 
DIVISION 01000- GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 
IDIRECT ON-SITE COSTS 
(Project Manager 
(Project Coordinator 
ISuperintendant 
[General On-Going Cleanup 
j 10 c.y. Dumpster w/ (1) dump/week 
(jobsite- Gas Mileage 
|Truck Lease - Project Manager 
(Truck Lease - Project Supenntendant 
Site Safety 
(Survey & Layoutk 
(Temporary Electric Connection/Distribution 
(Temporary Lighting 
(Temporary Heating 
(Temporary Telephone 
(Temporary Water 
Temporary Toilet 
(Project Sign 
(Barricades (Minimal Density) 
|Contract Documents for Construction 
|As-Built Drawings (Hard Copy) 
Project Manuals (Hard Copy) 1 
[Contractor Field Office & Shed I 
Drinking Water 1 
Office Supplies 
Contractor Office Equipment Rental 1 
1 Owner/Engineer Office 1 
iSmall Tools 
N/A 
VL 
Contractor 
< 
K 
^ 
* 
' * 
< 
* 
<, 
i 
<, 
x 
* 
* 
* 
< 
K 
K 
• 
t 
* 
< 1 
K 
• 
vL I 
t-
Owner 
y -
X. 
1 Other 
y 
[Notes 
A 
Ro44c 
YK4 Qi*><% 
t 
crv^ A-3/4 
1 
[Mobilization 
[Demobilization 
Dust Control 
Final Cleaning 
Punch List 
* 
yL 
* 
i XL 1 
* V\dilAo 6-K -s^te. 
One Time Only | 
1 PERMITS & F E E S 
1 Plan Review Fees 
[Permit Fees 
1 Impact Fees 
Special Fees 
[Conditional Use Fees 
| Water Connection Fees 
|Sewer Connection Fees 
Power Connection Fees 
Gas Connection Fees 
, N/A 
Phone/Data Connection Fees | 
Contractor 
i^-
! ^ ^ 
Owner 
< 
! Other 
^ c ^ 
<, 
A-
t 
I 
< 
< 
< 
sL 
Notes 
:ifA^y"X-pfc~~^T+\A lit 
If Any r ^ K & ^ £7(t. 
If Any / 
If Any 
If Any 
If Any 
If Any 
If Any 
If Any 
If Any 
ILAND 
|Land Availability 
[Easement Changes 
Zoning Changes 
Physical Conditions of I ,and 
Surveying 
Unforeseen Conditions 
Subsurface Conditions 
iCompleie Soils Report 
N/A Confrnc{or 
X 
' Owner 
< 
^ 
< 
••L 
4 
< 
y - __ 
Oilier Noles 
iMx> ^ W \ ^ . mb. 
Any Abnormal Conditions 
BONDS & INSURANCE 
[Payment & Performance Bonds 
Guarantee Bond 
lEnchroachment Bonds 
Misc. Bonds 
Liability Insurance 
< 
A 
< 
< 
>-
Other Notes 
<^,iw2jl 
<£jt fS ti^XUX. 
^^JLLjUi 
^uk^bA 
Builder's Risk Insurance 
|Automobile Insurance 
Worker's Compensation 
Other Insurance sC 
< 
VL 
^ 
ITIME 
Prime of Completion 
[Schedule of Work 
|Changes in scope Impacting Schedule 
[OwTjer delays Impacting Schedule 
1 Weather delays Impacting Schedule 
Acts of God Impacting Schedule 
Liquidated Damages 
Liquidated Bonuses 
X 
* 
X 
< 
X 
N 
A. i 
)C 
< 
_±= 1 
Oil i er Noles 
[Team Decision l ^ x . 6 » A . f ^ 
j j . ..VI Kq 
None ^ £ i _ 6<rA<U^T 
None v/|^_ ( U r y ^ r o ^ | 
[DESIGN 
Design of Contract^ 
Design of Project 
Contract Documents 
Contract Construction Documents 
Acceptance of Design & Construction Docunients 
N/A Contractor 
* 
Owner 
Y-
^ 
sL^ 
Other 
N. 
Nojes 
£jhb oAt<ViuUJL \W^J 
Acceptance by Both ] 
QUALITY CONTROL N/A Conlrnctor Owner Other Notes 
rki^LX <^JJ^> * Submittals 
Shop Drawings 
Quality Control 
Inspections 
Testing Services 
Warranty (1 Year Standard) 
MISC. 
Taxes 
Safety & Protection 
Access to Site 
JL 1~ 
_£• )C_ 
V- %— 
f^e 
By Both") 
W<Jc i&o^t y 
JzL. 
)L 4 
N/A Cont rac to r 
t-
J < ^ 
Owner Other Notes 
Maintain Snow Removal %jtu> 
IWintenzation 
(Dust Control 
[DIVISION 02000- SITE CONSTRUCTION 
Site Clearing 
iDewatering 
|Excavation 
Backfill 
Imported Fill 
1 Exported Fill 
(Fine Grading 
JAsphaltic Concrete 
iFlatwork 
Curbs 
1 Waterways 
Hydrants 
iTrench Excavatiop 
iTrench Pipe Bedding 
[Trench Asphalt Demo & Replace 
(irrigation Systems 
[Parking Appurtenances 
|Landscaping 
DIVISION 03000 CONCRETE 
^Concrete Reinforcement 1 
Spread Footings 1 
Continuous Footings 1 
Foundations J 
Slab on Grade 1 
Elevated Slabs ____ 1 
Miscellaneous Concrete j 
DIVISION 04000- MASONRY [ 
N/A 
N/A 
SL 
N/A j 
< . 
Contractor 
* 
Contractor 
* V. 
^ 
<£ 
V. 1 
VL 
Contractor 
1 VL_ 
\X f] 1 WvMlo JTOUJ\U^ (H 
Owner 
^ 
* 
* 
* 
< -
K 
* 
* 
< 
/ 
< 
< 
* 
,< 
^ 
>c 
< 
yL \ 
1 Other Notes 
ByBoth^^lu^c^Tt 
Owner Other 1 Notes 
Kb J)\W r^yrVc-k-WP' 
Owner Other j Notes 
Masonry Reinforcement 
Ground Face Colored C.M.U. 
Spilt Face Colored CM U. 
Scored Split Face C M U 
< 
, i , 
< 1 
v^  
[DIVISION 05000 METALS 
[Metal Fastening 
[Welding 
[Structural Steel Tubing i 
[Structural Steel Angle 
[Structural Steel Plate 
[Structural Steel Members ^ 
Metal Joists 
[Metal Decking 
|Cold Formed Metal Framing 
iMetal Stairs 
N/A 
Handrails & Railipgs _ _ 1 
Contractor 
1 ^ 
i < 
< 
< 
K 
. . <. . i 
4— 
4^ 
2 k _ _ 
< 1 
i Owner Other 
1 I 
Notes 
[DIVISION 06000 WOOD& PLASTICS 
Plastic Laminate 
Fastening Systems 
Framing Blocking 
Closet/Utility Wood Shelving 
Custom Cabinets 
N/A Contractor 
/ 
NC 
1
 < 
^ 
J 1 
Owner Other Notes 
DIVISION 07000 MOISTURE PROTECTION 
Damproofing _ . 
Waterproofing 
Building Insulation 
Exterior Insulated Finish System 
Vapor Retarders 
Roof Tiles 
Membrane Roofing 
N/A Contractor 
, C-J 
< 1 
1
 < 
V 
t >TH 
\ *_ 1 
Owner Other Notes 
Concrete 1 
[Flashing 
Roof Specialties 
Firestopping 
Joint Sealts 
< i_ 
< 
vC^  
-———-—--—---—---—----—_---_--, , - _ „ 
[DIVISION 08000 DOORS & WINDOWS 
(Metal Doors & Frames 
ICoiling Doors & Grilles 
(Aluminum Framed Storefront 
[Aluminum Windows 
Door Hardware 
Glass 
[Mirrors 
N/A Contractor 
/ 
< 
< 
X Z 
<K 
VL 
Owner Other Notes 
[DIVISION 09000 FINISHES 
|Non-Load Beanng Wall Framing 
(Acoustical Suspension 
IFurring & Lathing 
|Gypsum Board 
lAcoustical Ceilings 
(Wood Composition Flooring 
(Resilient Base & Accessories 
[Resilient Tile Flooring 
Carpet 
[Special Coatings 
Painting & Coating 
N/A 
i 
Contractor 
\f 
YL 
< 
A 
•< 
»C 
* 
-^ 
A. 
< 
Owner 
I ^ I I 
Other 
I 
Notes 
DIVISION 10000 SPECIALTIES 
Visual Display Boards 
Flagpoles 
Identification 
Metal Lockers 
Fire Protection Specialties 
N/A Contractor 
* • 
* 
A 
>c 
1 A 1 
Owner Other No_[es 
lfDesired 
If Desired 
Signage 
Postal Specialties . 
Accordion Folding Partition 
iStorage Shelving 
Telephone Specialties 
Toilet & Bath Accessories 
Wardrobe & Closet Specialties 
k__ 
£ 1 
i \L_ 
*K 
A 
\JL>^ vA((li^ 
IfDbired^y^ A\f,^ 
(IxnJJtoCOc ^ U A 
If Desired | 
[DIVISION 11000 EQUIPMENT 
iTheater & Stage Equipment 
[Mercantile Equipment 
lAudio-Visual Equipment 
jFood Service Equipment 
Residential Equipment 
Athletic Equipment 
N/A 
*c 
A 
A 
A 
< 
S(, 1 
Conjractojr Owner Other Notes 
If Desired 
If Desired ' 
If Desired | 
If Desired | 
DIVISION 12000 FURNISHINGS 
Manufactured Casework 
iFurnishings Accessories 
Floor Mats & Frames 
iBIinds & Shades 
Curtains & Drapes 
Office Furniture 
Seating 
Interior Plants & Planters 
N/A 
_ & -, 
* , _ 
^ 
^ 
)L 
Contractor 
vC 
A 
NL 
Owner Other Notes 
\U^. ^UUN-
] V •--
Upper Bleachei by Conlr. 1 
DIVISION 13000 SPECIAL CONSTRUCTION 
Swimming Pools 
hazardous Material Remediation 
.Security & Surveillance 
Detection & Alarm 
N/A 
< 
& 
A 
A 
Cojllrn_cto_r Owner Other N_oj_cs 
If Desired 
Soils Remediation 
If Desired 
If Desired 'yJL^ ^ flU^ 
p - \\»™ 
DIVISION 14000 CONVEYING SYSTEMS 
i Elevators 
N/A Contractor 1 T-1 Owner 
Other n°_tcs 
Standaid 
(DIVISION 15000 MECHANICAL 
(Piping Systems 
Valves 
(Piping Appurtenances 
|Pipe Supports 
|Plumbing Fixtures 
iMechanical Insulation 
fllydronics 
HVAC 
[Controls 
[Testing & Balancing 
Exhaust Systems 
Fire Protection 
Coordination with other Divisions 
N/A Contractor 
K 3r 
^ 
K 
< 
<L_ 
* i 
._ _1_ i 1 
< 
Y: 
* 1 
Owner Other Notes 
*A 1 1 1 I 
1 DIVISION 16000 ELECTRICAL 
(Electrical Service & Distribution 
(Lighting 
(Communications 
Sound 
(Video 
|Power Generation 
[Special Systems 
[Power to Panel 
Fire Alarm System 
ilransformcrs 
Testing 
Coordination with other Divisions 
N/A 
< 
* 
/ X-
Contractor 
< . 
< 
* 
-U 
y^. 
VC 
*- 1 
Owner 
* 
> 
s£ 
Other Notes 
Standard Requirements 
Building Only 
Conduit Only ] 
None ] 
None ] 
None 1 
None J 
Coordination &, Fees | 
Standard Grade £ f o - ^\#A/H 
If needed for Connection 
— " • • — i 
^ A - ^ ^ °\- \<\svav 
^^Wir^S?7" "^L^ \U(L - e^ie^ 4 ^ U _ 
